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 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2) and 27, Appellant Kim Davis (“Davis”) 
hereby moves this Court, on an emergency basis, for a stay pending appeal of the 
district court’s August 12, 2015 order (D.E. 43)1 (hereinafter the “Injunction”). 
INTRODUCTION 
The Injunction enjoins Davis, the County Clerk for Rowan County, Kentucky, 
to immediately authorize and issue under her name marriage licenses to the same-
sex couples named in this lawsuit, in derogation of her conscience and religious 
liberty. Despite acknowledging that this case presents a constitutional “conflict” and 
“debate” between implicit and explicit rights, the district court has refused to grant 
Davis a stay of the Injunction pending appeal, electing instead to grant a temporary 
stay that expires on August 31, 2015. As it has already done in prior precedential 
marriage cases, this Court should grant an immediate stay of the Injunction. 
A same-sex “marriage” (“SSM”) license issued on Davis’ authorization and 
bearing her name and imprimatur substantially and irreparably burdens Davis’ 
conscience and deeply-held, sincere religious beliefs, which dictate to Davis that 
such unions are not and cannot be “marriage.” That searing act of personal validation 
would forever echo in her conscience—and, if it happened, there is no absolution or 
correction that any earthly court can provide to rectify it. A stay of the Injunction 
will halt the irreversible implications on Davis’ conscience while this Court reviews 
                                                          
1  Citations to the district court record are indicated by this format: “D.E. __.” 
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Davis’ appeal and the multiple less restrictive alternatives available that do not 
substantially burden Davis (or the Plaintiffs). 
This case is a matter of first impression, left unaddressed following the 
nascent Obergefell v. Hodges. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Over against its redefinition 
of marriage, Obergefell unanimously held that First Amendment protections for 
religious persons remain despite same-sex “marriage.” The district court has 
acknowledged that “this civil action” presents a constitutional “debate,” “tension,” 
and “conflict” between “two individual liberties held sacrosanct in American 
jurisprudence.”2 In the district court’s view, Plaintiffs’ rights trump Davis’ religious 
rights. But, unlike Plaintiffs, Davis’ individual liberties are enumerated (not 
emanations) in the United States and Kentucky Constitutions and the Kentucky 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and, moreover, they are natural liberties tied to 
religious beliefs that are measured in millennia (not weeks). Such rights deserve a 
full hearing in this Court. In light of the foregoing, this Court should stay the 
Injunction pending final resolution of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 On July 2, 2015, less than one week after the Supreme Court decided 
Obergefell v. Hodges and the Kentucky Governor issued a directive ordering all 
                                                          
2  Justice Thomas expressly predicted this “inevitable” conflict as individuals 
“are confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between 
same-sex couples.” Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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county clerks to personally authorize SSM licenses (the “SSM Mandate”), Plaintiffs 
filed this lawsuit demanding that a particular person (Davis) in a particular county 
(Rowan County) authorize and approve their Kentucky marriage licenses, despite 
widespread availability of licenses and Davis’ undisputed religious conscience 
objection to SSM.3 See D.E. 1. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary 
injunction to bar Davis from “refusing to issue marriage licenses to any future 
marriage license applications submitted by the Named Plaintiffs.” See D.E. 2-2. 
Evidentiary hearings on this motion were held in Ashland, Kentucky (60 miles from 
the Rowan County clerk’s office), and in Covington, Kentucky (100 miles away), 
which were attended by multiple named Plaintiffs. See D.E. 21, 26.4 
On August 4, 2015, Davis filed a verified third-party Complaint against 
Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky (“Gov. Beshear”), the issuer of the SSM 
Mandate, and Wayne Onkst, Commissioner of Kentucky Department for Libraries 
and Archives, the state agency responsible for designing Kentucky marriage license 
forms. See D.E. 34 (attached hereto as Exhibit “F”).5 On August 7, 2015, Davis filed 
                                                          
3  Expressly to avoid disparate treatment of any couple, Davis discontinued the 
issuance of all marriage licenses after Obergefell. Two plaintiff couples are different 
sex couples, to whom Davis has no religious objection to issuing marriage licenses. 
4  A copy of the July 13, 2015 and July 20, 2015 hearing transcripts are attached 
hereto as Exhibits “D” and “E,” respectively.  
5  On that same day, Davis filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its 
entirety. See D.E. 32. 
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a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of Gov. Beshear’s SSM 
Mandate and obtain an exemption “from having to authorize the issuance of 
Kentucky marriage licenses.” See D.E. 39-7. The grounds on which Davis seeks 
relief from Gov. Beshear are intertwined with the grounds on which she opposed 
Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction against her. See D.E. 29, 39-1. Notwithstanding, 
the district court entered its Injunction, rather than considering Davis’ and Plaintiffs’ 
requests together and allowing Davis to develop a further evidentiary record on her 
own request for individual accommodation from Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate. 
 The Injunction enjoins Davis “from applying her ‘no marriage licenses’ policy 
to future marriage license requests submitted by Plaintiffs.” See D.E. 43 at 28 
(attached hereto as Exhibit “B”). The district court stated that “this civil action 
presents a conflict between two individual liberties held sacrosanct in American 
jurisprudence,” thereby conceding that Davis’ religious rights are, in fact, being both 
“threaten[ed]” and “infringe[d]” by Plaintiffs’ demands for her approval of their 
proposed unions, and by Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate to provide exactly that or 
resign. Id. at 2. Notwithstanding, without giving full consideration to Davis’ own 
motion for injunctive relief and further development of an evidentiary record, the 
district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. 
 Even though Plaintiffs indisputably are able to obtain a Kentucky marriage 
license from more than 130 marriage licensing locations, including all nearby and 
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surrounding counties, the district court held that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on 
the merits of their purported right to marry claims and were being irreparably 
harmed. See id. at 9-16. In reaching this decision, however, the district court 
considered “other Rowan County residents” not before the court on the Plaintiffs’ 
motion (which was limited exclusively to the named Plaintiffs) and speculated about 
religious accommodation requests that might be made at unspecified times in the 
future by other county clerks also not before the court. Id. at 12.  
 The district court also rejected Davis’ claims under the Kentucky Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (“Kentucky RFRA”), KY. REV. STAT. § 446.350, the Free 
Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Religious Test Clause of the United 
States Constitution, and similar Kentucky Constitution provisions. See D.E. 43 at 
16-28. In rejecting Davis’ religious liberty, conscience, and speech claims, the 
district court incorrectly concluded that the Kentucky marriage license form “does 
not require the county clerk to condone or endorse same-sex marriage” and instead 
merely “asks the county clerk to certify that the information provided is accurate and 
that the couple is qualified to marry under Kentucky law.”6 According to the district 
                                                          
6  See D.E. 43 at 22; see also id. at 25 (“[T]he act of issuing a marriage license 
to a same-sex couple merely signifies that the couple has met the legal requirements 
to marry. It is not a sign of moral or religious approval.”) (emphasis in original); id. 
at 27 (“Davis is simply being asked to signify that couples meet the legal 
requirements to marry. The State is not asking her to condone same-sex unions on 
moral or religious grounds, nor is it restricting her from engaging in a variety of 
religious activities.”). 
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court, the burden on Davis’ religious freedom is “more slight,” and she “remains 
free to practice her Apostolic Christian beliefs” since she “may continue to attend 
church twice a week, participate in Bible Study and minister to female inmates at 
the Rowan County jail,” and “believe that marriage is a union between one man and 
one woman.” Id. at 27. But, according to the district court, “her religious convictions 
cannot excuse her” from authorizing SSM licenses. See id. at 27-28. Facing an order 
enjoining her to authorize Kentucky marriage licenses in derogation of her religious 
conscience, Davis filed an immediate notice of appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a), see D.E. 44 (attached hereto as Exhibit “A”), and a motion to stay 
pending appeal or, in the alternative, to grant a temporary stay so that Davis may 
promptly apply to this Court for a stay pending appeal, see D.E. 45. 
On August 17, 2015, the district court denied Davis’ motion to stay the 
Injunction pending appeal, but granted a temporary stay pending this Court’s review 
of a similar request. See D.E. 52 (attached hereto as Exhibit “C”). In denying this 
stay request for the same reasons it granted a preliminary injunction, the district court 
nonetheless recognized (again) that “constitutional issues” are involved in this 
dispute and reiterated that a constitutional “debate” is present in the case at bar and 
therefore granted a temporary stay instead. Id. at 1, 7. On August 19, 2015, the 
district court ordered that its temporary stay will expire August 31, 2015 absent 
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a contrary Order from this Court. See D.E. 55 (attached hereto as Exhibit “G”). 
Davis now moves this Court to stay the Injunction pending her appeal to this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
In deciding a motion for stay pending appeal, this Court balances the same 
four factors that are traditionally considered in evaluating a motion for preliminary 
injunction: “(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the 
merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably 
harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be harmed if the court grants 
the stay; and (4) the public interest in granting the stay.” Mich. Coal. of Radioactive 
Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991). 
In prior marriage cases arising from Sixth Circuit district courts, this Court 
consistently entered stays pending a full appeal on the merits. For instance, in April 
DeBoer, et al. v. Richard Snyder, et al., No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014), Judges 
Rogers and White, joined by Eastern District of Kentucky Judge Caldwell, granted 
an emergency motion to stay pending an appeal of the Eastern District of Michigan’s 
marriage decision in that case. In Valeria Tanco, et al. v. William Haslam, et al., No. 
14-5297 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2014), Judges Guy and Clay, joined by Eastern District 
of Kentucky Judge Bertelsman, overturned the Middle District of Tennessee’s 
refusal to grant a stay pending an appeal of the district court’s marriage decision. 
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 Not long before this Court entered the above rulings, Western District of 
Kentucky Judge Heyburn in Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 
2014), granted a stay of his opinion invalidating Kentucky’s democratically-
approved and constitutionally-enacted natural definition of marriage, stating:  
Perhaps it is difficult for Plaintiffs to understand how 
rights won can be delayed. It is a truth that our judicial 
system can act with stunning quickness, as this Court has; 
and then with sometimes maddening slowness. One judge 
may decide a case, but ultimately others have a final say. 
It is the entire process, however, which gives our judicial 
system and our judges such high credibility and 
acceptance. This is the way of our Constitution. 
Id. at 558. That conclusion is only further warranted on this appeal, to a court with 
“final say” on the Constitutional “conflict” engendered herein. 
In the foregoing marriage cases, the stays entered preserved natural marriage 
laws upheld by this Court in DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), and 
absolutely barred same-sex couples from obtaining marriage licenses (or having 
marriage licenses recognized) until appeals were resolved. But here, the named 
Plaintiffs can indisputably obtain a Kentucky marriage license even with this Court’s 
stay of the Injunction pending appeal, from more than 130 marriage licensing 
locations spread throughout Kentucky. Without dispute, nothing physically or 
economically prevents these named Plaintiffs from obtaining a marriage license 
from any of these locations. Moreover, Davis’ claims are based upon enumerated 
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and individual Constitutional and statutory rights and protections that she holds as a 
person, which predate and survive Obergefell. 
I. Davis has a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of her appeal to 
warrant an immediate stay.         
To support a motion for stay pending appeal, the moving party “need not 
always establish a high probability of success on the merits.” Mich. Coal., 945 F.2d 
at 153; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 247 F.3d 631, 632-33 (6th Cir. 2001). Instead, 
“[t]he probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to 
the amount of irreparable injury [the moving party] will suffer absent the say. Simply 
stated, more of one excuses less of the other.” Mich. Coal., 945 F.2d at 153 (internal 
citation omitted). In other words, “a stay may be granted with either a high 
probability of success and some injury or vice versa.” State of Ohio v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 812 F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir. 1987). The moving party must still 
show “more than the mere ‘possibility’ of success on the merits,” which can be done 
by identifying “serious questions going to the merits.” Mich. Coal., 945 F.2d at 153-
54 (internal quotations omitted). Critically, Davis “can satisfy this element where 
substantial legal questions or matters of first impression are at issue and the equities 
favor maintaining the status quo.” See, e.g., Simon Prop. Group, Inc. v. Taubman 
Ctrs., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 794, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2003); see also United States v. 
Coffman, No. 09-181, 2010 WL 4683761, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 12, 2010) (granting 
motion to stay pending appeal after finding that “this case will present the Sixth 
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Circuit with an issue of first impression”). Thus, to grant a stay, this Court need not 
conclude, at this point, that the district court was wrong on the merits. Instead, this 
Court need only conclude that this case raises “serious questions” going to the 
merits, or a matter of first impression, left unanswered by Obergefell—which did 
not overturn the First Amendment or overwrite other religious liberty protections. 
This case presents substantial legal matters of first impression for this (or any 
other) federal appeals court following Obergefell. As the district court concluded, 
this case presents a constitutional “debate,” “conflict,” and “tension” between “two 
individual liberties held sacrosanct in American jurisprudence”—one enumerated 
and express (Davis’ religious freedom), and the other unenumerated (right to marry). 
See D.E. 43 at 2, 16; D.E. 52 at 1 (reiterating the existence of a constitutional 
“debate”); see also, e.g., D.E. 21, Hr’g Tr. (7/13/15), at 84:3-4, 85:20-22, 98:19-22, 
99:19-21, 103:15-18, 104:8-9 (prior statements from district court acknowledging 
that Davis’ fundamental rights are implicated in this case). The district court has now 
rendered a decision on the constitutional “debate” at issue—but that answer should 
not be forced upon Davis until her appeal is finally resolved. To ensure Davis’ 
fundamental and “sacrosanct” rights remain protected while this Court resolves the 
“conflict” identified (but wrongly decided) by the district court, a stay of the 
Injunction pending appeal is appropriate. This conclusion is only further compelled 
here, where Davis’ own motion for injunctive relief—specifically requesting an 
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accommodation from the SSM Mandate and a preliminary exemption “from having 
to authorize the issuance of Kentucky marriage licenses” (see D.E. 39-7)—was 
pending (but not decided) when the district court issued its Injunction. 
Moreover, as will be further addressed in Davis’ subsequent appellate filings, 
Davis’ inability to authorize and approve SSM licenses bearing her imprimatur 
against her religious conscience is protected by the United States and Kentucky 
Constitutions, along with the Kentucky RFRA. See U.S. CONST., amend I; KY. 
CONST., §§ 1, 5; KY. REV. STAT. § 446.350. The Kentucky RFRA protects a person’s 
“right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious 
belief,” and this religious freedom right “may not be substantially burdened unless 
the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has a compelling 
governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the 
least restrictive means to further that interest.” KY. REV. STAT. § 446.350; see also 
Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 427 (6th Cir. 2002) (Free Exercise 
Clause “protects not only the right to hold a particular religious belief, but also the 
right to engage in conduct motivated by that belief.”).7 As such, the Kentucky RFRA 
protects not only a person’s beliefs but also a person’s actions (or non-actions) based 
                                                          
7  Because Davis’ free exercise claim is combined with a free speech claim, her 
free exercise claim is also subject to strict scrutiny. See Employment Div., Dep’t of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
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thereon, and subjugates to the strictest scrutiny any governmental action infringing 
religiously-motivated actions (or non-actions).  
The Kentucky RFRA is similar to (but goes even further in protecting 
religious liberties than) the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“Federal 
RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) & (b), which was enacted to “provide very broad 
protection for religious liberty,” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 
2751, 2760 (2014), and imposes “the most demanding test known to constitutional 
law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). Thus, Gov. Beshear’s SSM 
Mandate—the state action here—must survive strict scrutiny, which the district 
court acknowledged but failed to apply. See D.E. 43 at 18, 27. 
Although the district court concluded that the burden on Davis is “more 
slight,” see D.E. 43 at 27, that conclusion is out-of-step with Supreme Court 
precedent analyzing substantial burdens on religious freedom under the analogous 
Federal RFRA, and also reaches a different result than a proposed Kentucky 
legislative act on what constitutes a substantial burden post-Obergefell.8 The 
prescribed form under Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate provided no opportunity for 
the religious objector Davis not to participate in endorsement and approval of SSM. 
                                                          
8  This bill would expressly protect clerks like Davis from having to issue SSM 
licenses, amending the Kentucky RFRA to state expressly that “[i]ssuing or 
recording” a SSM license can be considered a “substantial burden for which there is 
no compelling government interest.” See D.E. 39-6, An Act Relating to Marriage, 
Ky. House Bill 101 (2016 Reg. Sess.). 
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Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the “authorization” or permission to 
marry unmistakably comes from Davis. Davis is also required to put her name 
and imprimatur no less than two times on each and every marriage license she 
issues. But Davis cannot authorize a union of two persons which, in her sincerely-
held belief, is not marriage.9 In concluding that the act of issuing SSM licenses 
would not severely burden Davis’ religious convictions because such act would not 
implicate moral or religious approval of SSM, the district court essentially told Davis 
what her religious convictions should be, instead of recognizing the undisputed fact 
of what her religious convictions actually are, and that those convictions 
unmistakably bar her from issuing SSM licenses with her name plastered on them.10 
Under the required strict scrutiny analysis, only a compelling governmental 
interest—in infringing upon Davis’ inability to authorize and approve SSM 
licenses—which is “beyond broadly formulated interests” and shows harm in 
granting a “specific exemption” to this “particular religious claimant” will suffice. 
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirata Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
                                                          
9  See D.E. 26, Hr’g Tr. (7/20/15), Davis Direct, at 31:7-14, 32:4-7, 38:9-17, 
40:24-41:3, 41:24-42:1, 42:17-20 (“Because if I say that I authorize that, I’m saying 
I agree with it, and I can’t.”); id. at 43:2-5; Hr’g Tr. (7/20/15), Davis Cross, at 61:15-
19, 62:10-12 (“[M]y religious beliefs can’t condone issuing and being a party to the 
issuance of same-sex marriage licenses.”), 67:5-7; id., Davis Redirect, 75:16-19, 
80:16-18; see also id., Blevins Cross, at 17:3-6 (“[Davis] did tell me early on, before 
the decision was made, that if it was to allow same-sex marriage that she could not 
do that in her moral judgment. She just could not do it.”). 
10  See note 9, supra. 
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430-31 (2006). But even if this showing can be made, the infringement upon Davis 
must still satisfy the “exceptionally demanding” least-restrictive-means standard. 
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2780. This test may “require the Government to 
expend additional funds” to accommodate “religious beliefs.” Hobby Lobby, 134 
S.Ct. at 2781. In this matter, even if the “desired goal” is providing Plaintiffs with 
Kentucky marriage licenses in Rowan County11, see Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 
2780, numerous less restrictive means are available to accomplish it without 
substantially burdening Davis’ religious freedom and conscience, such as: 
 Providing an opt-out or exemption to the Kentucky marriage licensing 
scheme (as exists for the Kentucky fish and wildlife licensing scheme), 
KY. REV. STAT. § 150.195, and as other states, such as North Carolina 
have enacted, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. 51-5.5; 
 
 Deputizing a neighboring county clerk (or some other person) to issue 
Kentucky marriage licenses in Rowan County; 
 
 Modifying the prescribed Kentucky marriage license form to remove 
the multiple references to Davis’ name, and thus to remove the personal 
nature of the authorization that Davis must provide on the current form; 
 
 Deeming Davis “absent” for purposes of issuing SSM licenses, based 
upon her moral and religious inability to issue them, and allowing those 
licenses to be issued by the chief executive of Rowan County, as 
specifically authorized by Kentucky law, see KY. REV. STAT. § 
402.240; 
 
 Distributing Kentucky marriage licenses at the state-level through an 
online or other state-wide licensing scheme; or 
                                                          
11  Nothing in Obergefell suggests that Plaintiffs have a fundamental right to 
receive a marriage license from a particular clerk, in a particular county.  
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 Calling a special legislative session to address Kentucky’s entire 
marriage licensing scheme post-Obergefell. 
All of the foregoing options, and others, are available to avoid substantially 
burdening Davis’ personal religious freedom in the wake of the redefinition of 
marriage in Obergefell. The nature of Davis’ religious objection is more firmly 
established in history than perhaps any other religious conscience objection because 
the “meaning of marriage” as a union between one man and one woman “has 
persisted in every culture,” “has formed the basis of human society for millennia,” 
and has singularly “prevailed in the United States throughout our history.” 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612-13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In fact, the majority in 
Obergefell conceded that the institution of marriage as exclusively a union between 
a man and a woman “has existed for millennia and across civilizations” and this view 
“long has been held—and continues to be held—in good faith by reasonable and 
sincere people here and throughout the world.” Id. at 2594 (Kennedy, J., 
majority) (emphasis added). Thus, although the traditional view of marriage was 
discarded by the majority in Obergefell, that long-held view of marriage provides 
the historical underpinnings for a religious exemption and accommodation from the 
redefinition of marriage under the First Amendment and Kentucky RFRA. 
The mandate commanding Davis to affix her name to SSM licenses also 
violates her fundamental free speech rights protected by the United States and 
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Kentucky Constitutions. The Free Speech Clause protects “both what to say and 
what not to say,” Riley v. Nat’l Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 
(1988) (emphasis added), and states may not “force[] an individual, as part of [their] 
daily life” to “be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point 
of view [he/she] finds unacceptable.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1976). 
The Kentucky marriage form uses the word “marriage” at six different places on the 
form (not including the reference to “join[ing] together in the state of matrimony”), 
twice designates Davis as the person authorizing the marriage license, and requires 
the stamping of her name and endorsement on the proposed union. See KY. REV. 
STAT. § 402.100(3). For Gov. Beshear to state that Kentucky is issuing and 
recognizing SSM licenses is one thing. But commanding Davis to be an “instrument” 
for a message, view, and proposed union that she finds “morally objectionable” and 
“repugnant to [her] moral and religious beliefs” is altogether different, and violates 
not only her conscience, but also her free speech rights. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707. 
Further, compelling Davis to authorize marriages against her sincerely held 
religious beliefs about marriage constitutes an improper religious test for holding (or 
maintaining) public office. Davis is being arm-twisted to either participate in the 
issuance of SSM licenses (her conscience be damned) or resign, since holding public 
office is her choice (her livelihood, qualifications, and public service be damned). 
But the fact “that a person is not compelled to hold office” is not an excuse for Gov. 
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Beshear to impose constitutionally-forbidden, conscience-violating criteria for 
office. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961). Like a non-combatant 
whose “religious scruples” prevent him from shouldering a rifle, Davis may still 
“faithfully and devotedly” serve her county without approving SSM licenses. See 
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 64 (1946). 
II. Davis is more harmed than Plaintiffs absent a stay pending appeal. 
In weighing the harm that will occur as a result of granting or denying a stay, 
this Court generally considers three factors: “(1) the substantiality of the injury 
alleged; (2) the likelihood of its occurrence; and (3) the adequacy of the proof 
provided.” Mich. Coal., 945 F.2d at 154. The “key word” in this consideration is 
“irreparable,” and the harm must be “both certain and immediate, rather than 
speculative or theoretical.” Id. The impending harm to Davis satisfies this standard, 
and outweighs any purported harm to Plaintiffs. 
Nothing is physically or economically preventing the named Plaintiffs in this 
case from obtaining a marriage license elsewhere in Kentucky. As a matter of 
Kentucky law, individuals may obtain a marriage license from the county clerk in 
any one of Kentucky’s 120 counties (and the more than 130 marriage licensing 
locations), irrespective of their county of residence. See KY. REV. STAT. § 402.080. 
Plaintiffs concede they can obtain Kentucky marriage licenses in another county and 
from someone other than Davis. They simply chose (and choose) not to. As such, 
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Plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable and irreversible injury if resolution is postponed 
to await this Court’s decision on the merits. This conclusion comports with the stay 
orders pending appeal entered by this Court in DeBoer and Tanco, and by Western 
District of Kentucky Judge Heyburn in Bourke. But, since those stay orders 
prohibited the issuance of SSM licenses or recognition of same-sex “marriage” in 
their entirety, the potential purported harm to Plaintiffs here is far less. 
In stark contrast, Davis faces significant, irrevocable, and irreversible harm if 
she is forced to authorize and approve even one SSM license with her name on it, 
against her religious conscience, for “it is well-settled that ‘loss of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable 
injury.’” Connection Distributing Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). If such rights “are not jealously 
safeguarded, persons will be deterred, even if imperceptibly, from exercising those 
rights in the future.” Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 378 (6th Cir. 1989). 
There is no “adequate compensatory or other corrective relief” that “will be 
available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation” (including a permanent 
injunction in her favor) if Davis is forced to violate her religious conscience now. 
See Mich. Coal., 945 F.2d at 153. It is comparable to forcing the religious objecting 
nurse to perform an abortion, the religious objecting company or non-profit to pay 
for abortions or abortion-related insurance coverage, the religious objecting non-
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combatant to fire on an enemy soldier, or the religious objecting state official to 
participate in or attend the execution of a convicted prisoner. Ordering Davis to 
authorize and approve a SSM license is the act that violates her conscience and 
substantially burdens her religious freedom – an act which cannot be undone. 
Importantly, Davis is not claiming a substantial burden on her religious freedom if 
someone else authorizes and approves a SSM license devoid of her name. 
Finally, the harm to Davis is not speculative but imminent. The searing act of 
her conscience is authorizing a SSM license bearing her imprimatur (see, e.g., D.E. 
29 at 14-15, 18-20; D.E. 39-1 at 15-18, 21-25); Plaintiffs insist on having no one 
other than Davis approve their proposed union (see D.E. 21, Hr’g Tr. (7/13/15), 
Miller Direct, at 29:9-12; id., Spartman Direct, at 47:8-10; D.E. 46, 46-2); and the 
district court has ordered Davis to approve SSM licenses (see D.E. 43). This 
impending harm to Davis’ conscience outweighs any travel inconveniences on 
Plaintiffs, who can obtain (or could have already obtained) a marriage license from 
more than 130 licensing locations across Kentucky while the appeal is pending. 
III. The public interest favors granting a stay. 
When it comes to the “protection of First Amendment liberties,” the public 
has a “significant interest.” Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher, 
70 F.3d 1474, 1490 (6th Cir. 1995). Moreover, the Injunction significantly changes 
the relative position of the parties and, in fact, completely alters (prematurely) the 
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status quo existing between the parties at a time when there is ongoing public debate 
in Kentucky between the SSM Mandate and religious liberty. See S. Milk Sales, Inc. 
v. Martin, 924 F.2d 98, 102 (6th Cir. 1991) (an essential purpose of a preliminary 
injunction is “to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits 
can be held”) (citation omitted). This Court will have a chance to review the district 
court’s constitutional and statutory determinations. To ensure that Davis’ conscience 
and rights are not forever and irreversibly violated, this Court should stay the 
Injunction pending appeal. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Appellant Kim Davis respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant 
immediate consideration and (2) enter an order staying the district court’s August 
12, 2015 order pending final resolution of the appeal in this Court. 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
ASHLAND DIVISION 
 
APRIL MILLER, ET AL., 
 
  Plaintiffs, 
 
 v. 
 
KIM DAVIS, ET AL., 
 
  Defendants. 
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: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
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CIVIL ACTION 
 
0:15-CV-00044-DLB 
 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
DAVID L. BUNNING 
 
KIM DAVIS, 
 
  Third-Party Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
STEVEN L. BESHEAR, in his official 
capacity as Governor of Kentucky, and 
WAYNE ONKST, in his official capacity 
as State Librarian and Commissioner, 
Kentucky Department for Libraries and 
Archives, 
 
  Third-Party Defendants. 
 
 
: 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
       
 Notice is hereby given that Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Kim Davis (“Davis”), by and 
through her undersigned counsel, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit from the August 12, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (D.E. 43). 
 A copy of the August 12, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order from which Davis appeals 
is attached hereto as Exhibit “A.” 
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 Davis has paid by ECF online payment in the amount of $505.00 for the notice of appeal 
fee specified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky’s Fee 
Schedule. 
 The parties to the order appealed from and the names and addresses of their attorneys are 
as follows: 
 Plaintiffs: April Miller, Karen Ann Roberts, Shantel Burke, Stephen Napier, Jody 
Fernandez, Kevin Holloway, L. Aaron Skaggs, and Barry Spartman 
 Attorneys for Plaintiffs:  
Daniel J. Canon 
L. Joe Dunman 
Laura E. Landenwich 
CLAY DANIEL WALTON ADAMS, PLC 
462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101 
Louisville, KY 40202 
 
William Ellis Sharp 
ACLU OF KENTUCKY 
315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300 
Louisville, KY 40202 
 
 Defendant: Rowan County 
 Attorneys for Rowan County:  
Jeffrey C. Mando 
Claire Parsons 
ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & DUSING, PLLC 
40 West Pike Street 
Covington, KY 41011 
 
 Third-Party Defendants: Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky and Wayne Onkst, 
Commissioner of Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives 
 Attorneys for Gov. Beshear and Commr. Onkst:  
 No appearances have yet been filed. 
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       Attorneys for Rowan County 
William Ellis Sharp 
ACLU OF KENTUCKY 
315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300 
Louisville, KY 40202 
sharp@aclu-ky.org 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
 
 I also hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing will be sent via 
U.S.P.S. first class mail to the Attorney General of Kentucky on behalf of Third-Party Defendants 
Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky, and Wayne Onkst, Commissioner of the Kentucky 
Department for Libraries and Archives, at the following location: 
Attorney General Jack Conway 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
700 Capitol Avenue, Suite 118 
Frankfort, KY 40601-3449 
 
 
DATED: August 12, 2015    /s/ Jonathan D. Christman_______ 
       Jonathan D. Christman 
Attorney for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff 
Kim Davis 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT ASHLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-44-DLB
APRIL MILLER, et al.  PLAINTIFFS
vs.     MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KIM DAVIS, individually and in her official capacity, et al.          DEFENDANTS
***********************
I. Introduction
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc.
# 2).  Plaintiffs are two same-sex and two opposite-sex couples seeking to enjoin Rowan
County Clerk Kim Davis from enforcing her own marriage licensing policy.  On June 26,
2015, just hours after the U.S. Supreme Court held that states are constitutionally required
to recognize same-sex marriage, Davis announced that the Rowan County Clerk’s Office
would no longer issue marriage licenses to any couples.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  Davis, an Apostolic Christian with a sincere religious objection to
same-sex marriage, specifically sought to avoid issuing licenses to same-sex couples
without discriminating against them.  Plaintiffs now allege that this “no marriage licenses”
policy substantially interferes with their right to marry because it effectively forecloses them
from obtaining a license in their home county.  Davis insists that her policy poses only an
incidental burden on Plaintiffs’ right to marry, which is justified by the need to protect her
own free exercise rights.
1
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The Court held preliminary injunction hearings on July 13, 2015 and July 20, 2015. 
Plaintiffs April Miller, Karen Roberts, Jody Fernandez, Kevin Holloway, Barry Spartman,
Aaron Skaggs, Shantel Burke and Stephen Napier were represented by William Sharp of
the Americans for Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and Daniel Canon.  Jonathan Christman
and Roger Gannam, both of the Liberty Counsel, and A.C. Donahue appeared on behalf
of Defendant Kim Davis.  Rowan County Attorney Cecil Watkins and Jeff Mando
represented Defendant Rowan County.  Official Court Reporters Peggy Weber and Lisa
Wiesman recorded the proceedings.  At the conclusion of the second hearing, the Court
submitted the Motion pending receipt of the parties’ response and reply briefs.  The Court
having received those filings (Docs. # 28, 29 and 36), this matter is now ripe for review. 
At its core, this civil action presents a conflict between two individual liberties held
sacrosanct in American jurisprudence.  One is the fundamental right to marry implicitly
recognized in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The other is the
right to free exercise of religion explicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment.  Each party
seeks to exercise one of these rights, but in doing so, they threaten to infringe upon the
opposing party’s rights.  The tension between these constitutional concerns can be
resolved by answering one simple question: Does the Free Exercise Clause likely excuse
Kim Davis from issuing marriage licenses because she has a religious objection to same-
sex marriage?  For reasons stated herein, the Court answers this question in the negative.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs April Miller and Karen Roberts have been in a committed same-sex
relationship for eleven years.  (Doc. # 21 at 25).  After hearing about the Obergefell
decision, they went to the Rowan County Clerk’s Office and requested a marriage license
2
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from one of the deputy clerks.  (Id. at 25-26).  The clerk immediately excused herself and
went to speak with Kim Davis.  (Id. at 28).  When she returned, she informed the couple
that the Rowan County Clerk’s Office was not issuing any marriage licenses.  (Id.). 
Plaintiffs Kevin Holloway and Jody Fernandez, a committed opposite-sex couple, had a
similar experience when they tried to obtain a marriage license from the Rowan County
Clerk’s Office.  (Id. at 36).
Both couples went straight to Rowan County Judge Executive Walter Blevins and
asked him to issue their marriage licenses.  (Id. at 30-32, 36).  Blevins explained that,
under Kentucky law, a county judge executive can only issue licenses when the elected
county clerk is absent.  See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.240.  Because Davis continued to
perform her other duties as Rowan County Clerk, Blevins concluded that she was not
“absent” within the meaning of the statute.  (Id.).  Therefore, he did not believe that he had
the authority to issue their marriage licenses.  (Id.).
Plaintiffs Barry Spartman and Aaron Skaggs also planned to solemnize their long-
term relationship post-Obergefell.  (Id. at 42-44).  Before going to the Rowan County
Clerk’s Office, they phoned ahead and asked for information about the marriage licensing
process.  (Id.).  They wanted to make sure that they brought all necessary documentation
with them.  (Id.).  One of the deputy clerks told the couple “not to bother coming down”
because they would not be issued a license.  (Id.).
Seven neighboring counties (Bath, Fleming, Lewis, Carter, Elliott, Morgan and
Menifee) are currently issuing marriage licenses.  (Doc. # 26 at 53).  All are less than an
hour away from the Rowan County seat of Morehead.  (Id.).  While Plaintiffs have the
means to travel to any one of these counties, they have admittedly chosen not to do so. 
3
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(Doc. # 21 at 38, 48).  They strongly prefer to have their licenses issued in Rowan County
because they have significant ties to that community.  (Id. at 28-29, 47).  They live, work,
socialize, vote, pay taxes and conduct other business in and around Morehead.  (Id.). 
Quite simply, Rowan County is their home.
According to Kim Davis, the Rowan County Clerk’s Office serves as a “pass through
collection agency” for the State of Kentucky.  (Doc. # 26 at 24-25).  She and her six deputy
clerks regularly handle delinquent taxes, oversee elections, manage voter registration and
issue hunting and fishing licenses.  (Id.).  A portion of the fees collected in exchange for
these services is used to fund the Office’s activities throughout the year.  (Id.).  The
remainder is remitted to the State.  (Id.).
Under Kentucky law, county clerks are also responsible for issuing marriage
licenses.1  See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.080.  The process is quite simple.  The couple
must first go to the county clerk’s office and provide their biographical information to one
of the clerks.  See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.100.  The clerk then enters the information into
a computer-generated form, prints it and signs it.  Id.  This form signifies that the couple is
licensed, or legally qualified, to marry.2  Id.  At the appropriate time, the couple presents
this form to their officiant, who must certify that he or she performed a valid marriage
ceremony.  Id.  The couple then has thirty days to return the form to the clerk’s office for
1) This task requires relatively few resources, at least in Rowan County.  (Doc. # 26 at 24-30).  Davis testified
that her Office issued 212 marriage licenses in 2014.  Marriage licenses cost $35.50.  (Id.).  Of that sum, the
Office retains $21.17, and remits the remaining $14.33 to the State.  (Id.).  Thus, Rowan County Clerk’s Office
made about $4,500, or roughly 0.1% of its annual budget, from issuing marriage licenses in 2014.  (Id.).  Davis
also estimated that the task of issuing marriage licenses occupies one hour of one deputy clerk’s time per
week.  (Id.).
2) A couple is “legally qualified” to marry if both individuals are over the age of eighteen, mentally competent,
unrelated to each other and currently unmarried.  See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.010, 402.020(a)-(d), (f).
4
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recording.  See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.220, 402.230. The State will not recognize
marriages entered into without a valid license therefor. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.080.
The Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives (“KDLA”) prescribes the above-
mentioned form, which must be used by all county clerks in issuing marriage licenses.3  Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.100, 402.110.  It is composed of three sections, which correspond
to the steps detailed above: (1) a marriage license, to be completed by a county or deputy
clerk; (2) a marriage certificate, to be completed by a qualified officiant; and (3) a recording
statement, to be completed by a county or deputy clerk.  The marriage license section has
the following components:
(a) An authorization statement of the county clerk issuing the
license for any person or religious society authorized to
perform marriage ceremonies to unite in marriage the persons
named;
(b) Vital information for each party, including the full name, date of
birth, place of birth, race, condition (single, widowed, or
divorced), number of previous marriages, occupation, current
residence, relationship to the other party, and full names of
parents; and
(c) The date and place the license is issued, and the signature of
the county clerk or deputy clerk issuing the license.
See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.100(1) (emphasis added).  
Davis does not want to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples because they
will bear the above-mentioned authorization statement.  She sees it as an endorsement of
same-sex marriage, which runs contrary to her Apostolic Christian beliefs.  (Id. at 42).  Four
of Davis’ deputy clerks share her religious objection to same-sex marriage, and another is
3)  Only one aspect of the form has changed since Obergefell–whereas the marriage applicants were once
referred to as “Bride” and “Groom,” they are now identified as “First Party” and “Second Party.”
5
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undecided on the subject.  (Id. at 49).  The final deputy clerk is willing to issue the licenses,
but Davis will not allow it because her name and title still appear twice on licenses that she
does not personally sign.  (Doc. # 29-3 at 7). 
In the wake of Obergefell, Governor Beshear issued the following directive to all
county clerks:
Effective today, Kentucky will recognize as valid all same sex marriages
performed in other states and in Kentucky.  In accordance with my
instruction, all executive branch agencies are already working to make any
operational changes that will be necessary to implement the Supreme Court
decision.  Now that same-sex couples are entitled to the issuance of a
marriage license, the Department of Libraries and Archives will be sending
a gender-neutral form to you today, along with instructions for its use.  
(Doc. # 29-3 at 11).  He has since addressed some of the religious concerns expressed by
some county clerks:
You can continue to have your own personal beliefs but, you’re also taking
an oath to fulfill the duties prescribed by law, and if you are at that point to
where your personal convictions tell you that you simply cannot fulfill your
duties that you were elected to do, th[e]n obviously an honorable course to
take is to resign and let someone else step in who feels that they can fulfill
those duties.
(Doc. # 29-11).  Davis is well aware of these directives.  Nevertheless, she plans to
implement her “no marriage licenses” policy for the remaining three and a half years of her
term as Rowan County Clerk.  (Doc. # 26 at 67).
III. Standard of Review
A district court must consider four factors when entertaining a motion for preliminary
injunction:
(1) whether the movant has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success
on the merits;
(2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm;
6
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(3) whether an injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and 
(4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of such
an injunction.  
See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 528 (6th Cir. 1998).  These “are factors to be
balanced, and not prerequisites that must be met.”  In re Eagle Picher Indus., Inc., 963 F.3d
855, 859 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating further that these factors “simply guide the discretion of
the court”).   
IV. Analysis
A. Defendant Kim Davis in her official capacity
Plaintiffs are pursuing this civil rights action against Defendants Rowan County and
Kim Davis, in her individual and official capacities, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . 
This statute “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”  Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)
(internal quotations omitted).
At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs seek to vindicate their constitutional rights by
obtaining injunctive relief against Defendant Kim Davis, in her official capacity as Rowan
County Clerk.  Because official capacity suits “generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent,” one might assume that
Plaintiffs are effectively pursuing injunctive relief against Rowan County.  Monell v. New
7
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York City Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978).  However, Rowan County
can only be held liable under § 1983 if its policy or custom caused the constitutional
deprivation.  Id. at 694. 
A single decision made by an official with final policymaking authority in the relevant
area may qualify as a policy attributable to the entity.  Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 482-83 (1986).  Whether an official acted as a final policymaker is a question of
state or local law.  Id.  However, courts must avoid categorizing an official as a state or
municipal actor “in some categorical, ‘all or nothing’ manner.”  McMillian v. Monroe Cnty.,
Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997).  They key inquiry is whether an official is a “final
policymaker [ ] for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue.”  Id. 
Accordingly, the Court will focus on whether Davis likely acted as a final policymaker for
Rowan County regarding the issuance of marriage licenses.  
While Davis is the elected Rowan County Clerk, subject to very little oversight by the
Rowan County Fiscal Court, there are no other facts in the record to suggest that she set
marriage policy for Rowan County.  After all, the State of Kentucky has “absolute
jurisdiction over the regulation of the institution of marriage.”  Pinkhasov v. Petocz, 331
S.W.3d 285, 291 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).  The State not only enacts marriage laws, it
prescribes procedures for county clerks to follow when carrying out those laws, right down
to the form they must use in issuing marriage licenses.  Id.; see also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 402.080, 402.100.  Thus, Davis likely acts for the State of Kentucky, and not as a final
policymaker for Rowan County, when issuing marriage licenses.
This preliminary finding does not necessarily foreclose Plaintiffs from obtaining
injunctive relief against Davis.  While the Eleventh Amendment typically bars Plaintiffs from
8
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bringing suit against a state or its officials, “official-capacity actions for prospective relief are
not treated as actions against the state.”  Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14
(1985).  This narrow exception, known as the Ex Parte Young doctrine, permits a federal
court to “enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal
law.”  Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908)).  “It rests on the premise–less delicately called a ‘fiction,’–that when a federal court
commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, he is
not the State for sovereign immunity purposes.”  Va. Office for Prot. and Advocacy v.
Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011).  Because Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Davis from
violating their federal constitutional rights, this Court has the power to grant relief under Ex
Parte Young.4
B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction
1. Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits
a. The fundamental right to marry
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  This “due
process” clause has both a procedural component and a substantive component.  See EJS
Prop., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 2012).  Procedural due process
simply requires that the government provide a fair procedure when depriving an individual
of life, liberty or property.  Id.  By contrast, substantive due process “protects a narrow class
4) In their reply brief, Plaintiffs argued that the Court need not decide whether Davis is a state actor or
municipal policymaker in order to grant injunctive relief.  The Court’s preliminary finding on this matter does
not necessarily foreclose Plaintiffs from arguing the “municipal policymaker” theory in the future.  The Court
simply seeks to ensure that it is indeed able to grant injunctive relief against Kim Davis in her official capacity. 
9
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of interests, including those enumerated in the Constitution, those so rooted in the
traditions of the people as to be ranked fundamental, and the interest in freedom from
government actions that ‘shock the conscience.’” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 588 (6th
Cir. 2014).
Although the Constitution makes no mention of the right to marry, the U.S. Supreme
Court has identified it as a fundamental interest subject to Fourteenth Amendment
protection.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s anti-
miscegenation statutes as violative of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment).  After all, “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”
 Id.  This right applies with equal force to different-sex and same-sex couples.  Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right
inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment same-sex couples may not be deprived of that right
and that liberty.”).
If a state law or policy “significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right[, it] cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and
is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388
(1978).  A state substantially interferes with the right to marry when some members of the
affected class “are absolutely prevented from getting married” and “[m]any others, able in
theory to satisfy the statute’s requirements[,] will be sufficiently burdened by having to do
so that they will in effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry.”  Id. at 387
(invalidating a Wisconsin statute that required individuals with child support obligations to
10
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obtain a court order before marrying).  
However, “not every state action, ‘which relates in any way to the incidents of or the
prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny.’”  Wright v. MetroHealth
Med. Ctr., 58 F.3d 1130, 1134 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386).  States
may impose “reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to
enter into the marital relationship.”  Id. at 1135.  If the statute does not create a “direct legal
obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married” or significantly discourage marriage,
then it will be upheld so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 
Id. (quoting Zablocki 434 U.S. at 387-88 n. 12); see also Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54
n.11 (1977) (upholding a Social Security provision that terminated secondary benefits
received by the disabled dependent child of a covered wage earner if that child married an
individual who was not entitled to benefits).
The state action at issue in this case is Defendant Davis’ refusal to issue any
marriage licenses.  Plaintiffs contend that Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy significantly
interferes with their right to marry because they are unable to obtain a license in their home
county.  Davis insists that her policy does not significantly discourage Plaintiffs from
marrying because they have several other options for obtaining licenses: (1) they may go
to one of the seven neighboring counties that are issuing marriage licenses; (2) they may
obtain licenses from Rowan County Judge Executive Walter Blevins; or (3) they may avail
themselves of other alternatives being considered post-Obergefell.
Davis is correct in stating that Plaintiffs can obtain marriage licenses from one of the
surrounding counties; thus, they are not totally precluded from marrying in Kentucky. 
However, this argument ignores the fact that Plaintiffs have strong ties to Rowan County. 
11
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They are long-time residents who live, work, pay taxes, vote and conduct other business
in Morehead.  Under these circumstances, it is understandable that Plaintiffs would prefer
to obtain their marriage licenses in their home county.  And for other Rowan County
residents, it may be more than a preference.  The surrounding counties are only thirty
minutes to an hour away, but there are individuals in this rural region of the state who
simply do not have the physical, financial or practical means to travel.5  
This argument also presupposes that Rowan County will be the only Kentucky
county not issuing marriage licenses.  While Davis may be the only clerk currently turning
away eligible couples, 57 of the state’s 120 elected county clerks have asked Governor
Beshear to call a special session of the state legislature to address religious concerns
related to same-sex marriage licenses.6  (Doc. # 29-9).  If this Court were to hold that
Davis’ policy did not significantly interfere with the right to marry, what would stop the other
56 clerks from following Davis’ approach?  What might be viewed as an inconvenience for
residents of one or two counties quickly becomes a substantial interference when
applicable to approximately half of the state. 
As for her assertion that Judge Blevins may issue marriage licenses, Davis is only
partially correct.  KRS § 402.240 provides that, “[i]n the absence of the county clerk, or
5) The median household income in Rowan County is $35,236 and 28.6% of the population lives below the
poverty line.  See United States Census Bureau,  http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/21205.html.  For
the entire state of Kentucky, the median household income is $43,036 and 18.8% of the population lives below
the poverty line.  Id.
6) See also Jack Brammer, 57 County Clerks Ask Governor for Special Session on Same-Sex Marriage
Licenses, The Lexington Herald Leader (July 8, 2015),
http://www.kentucky.com/2015/07/08/3936545_57-kentucky-county-clerks-ask.html?rh=1; Terry DeMio,
Boone, Ky. Clerks Want Same-Sex License Law, Cincinnati Enquirer (July 9, 2015),
http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/local/northern-ky/2015/07/09/boone-clerk-wants-special-legislative-s
ession-address-sex-marriage-issues-clerks/29919103/.
12
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during a vacancy in the office, the county judge/executive may issue the license and, in so
doing, he shall perform the duties and incur all the responsibilities of the clerk.”  The statute
does not explicitly define “absence,” suggesting that a traditional interpretation of the term
is appropriate.  See Merriam-Webster Online Dict ionary, 2015,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/, (describing “absence” as “a period of time when
someone is not present at a place, job, etc.”).  However, Davis asks the Court to deem her
“absent,” for purposes of this statute, because she has a religious objection to issuing the
licenses.  While this is certainly a creative interpretation, Davis offers no legal precedent
to support it.  
This proposal also has adverse consequences for Judge Blevins.  If he began
issuing marriage licenses while Davis continued to perform her other duties as Rowan
County Clerk, he would likely be exceeding the scope of his office. After all, KRS § 402.240
only authorizes him to issue marriage licenses when Davis is unable to do so; it does not
permit him to assume responsibility for duties that Davis does not wish to perform.  Such
an arrangement not only has the potential to create tension between the next judge
executive and county clerk, it sets the stage for further manipulation of statutorily defined
duties.7  Under these circumstances, the Court simply cannot count this as a viable option
for Plaintiffs to obtain their marriage licenses.
7) Even if the Court were inclined to accept Davis’ interpretation of the term “absence,” it would have doubts
about the practicality of this approach.  Judge Blevins is the highest elected official in Rowan County.  (Doc.
# 26 at 7).  He is frequently out of the office on official business.  (Id.).  While Judge Blevins would not have
to process a large number of marriage requests, he might not be regularly available for couples seeking
licenses. Thus, the Court would be concerned about Judge Blevins’ ability to perform this function as efficiently
as Davis and her six deputy clerks.
13
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Davis finally suggests that Plaintiffs will have other avenues for obtaining marriage
licenses in the future.  For example, county clerks have urged Governor Beshear to create
an online marriage licensing system, which would be managed by the State of Kentucky. 
While these options may be available someday, they are not feasible alternatives at
present.  Thus, they have no impact on the Court’s “substantial interference” analysis. 
Having considered Davis’ arguments in depth, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
one feasible avenue for obtaining their marriage licenses–they must go to another county. 
Davis makes much of the fact that Plaintiffs are able to travel, but she fails to address the
one question that lingers in the Court’s mind.  Even if Plaintiffs are able to obtain licenses
elsewhere, why should they be required to?  The state has long entrusted county clerks
with the task of issuing marriage licenses.  It does not seem unreasonable for Plaintiffs, as
Rowan County voters, to expect their elected official to perform her statutorily assigned
duties.  And yet, that is precisely what Davis is refusing to do.  Much like the statutes at
issue in Loving and Zablocki, Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy significantly discourages
many Rowan County residents from exercising their right to marry and effectively
disqualifies others from doing so.  The Court must subject this policy apply heightened
scrutiny.
b. The absence of a compelling state interest
When pressed to articulate a compelling state interest served by her “no marriage
licenses” policy, Davis responded that it serves the State’s interest in protecting her
religious freedom.  The State certainly has an obligation to “observe the basic free exercise
rights of its employees,” but this is not the extent of its concerns.  Marchi v. Bd. of Coop.
Educ. Serv. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469, 476 (2d. Cir. 1999).  In fact, the State has some
14
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priorities that run contrary to Davis’ proffered state interest.  Chief among these is its
interest in preventing Establishment Clause violations.  See U.S. Const. amend. I (declaring
that “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion”).  Davis has
arguably committed such a violation by openly adopting a policy that promotes her own
religious convictions at the expenses of others.8  In such situations, “the scope of the
employees’ rights must [ ] yield to the legitimate interest of governmental employer in
avoiding litigation.”  Marchi, 173 F.3d at 476.
The State also has a countervailing interest in upholding the rule of law.  See
generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (“The rule of law,
evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, . . . is the great mucilage that holds
society together.”).  Our form of government will not survive unless we, as a society, agree
to respect the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions, regardless of our personal opinions.  Davis
is certainly free to disagree with the Court’s opinion, as many Americans likely do, but that
does not excuse her from complying with it.  To hold otherwise would set a dangerous
precedent.  
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy
likely infringes upon Plaintiffs’ rights without serving a compelling state interest.  Because
Plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claim, this
first factor weighs in favor of granting their request for relief.
2. Potential for irreparable harm to Plaintiffs
When a plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits of a
8) Although it is not the focus of this opinion, Plaintiffs have already asserted such an Establishment Clause
claim against Kim Davis in her official capacity.  (Doc. # 1 at 13).
15
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constitutional deprivation claim, it follows that he or she will suffer irreparable injury absent
injunctive relief.  See Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 578
(6th Cir. 2002) (“Courts have also held that a plaintiff can demonstrate that a denial of an
injunction will cause irreparable harm if the claim is based upon a violation of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.”); see also Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th
Cir .1998) (finding that the loss of First Amendment rights for a minimal period of time
results in irreparable harm); Ohio St. Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808,
851 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (recognizing that a restriction on the fundamental right to vote
constitutes irreparable injury).
The Court is not aware of any Sixth Circuit case law explicitly stating that a denial
of the fundamental right to marry constitutes irreparable harm.  However, the case law cited
above suggests that the denial of constitutional rights, enumerated or unenumerated,
results in irreparable harm.  It follows that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm from Davis’
“no marriage licenses” rule, absent injunctive relief.  Therefore, this second factor also
weighs in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ Motion. 
3. Potential for substantial harm to Kim Davis
a. The right to free exercise of religion
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying the First Amendment to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment).  This Free Exercise Clause “embraces two concepts,–freedom
to believe and freedom to act.”  Id. at 304.  “The first is absolute but, in the nature of things,
the second cannot be.”  Id.  Therefore, “[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the
16
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protection of society.”  Id.
Traditionally, a free exercise challenge to a particular law triggered strict scrutiny. 
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).  A statute would only be upheld
if it served a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored to effectuate that
interest.  Id.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has retreated slightly from this approach. 
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  While laws targeting
religious conduct remain subject to strict scrutiny, “[a] law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has
the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”  Babalu, 508 U.S. at 532;
see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 880 (stating further that an individual’s religious beliefs do not
“excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State
is free to regulate”).
“Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one
requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.”  Babalu, 508 U.S.
at 532.  A law is not neutral if its object “is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of
their religious motivation.”  Id. at 533 (finding that a local ordinance forbidding animal
sacrifice was not neutral because it focused on “rituals” and had  built-in exemptions for
most other animal killings).  The Court has not yet “defined with precision the standard used
to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application.”  Id. at 543.  However, it has
observed that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause ‘protect[s] religious observers against unequal
treatment,’ and inequality results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests
it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious
17
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motivation.”  Id. at 542.  
While Smith and Babalu do not explicitly mention the term “rational basis,” lower
courts have interpreted them as imposing a similar standard of review on neutral laws of
general applicability.  See, e.g., Seger v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 453 F. App’s 630,
634 (2011).  Under rational basis review, laws will be upheld if they are “rationally related
to furthering a legitimate state interest.”  Id. at 635 (noting that “[a] law or regulation subject
to rational basis review is accorded a strong presumption of validity”); see also F.C.C. v.
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (stating generally that laws subject to
rational basis review must be upheld “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification”). 
In response to Smith and Babalu, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”).  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.  It prohibits the government from
“substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability,” except when the government demonstrates that the burden
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means
of furthering that interest.  Id.  Although Congress intended RFRA to apply to the states as
well as the federal government, the Court held that this was an unconstitutional exercise
of Congress’ powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).  Free exercise challenges to federal laws remain subject
to RFRA, while similar challenges to state policies are governed by Smith.  See, e.g.,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
For purposes of this inquiry, the state action at issue is Governor Beshear’s post-
Obergefell directive, which explicitly instructs county clerks to issue marriage licenses to
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same-sex couples.  Davis argues that the Beshear directive not only substantially burdens
her free exercise rights by requiring her to disregard sincerely-held religious beliefs, it does
not serve a compelling state interest.  She further insists that Governor Beshear could
easily grant her a religious exemption without adversely affecting Kentucky’s marriage
licensing scheme, as there are readily available alternatives for obtaining licenses in and
around Rowan County.9  
This argument proceeds on the assumption that Governor Beshear’s policy is not
neutral or generally applicable, and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.10  However, the
text itself supports a contrary inference.  Governor Beshear first describes the legal impact
of the Court’s decision in Obergefell, then provides guidance for all county clerks in
implementing this new law.  His goal is simply to ensure that the activities of the
Commonwealth are consistent with U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
While facial neutrality is not dispositive, Davis has done little to convince the Court
that Governor Beshear’s directive aims to suppress religious practice.  She has only one
piece of anecdotal evidence to demonstrate that Governor Beshear “is picking and
choosing the conscience-based exemptions to marriage that he deems acceptable.”  (Doc.
# 29 at 24).  In 2014, Attorney General Jack Conway declined to appeal a federal district
9) Davis further develops this argument in her own Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 39) against
Governor Beshear and KDLA Librarian Wayne Onkst.  That Motion is not yet ripe for review.
10) In Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that free exercise claims involving neutral and generally
applicable laws may still be subject to heightened scrutiny if asserted alongside another constitutional right. 
If the Court concludes that the Beshear directive is neutral and generally applicable, Davis argues that strict
scrutiny must still apply because her free exercise claim is coupled with a free speech claim.  (Doc. # 29 at
23).  However, this proposal fails because Davis’ free speech rights are qualified by virtue of her public
employment.  See Draper v. Logan Cnty. Pub. Library, 403 F. Supp. 2d 608, 621-22 (W.D. Ky. 2005) (applying
the Pickering balancing test to a combined free exercise and free speech claim asserted by a public
employee).  The Court will discuss this concept further in the next section.
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court decision striking down Kentucky’s constitutional and statutory prohibitions on same-
sex marriage.  (Doc. # 29-12).  He openly stated that he could not, in good conscience,
defend discrimination and waste public resources on a weak case.11  (Id.).  Instead of
directing Attorney General Conway to pursue the appeal, regardless of his religious beliefs,
Governor Beshear hired private attorneys for that purpose.  (Doc. # 29-13).  He has so far
refused to extend such an “exemption” to county clerks with religious objections to same-
sex marriage.  (Doc. # 29-11).
However, Davis fails to establish that her current situation is comparable to Attorney
General Conway’s position in 2014.  Both are elected officials who have voiced strong
opinions about same-sex marriage, but the comparison ends there.  Governor Beshear did
not actually “exempt” Attorney General Conway from pursuing the same-sex marriage
appeal.  Attorney General Conway’s decision stands as an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion on an unsettled legal question.  By contrast, Davis is refusing to recognize the
legal force of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in performing her duties as Rowan County
Clerk.  Because the two are not similarly situated, the Court simply cannot conclude that
Governor Beshear treated them differently based upon their religious convictions.  There
being no other evidence in the record to suggest that the Beshear directive is anything but
neutral and generally applicable, it will likely be upheld if it is rationally related to a
11) Davis refers to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky’s decisions in Bourke v.
Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545 (W.D. Ky. 2014), and Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (W.D.
Ky. 2014).  Judge John Heyburn held that Kentucky’s constitutional and statutory prohibitions on same-sex
marriages “violate[ ] the United States Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection under the law, even under
the most deferential standard of review.”  Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 544.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
consolidated these cases with several similar matters originating from Ohio, Michigan and Tennessee and
reversed them.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).  The Supreme Court of the United States
then granted certiorari on these cases, now collectively known as Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039
(2015). 
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legitimate government purpose. 
The Beshear directive certainly serves the State’s interest in upholding the rule of
law.  However, it also rationally relates to several narrower interests identified in Obergefell. 
By issuing licenses to same-sex couples, the State allows them to enjoy “the right to
personal choice regarding marriage [that] is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”
and enter into “a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals.”  135 S. Ct. at 2599-2600.  It also allows same-sex couples to take advantage
of the many societal benefits and fosters stability for their children.  Id. at 2600-01. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that it likely does not infringe upon Davis’ free exercise
rights.
b. The right to free speech
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”  Under the Free Speech Clause, an individual has the “right to utter
or print, [as well as] the right to distribute, the right to receive and the right to read.” 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)(citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).  An individual also has the “right to refrain from speaking at all.” 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (invalidating a state law that required New
Hampshire drivers to display the state motto on their license plates).  After all, “[a] system
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.”  Id.  
While the Free Speech Clause protects citizens’ speech rights from government
intrusion, it does not stretch so far as to bar the government “from determining the content
of what it says.”  Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
21
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2245-46 (2015).  “[A]s a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to
promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position.  In doing so, it represents its
citizens and carries out its duties on their behalf.”  Id.  That being said, the government’s
ability to express itself is not unlimited.  Id.  “[T]he Free Speech Clause itself may constrain
the government’s speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel private persons
to convey the government’s speech.”  Id. (stating further that “[c]onstitutional and statutory
provisions outside of the Free Speech Clause may [also] limit government speech”).
This claim also implicates the Beshear directive.  Davis contends that this directive
violates her free speech rights by compelling her to express a message she finds
objectionable.  Specifically, Davis must issue marriage licenses bearing her “imprimatur
and authority” as Rowan County Clerk to same-sex couples .  Doc. # 29 at 27).  Davis
views such an act as an endorsement of same-sex marriage, which conflicts with her
sincerely-held religious beliefs.
As a preliminary matter, the Court questions whether the act of issuing a marriage
license constitutes speech.  Davis repeatedly states that the act of issuing these licenses
requires her to “authorize” same-sex marriage.  A close inspection of the KDLA marriage
licensing form refutes this assertion.  The form does not require the county clerk to
condone or endorse same-sex marriage on religious or moral grounds.  It simply asks the
county clerk to certify that the information provided is accurate and that the couple is
qualified to marry under Kentucky law.  Davis’ religious convictions have no bearing on this
purely legal inquiry.
The Court must also acknowledge the possibility that any such speech is attributable
to the government, rather than Davis.  See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248 (finding that
22
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specialty license plates are government speech because the government has exercised
final approval over the designs, and thus, chosen “how to present itself and its
constituency”).  The State prescribes the form that Davis must use in issuing marriage
licenses.  She plays no role in composing the form, and she has no discretion to alter it. 
Moreover, county clerks’ offices issue marriage licenses on behalf of the State, not on
behalf of a particular elected clerk.
Assuming arguendo that the act of issuing a marriage license is speech by Davis,
the Court must further consider whether the State is infringing upon her free speech rights
by compelling her to convey a message she finds disagreeable.  However, the seminal
“compelled speech” cases provide little guidance because they focus on private individuals
who are forced to communicate a particular message on behalf of the government.  See,
e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down a state law that
required schoolchildren to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the flag).  Davis is a
public employee, and therefore, her speech rights are different than those of a private
citizen.12  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). 
“[T]he government may not constitutionally compel persons to relinquish their First
Amendment rights as a condition of public employment,” but it does have “a freer hand in
regulating the speech of its employees than it has in regulating the speech of the public at
large.”  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 156 (1983); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671
12) Most free speech cases involving public employees center on compelled silence rather than compelled
speech.  See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (focusing on a district attorney’s claim that she was fired in
retaliation for exercising her free speech rights).  “[I]n the context of protected speech, the difference is without
constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily
comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.”  Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487 U.S. 781, 796-97.
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(1994).  Accordingly, “[w]hen a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity
must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418; see also
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, (1973)
(stating that “neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution”
invalidates the Hatch Act’s bar on partisan political conduct by federal employees). 
“[T]wo inquiries [ ] guide interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to
public employee speech.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of
Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 563 (1968)).  First, a court must
determine “whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”  Id.
(explaining further that this question often depends upon whether the employee’s speech
was made pursuant to his or her official duties).  Id. at 421.  If the answer is no, then the
employee’s speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection.  Id. at 421 (“Restricting
speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”).  If the answer
is yes, a court must then consider “whether the relevant government entity had an
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the
general public.”  Id.  (stating further that the government’s restrictions “must be directed at
speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s operations”).
The Court must adapt this test slightly because Davis’ claim focuses on her right not
to speak.  In this context, the first inquiry is whether Davis refused to speak (i.e. refused to
issue marriage licenses) as a citizen on a matter of public concern.  The logical answer to
this question is no, as the average citizen has no authority to issue marriage licenses. 
Davis is only able to issue these licenses, or refuse to issue them, because she is the
24
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Rowan County Clerk.  Because her speech (in the form of her refusal to issue marriage
licenses) is a product of her official duties, it likely is not entitled to First Amendment
protection.  The Court therefore concludes that Davis is unlikely to succeed on her
compelled speech claim.
c. The prohibition on religious tests
Article VI, § 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides as follows:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of
the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.
Under this Clause, “[t]he fact [ ] that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot
possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the
Constitution.”  Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (striking down a state requirement
that an individual declare his belief in God in order to become a notary public); see also
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating a state law that prevented religious
officials from serving in the state legislature).
Davis contends that “[c]ompelling all individuals who have any connection with the
issuance of marriage licenses . . . to authorize, approve, and participate in that act against
their sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage, without providing accommodation,
amounts to an improper religious test for holding (or maintaining) public office.”  (Doc. # 29
at 20).  The Court must again point out that the act of issuing a marriage license to a same-
sex couple merely signifies that the couple has met the legal requirements to marry.  It is
not a sign of moral or religious approval.  The State is not requiring Davis to express a
25
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particular religious belief as a condition of public employment, nor is it forcing her to
surrender her free exercise rights in order to perform her duties.  Thus, it seems unlikely
that Davis will be able to establish a violation of the Religious Test Clause.
Although Davis focuses on the Religious Test Clause, the Court must draw her
attention to the first half of Article VI, Clause § 3.  It requires all state officials to swear an
oath to defend the U.S. Constitution.  Davis swore such an oath when she took office on
January 1, 2015.  However, her actions have not been consistent with her words.  Davis
has refused to comply with binding legal jurisprudence, and in doing so, she has likely
violated the constitutional rights of her constituents.  When such “sincere, personal
opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put
the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those
whose own liberty is then denied. “ Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.  Such policies simply
cannot endure.
d. The Kentucky Religious Freedom Act
Kentucky Constitution § 1 broadly declares that “[a]ll men are, by nature, free and
equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned .
. . [t]he right of worshiping Almighty God according to the dictates of their consciences.” 
Kentucky Constitution § 5 gives content to this guarantee:
No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society or
denomination; nor to any particular creed, mode of worship or system of
ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person be compelled to attend any place
of worship, to contribute to the erection or maintenance of any such place,
or to the salary or support of any minister of religion; nor shall any man be
compelled to send his child to any school to which he may be conscientiously
opposed; and the civil rights, privileges or capacities of no person shall be
taken away, or in anywise diminished or enlarged, on account of his belief or
disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma or teaching.  No human authority shall,
26
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in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.
Kentucky courts have held that Kentucky Constitution § 5 does not grant more
protection to religious practice than the First Amendment.  Gingerich v. Commonwealth,
382 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Ky. 2012).  Such a finding would normally permit the Court to
collapse its analysis of state and federal constitutional provisions.  However, the Kentucky
Religious Freedom Act, patterned after the federal RFRA, subjects state free exercise
challenges to heightened scrutiny:
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s freedom of religion. 
The right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held
religious belief may not be substantially burdened unless the government
proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has a compelling
governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has
used the least restrictive means to further that interest.  A “burden” shall
include indirect burdens such as withholding benefits, assessing penalties,
or an exclusion from programs or access to facilities.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.350.
Davis again argues that the Beshear directive substantially burdens her religious
freedom without serving a compelling state interest.  The record in this case suggests that
the burden is more slight.  As the Court has already pointed out, Davis is simply being
asked to signify that couples meet the legal requirements to marry.  The State is not asking
her to condone same-sex unions on moral or religious grounds, nor is it restricting her from
engaging in a variety of religious activities.  Davis remains free to practice her Apostolic
Christian beliefs.  She may continue to attend church twice a week, participate in Bible
Study and minister to female inmates at the Rowan County Jail.  She is even free to believe
that marriage is a union between one man and one woman, as many Americans do. 
However, her religious convictions cannot excuse her from performing the duties that she
27
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took an oath to perform as Rowan County Clerk.  The Court therefore concludes that Davis
is unlikely to suffer a violation of her free exercise rights under Kentucky Constitution § 5.
4. Public interest
“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional
rights.”  G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F. 3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir.
1994).  Because Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy likely infringes upon Plaintiffs’
fundamental right to marry, and because Davis herself is unlikely to suffer a violation of her
free speech or free exercise rights if an injunction is issued, this fourth and final factor
weighs in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ Motion.
V. Conclusion
District courts are directed to balance four factors when analyzing a motion for
preliminary injunction.  In this case, all four factors weigh in favor of granting the requested
relief.  Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, 
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 2) against
Defendant Kim Davis, in her official capacity as Rowan County Clerk, is hereby granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Kim Davis, in her official capacity as
Rowan County Clerk, is hereby preliminarily enjoined from applying her “no marriage
licenses” policy to future marriage license requests submitted by Plaintiffs.
This 12th day of August, 2015.
G:\DATA\Opinions\Ashland\15-44 MOO Granting Mtn for Preliminary Injunction.wpd
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT ASHLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-44-DLB
APRIL MILLER, et al.  PLAINTIFFS
vs.         ORDER
KIM DAVIS, both individually
and in her official capacity, et al.          DEFENDANTS
***********************
I. Introduction
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Kim Davis’ Motion to Stay (Doc. # 45)
the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of August 12, 2015 (Doc. # 43), in which it
enjoined her from enforcing her “no marriage licenses” policy against Plaintiffs.  Davis
argues that a stay is necessary to protect her constitutional rights while the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals entertains her interlocutory appeal of the Court’s decision (Doc. # 44). 
Plaintiffs having submitted a Response in Opposition to the Motion (Doc. # 46), and Davis
having filed her Reply (Doc. # 51), this matter is now ripe for the Court’s review.  After
considering the record, the controlling law, and the parties' arguments, the Court concludes
that a stay pending appeal is not warranted.  Defendant Kim Davis’ Motion to Stay (Doc.
# 45) is therefore denied.
However, in recognition of the constitutional issues involved, and realizing that
emotions are running high on both sides of the debate, the Court finds it appropriate to
1
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temporarily stay this Order pending review of Defendant Davis’ Motion to Stay (Doc. #
45) by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
II. Analysis
“While an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judgment that grants,
dissolves, or denies an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an
injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”  Fed.
R. Civ. P. 62(c); see also Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1) (providing that “[a] party must ordinarily
move first in the district court for . . . an order suspending modifying, restoring, or granting
an injunction while an appeal is pending).  To determine whether a stay is warranted,
district courts must consider the following four factors: (1) the likelihood that the party
seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving
party will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be harmed
if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in granting the stay.  Mich. Coalition
of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991)
(noting that “the factors to be considered are the same for both a preliminary injunction and
a stay pending appeal”).
A movant “need not always establish a high probability of success on the merits” to
justify the granting of a stay.  Id. 
The probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely
proportional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiffs will suffer absent the
stay.  Simply stated, more of one excuses less of the other.  This relationship
however, is not without its limits; the movant is always required to
demonstrate more than the mere “possibility” of success on the merits.  For
example, even if a movant demonstrates irreparable harm that decidedly
outweighs any potential harm to the defendant if a stay is granted, he is still
required to show, at a minium, “serious questions going to the merits.”
2
Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB   Doc #: 52   Filed: 08/17/15   Page: 2 of 7 - Page ID#: 1265      Case: 15-5880     Document: 15-4     Filed: 08/19/2015    Page: 3 (59 of 313)
Id. at 153-54 (internal citations omitted).
Courts generally look to three factors in evaluating the harm that will occur absent
a stay: (1) the substantiality of the injury alleged; (2) the likelihood of its occurrence; and
(3) the adequacy of the proof provided.  Id. at 154.  A movant must not only demonstrate
that the harm alleged is “both certain and immediate, rather than speculative or theoretical,”
he or she “must provide some evidence that the harm has occurred in the past and is likely
to occur again.”  Id.  
In its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court held that Davis’ “no marriage
licenses” policy likely infringed upon Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marry, thus warranting
injunctive relief.  (Doc. # 43 at 28).  The Court further found that Davis was unlikely to suffer
a violation of her free exercise rights if an injunction was issued.  (Id.).  Although these
findings suggest that Davis is unlikely to prevail on appeal, she insists that “[t]his case
presents substantial legal matters of first impression for this (or any other) federal appeals
court following the Obergefell decision from the United States Supreme Court.”  (Doc. # 45-
1 at 10). 
Davis cites to United States v. Coffman for the proposition that matters of first
impression create serious questions going to the merits.  See Civ. A. No. 5:09-181-KKC,
2010 WL 4683761 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 12, 2010).  In that case, the Government moved the court
to stay its previous order, which “requir[ed] the Government to remove lis pendens notices
it placed on property listed in the superseding indictment as substitute assets, pending an
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.”  Id. at *1.  Because the
court was not aware of any precedent addressing “whether the Government has authority
under Kentucky law to place lis pendens notices on a criminal defendant’s substitute assets
3
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prior to trial,” it determined that the Government had more than a mere possibility of
success on the merits on appeal.  Id. at *2. 
In this case, by contrast, the Court is not tasked with resolving an unsettled issue
of state law.  It is being asked to apply clearly established federal law, as enunciated in
Obergefell.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not consider the
more narrow issue before this Court–whether requiring a county clerk to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples violates her free exercise rights–it was not silent as to the
likely impact of its holding on religious freedom.
The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but
rights come not from ancient sources alone.  The rise, too, from a better
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that
remains urgent in our own era.  Many who deem same-sex marriage to be
wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged
here.  But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and
public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the
State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose
own liberty is then denied.  Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek
in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would
disparage their choice and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.
*          *          *          *          *
[I]t must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by
divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.  The First
Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given
proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and
so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to
continue the family structure they have long revered.  The same is true of
those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons.  In turn, those who
believe allowing same-sex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether
as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who
disagree with their view in an open and searching debate.  The Constitution,
however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage
on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.
4
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Id. at 2602-03, 2607.  These passages strongly suggest that Davis’ “religious convictions
cannot excuse her from performing the duties that she took an oath to perform as Rowan
County Clerk.”  (Doc. # 43 at 27-28).  With this guidance at hand, the Court finds that Davis
has not established a likelihood of success on the merits on appeal.  This factor weighs
against staying the case.
Davis next argues that she is highly likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a stay,
which compensates for the low likelihood of her success on appeal.  Specifically, Davis
contends that she will incur “significant, irrevocable, and irreversible harm if she is forced
to authorize and approve a [same-sex marriage] license against her religious conscience.” 
(Doc. # 45-1 at 12).  She also points out that “[n]o one, and not even a permanent
injunction in her favor, can reverse that action if she is compelled to violate her
conscience.”  (Id. at 13).  
While Davis is correct in stating that a violation of her free exercise rights would
constitute irreparable harm, she has failed to show that she is likely to suffer a violation of
her free exercise rights in the first place.  See Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d
281, 288 (6th Cir .1998).  As the Court pointed out in its Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Davis is only being required to certify that couples meet the legal requirements to marry. 
She does not have to authorize or approve any unions on moral or religious grounds. 
Absent a likely constitutional violation, Davis is unlikely to suffer irreparable harm absent
a stay. 
The Court having found that Davis is unlikely to prevail on appeal or suffer
irreparable harm absent a stay, it follows that Plaintiffs are likely to suffer harm if a stay is
granted.  The Court has already held that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of
5
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their claim and enjoined Davis from enforcing her “no marriage licenses” policy against
them.  If the Court decided to delay enforcement of its Order while Davis pursues an
unpromising appeal, it would essentially give Plaintiffs a favorable legal ruling with no teeth
and prolong the likely violation of their constitutional rights.  Thus, this third factor also
weighs against staying the Order. 
Finally, the Court notes that it is in the public interest to prevent the violation of a
party’s constitutional rights.  G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F. 3d
1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994).  Because Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy likely infringes
upon Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marry, and because Davis herself is unlikely to suffer
a violation of her free exercise rights if compelled to issue marriage licenses, the Court
concludes that the public interest is not served by granting a stay.
III. Conclusion
District courts are directed to balance four factors when analyzing a motion to stay. 
In this case, all four factors weigh in favor of denying the requested relief.  Accordingly, for
the reasons set forth herein,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Kim Davis’ Motion to Stay (Doc. # 45) be, and is,
hereby DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order denying Kim Davis’ Motion to Stay
be, and is, hereby TEMPORARILY STAYED pending review of Defendant Davis’ Motion
to Stay (Doc. # 45) by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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This 17th day of August, 2015.
G:\DATA\ORDERS\Ashland Civil\2015\15-44 Order re Mtn to Stay.wpd
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   (Whereupon, the Preliminary Injunction Hearing 
proceedings commenced on Monday, July 13, 2015, at 
12:00 p.m., on the record in open court, as follows.)  
THE COURT:  All right.  Madam Clerk, if you
could call the case set for noon, please.
THE CLERK:  Yes, Your Honor.
Ashland Civil Action 15cv44, April Miller,
et al., versus Kim Davis, et al., this being called for a
preliminary injunction hearing.
THE COURT:  All right.  If we could start with
entries of appearance, please, and if you'd identify who
you're here representing.
We'll start over here.
MR. WATKINS:  Cecil Watkins on behalf of
Rowan County, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  
MR. MANDO:  Jeff Mando on behalf of
Rowan County, Your Honor.
MR. DONAHUE:  A.C. Donahue on behalf of
Kim Davis by special appearance.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Jonathan Christman also on
behalf of Kim Davis by special appearance.
MR. GANNAM:  Roger Gannam on behalf of
Kim Davis by special appearance.
MR. SHARP:  Good morning, Your Honor.  
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Bill Sharp on behalf of Ms. April Miller and
the other plaintiffs.
MR. CANON:  Dan Canon on behalf of the
plaintiffs.
THE COURT:  All right.  I'm glad to see we have
someone representing the county.
Did you enter your appearance today, Mr. Mando?
MR. MANDO:  Yeah, Your Honor, we were just
served the end of last week.
MR. WATKINS:  Thursday, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.  And, Mr. Watkins, you're
with whom?
MR. WATKINS:  I'm the Rowan County attorney.
THE COURT:  You are the county attorney.
That's what I thought.  
MR. WATKINS:  Yes.
THE COURT:  I just wanted to make sure.
Okay.  Well, as you know, this matter is set
for a preliminary injunction hearing.
Answers haven't been filed.  I don't know if
there's been an answer prepared.  You haven't responded
to the motion.  I know by local rule you have a certain
time to respond.
My hope today is to take whatever evidence
you-all want to submit on either side for purposes of the
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preliminary injunction motion.
This was filed as a motion for preliminary
injunction, not a motion for TRO, so that told me when it
was filed that I would be able to allow for written
response.  And you chose to file it the way you wanted to
so that was your decision.
I hope to allow for proof to be put on today,
and then, if necessary, I'll -- well, not if necessary, I
do plan on hearing argument.  I have some questions of my
own.
The case is not about whether or not we agree
or disagree with what the Supreme Court ruled a couple
weeks ago because that's the Supreme Court's business.
Only the Supreme Court can overrule the Supreme Court.
So if anybody is in here looking for me to
reverse the Supreme Court, that's not going to happen.  I
think I would quickly be reversed, and I don't really
enjoy doing that.
So we're here to hear the evidence necessary
for the preliminary injunction motion, and then I'll give
you an opportunity to orally make whatever argument you
want to make.
You can still file written response if you
wish.  Mr. Mando, you can file a written response if you
wish.
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So, I guess, the burden is on the plaintiff.
So I'll give you the opportunity to call witnesses.  I
mean, there may be an opportunity to stipulate to facts.
The facts seem fairly straightforward.
I've read a little bit about what's in the
pleadings.  The public statements, I think, there's
public statements that the Defendant Davis made within
the pleadings.  Of course, that's not under oath so I
don't know if that would be the testimony that she would
give today.  
But, Mr. Gannam -- is it Gannam?
MR. GANNAM:  Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  Do you wish to say
something, sir?
MR. GANNAM:  Yes, Your Honor.  On a preliminary
matter, Kim Davis, the defendant, has not been served;
and, therefore, this Court does not currently have
jurisdiction over her.  
I have authorities providing that when a
preliminary injunction motion is called for hearing and
the defendant hasn't been served yet, the Court is
without jurisdiction, and the motion should be denied
without prejudice with the opportunity to refile it once
the defendant is served.
But Kim Davis has not been served; and,
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therefore, this Court does not currently have
jurisdiction over her.
THE COURT:  Well, I have jurisdiction over the
complaint.  We'll just hear evidence on -- I'm going to
hear evidence today regardless because everybody is here.
MR. GANNAM:  Well, Your Honor, may I just ask
then that we would move to suspend the hearing and
request the Court to certify that ruling that we'll
proceed even though she has not been served for an
immediate appeal under 28 USC 1292(b)?
THE COURT:  So you're going to come back
tomorrow?
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, we are -- 
THE COURT:  I mean, I'm here.  I mean, you
don't know my -- I'm in -- I usually am in Covington.  I
had a regular docket today, so I just set this for
hearing today because I was going to be here.  
MR. GANNAM:  Understood, Your Honor.  And I
would just say that the case law that --
THE COURT:  Trying to save everybody some time.
MR. GANNAM:  The case law makes it clear the
burden to accomplish service is on point.
THE COURT:  Well, I recognize that.  Why hasn't
she been served?
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, if I may.
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THE COURT:  Sure.
MR. SHARP:  It's been sent out via certified
mail, returned delivery, signature confirmation.  We
are -- obviously, we drove here last night, which is
obviously a three-hour drive so we haven't been in the
office today to see if the confirmation on service has
come back.
I would point out that counsel for Ms. Davis
e-mailed me on June -- July the 7th --
THE COURT:  So six days ago.  
MR. SHARP:  -- with their entry of appearance.
They formally filed their entry of appearance in this
case on July the 8th.  It's unfortunate that after having
driven three hours yesterday to be here that this is the
first time we're hearing about it.
THE COURT:  Well, I'm not surprised.  I mean,
if they're -- they're going to raise arguments that
they're going to raise.  I mean, they don't have to raise
arguments with you.  They can -- I mean, I'm not -- I'm
trying to get the -- and the only -- I look out here
among the lawyers that I recognize, and Mr. Mando appears
before me regularly in Covington, and he knows one of my
favorite things is to see what we can all agree about.
MR. SHARP:  If I may, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Yes.  
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB   Doc #: 21   Filed: 07/16/15   Page: 8 of 112 - Page ID#: 107      Case: 15-5880     Document: 15-5     Filed: 08/19/2015     Page: 9 (73 of 313)
     9
MR. SHARP:  If it please the Court, I mean, we
would consider asking the Court to convert the motion for
preliminary injunction to a motion for TRO.  We're
prepared to present evidence on that request today.
THE COURT:  How about that, if they convert it?  
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, it -- 
THE COURT:  If I orally grant their motion, and
we convert it to a TRO motion, I mean, I can grant that
without notice.
MR. GANNAM:  The TR -- they haven't filed a
motion for TRO.
THE COURT:  I know, but if I allow them to do
it orally, and we have a temporary restraining order
hearing today, it wouldn't be a preliminary injunction.
It could only be good for 10 days.
MR. GANNAM:  Yes, Your Honor.  But the rule for
TRO requires, first of all, that a sworn pleading or an
affidavit be provided to the Court establishing the facts
in which the TRO would be based.  I also --
THE COURT:  Well, the -- 
MR. GANNAM:  It also requires written statement
from the attorneys explaining why service wasn't possible
before the hearing.  And we're prepared to provide a
declaration to the Court that in the second case that was
filed against Kim Davis the attorneys filed the case on
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July 10th, and accomplished service by hand delivery at
her office on the same day.
So the plaintiffs cannot show that it was
impractical or impossible or that they were unable to
effect service prior to today's hearing that they've
known about.
And we believe that it was incumbent on the
plaintiff to notify the Court that they didn't have
service and couldn't proceed today.
THE COURT:  Well, the notice that's required --
well, Rule 65, which is the rule that governs TROs, if
you want to receive injunctive -- temporary injunctive
relief, you have to submit an affidavit showing why the
other side should not be notified.  And you've been
notified of this hearing.
Now, the service thing is a quandary to me
because I think the lawyer representing the plaintiff in
15-46 -- I just was able to review that Friday -- was a
lawyer from Lexington, as I recall.
MR. SHARP:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  And I haven't received any notice
of the service in ECF as of this weekend.
Do you take a position on this, Mr. Mando, this
request to continue the hearing?  I don't want to
continue the hearing because we're all here.
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MR. MANDO:  We prefer not to continue the
hearing just for a matter of convenience, and the fiscal
court's position is a little bit different than
Ms. Davis's.
THE COURT:  I would -- I would suspect it would
be.
MR. MANDO:  Because we have no authority,
Your Honor, to tell the clerk what to do when it comes to
issuing those marriage licenses.  We can't order her to
issue one.  We can't tell her -- to forebear her from
issuing one under Kentucky law.
THE COURT:  Well, what is the -- what is the
process?  It's been awhile since I've gotten married.
But I remember I lived in Fayette County at the time, and
I went into the clerk's office and paid $25 or whatever
it was and walked out with an envelope, sealed envelope,
that I -- it's still in my house, probably still sealed.
Is that the process?  And I realize we're --
you're probably not -- maybe you might --
MR. MANDO:  The county attorney might be able
to -- 
THE COURT:  -- know, Mr. Watkins.  
MR. MANDO:  -- give the specifics of that than
I can, Your Honor.
MR. WATKINS:  Well, afterwards, Your Honor,
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they're going to have to come back in and do their proper
filing of their marriage.  But, I mean, initially I think
you're correct what you need to do.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Well, I think what I'm going
to do -- get my rule book out.  Let's see here.
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, if we could take a
five-minute recess, we'll check with the office to see if
service has been returned as of this morning.
THE COURT:  And can I see your cases that
you've cited?  Are they all Sixth Circuit, I guess?
MR. GANNAM:  I'm sorry, Your Honor, I didn't
hear you.
THE COURT:  You were citing some authority
earlier.
MR. GANNAM:  Well, your Honor, I can provide --
I have -- have it all here if I may approach and provide
the Court, please.
THE COURT:  Well, you can hand it to the court
security officer.
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, the first case is
Schuh versus Michigan Department of Corrections.
Your Honor, these cases are all over the place
in terms of providing the basic proposition.  In this
case it's on the second page in the highlighted portion.
It simply provides, "When a preliminary injunction is
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sought under Rule 65(a), service of the summons and the
complaint is required.  It is well settled that without
service of process a Court has no jurisdiction over
defendants named in a lawsuit."
THE COURT:  Well, I agree that service is
ultimately required.  I mean, if you don't get served,
you can't have notice of the proceeding.  You can't
receive due process.  I mean, you have to.  I mean, as
far as no service, formal service, of course, if she
hasn't been formally served, the Court is not without --
is without jurisdiction to order her to do anything until
she's properly served.  And I don't plan on ordering her
to do anything today.  I don't plan on ruling today.  I
plan on hearing evidence today so that I can ultimately
make an informed decision.  That's all I'm here to do is
to hear evidence today.  
So I understand that it's well settled that
without service of process, a Court has no jurisdiction
over defendants named in a lawsuit.  
I have dismissed lawsuits without -- what is
it -- Rule 12 -- 12(b) -- I can't remember off the top of
my head, one of the subsections.  But, at any rate, I
recognize that.  I mean, you-all traveled here from
Florida.  I mean, I don't want to have to bring you back
for another hearing.
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MR. GANNAM:  Well, Your Honor, we're not
concerned about our own travels.
THE COURT:  Well, I'm concerned because I think
it's important that we try to to the extent that everyone
can save resources of whatever entity is representing
them, we're all here.  I mean, whether there's service or
not, I don't know how I -- why I can't hear evidence of
the case.
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, in --
THE COURT:  And the complaint has been filed.
I have jurisdiction over the civil rights complaint.
MR. GANNAM:  That's correct, Your Honor.  The
proper procedure if -- if you only have jurisdiction over
the plaintiffs would be a TRO procedure if they can show
there's a reason why they couldn't get notice.
And under Rule 65 notice includes at least
service of the summons and complaint and the motion
papers.
I can provide -- I can point to other cases in
here that -- where summons -- where the service had not
been accomplished, the appropriate step was to deny the
motion for preliminary injunction and have the plaintiffs
refile it.
THE COURT:  Well, I can pull the names.  We're
going to get to the merits.
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MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor --
THE COURT:  We will all get to the merits.  I
mean, your client would love to get to the merits.
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, we would --
THE COURT:  Mr. Mando's client would love to
get to the merits, as would the plaintiffs.  To the
extent we can expedite this, it helps everyone.
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, we believe it would be
more appropriate to allow service to be accomplished,
allow Ms. Davis a regular standard briefing schedule to
be able to respond to this motion for preliminary
injunction, and then have a hearing on the merits of the
preliminary injunction motion after we've had an
opportunity to develop somewhat of a record.
THE COURT:  Well, that's what we're here today
to do is develop a record.
MR. GANNAM:  I mean, develop a record before
the hearing so that we're not presenting witnesses for
the first time at the hearing, but rather have the
opportunity perhaps to take a little discovery or do
whatever -- do whatever we can do within the regular
21-day briefing period that the rule already provides.
THE COURT:  Well, the motion -- there was a
motion filed.  Mr. Sharp, do you have that?
MR. SHARP:  I do, Your Honor.  July the 2nd.
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THE COURT:  July 2nd.  So your response is due
on the 23rd.  Well, actually, it's the 26th, three days
for mailing.  That's always been a --
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, it will be due 21 days
after service, and it has not been served yet.
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, I'm a -- I'm a little
perplexed given that counsel has entered their appearance
in the case.
THE COURT:  Well, again, we're dealing with a
situation where there's not going to be any agreements so
everybody is going to have to comply with all the rules
and the procedures, which is fine.  If that's how
everybody wants to have everything work, that's -- I
presided over that type of case, and I've presided over
cases where people are more conciliatory.  So it
really -- it doesn't matter to me.
But if everybody is going to be required to
cross every T and dot every I, that's fine.  I'm going to
hear the evidence today.  I'm going to allow the proof to
be put on today.  Whatever proof you want to put on,
we're going to put it on today.  You'll have time to file
written response, as will you if you wish to file written
response.
I have some questions myself.  I take it
Ms. Davis is not here because she wasn't served.  Is that
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fair?  I'm just guessing based upon the conversation.
MR. GANNAM:  She's not currently in the
courthouse, Your Honor.  She is available, but she is not
here.
THE COURT:  Okay.  She is available?
MR. GANNAM:  Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.  All right.  Well, so let me
make sure I have the record that needs to be completely
clear.
There is an oral motion -- you make your oral
motion, and then I'll let you make your oral motion, and
then we can make sure the minutes reflect exactly what we
want here.
What's your oral motion, Mr. Gannam?  Is it
Gannon or Gannam?
MR. GANNAM:  Gannam, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Gannam.  G-A-N-N-O-M?
MR. GANNAM:  A-M.
THE COURT:  A-M, okay.  All right.  Thank you.
MR. GANNAM:  Well, Your Honor, our initial
objection was lack of service and therefore lack of
jurisdiction.
THE COURT:  So oral motion to dismiss.  Not
dismiss but -- was it -- it wasn't to dismiss.  It was
oral motion to what?
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MR. GANNAM:  No, Your Honor.  We object to
proceeding with the hearing on a PI motion when there has
not been service.
THE COURT:  The oral motion to what?
MR. GANNAM:  Well, in light of the Court's
ruling to move forward despite there not being service.
THE COURT:  Okay.  I mean, it will be
defendants -- Defendant Davis's objection to the hearing
in absence of service.  Is that fair?
MR. GANNAM:  That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.  All right.  That will be
overruled.
All right.  What's your other request?
MR. GANNAM:  In light of overruling that
objection and proceeding forward, we request the Court to
suspend the hearing and immediately certify that issue
for an immediate appeal under 28 USC 1292(b).
THE COURT:  Okay.  That's going to be denied.
MR. GANNAM:  And I would -- if I just may point
out in the same case I read from earlier, Your Honor, the
Court there held that to the extent plaintiff seeks an
ex parte preliminary injunction, which is what this
proceeding will now be --
THE COURT:  It's not ex parte. 
MR. GANNAM:  -- that that's procedurally
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improper.
THE COURT:  It's not ex parte.  Ex parte would
be if -- obviously, we have lots of folks in the back and
lots of folks here.  I mean, it's not ex parte.  I mean,
you've been -- you have notice.  You haven't formally
been served.  I mean, under Rule 65 a temporary
restraining order under subsection (b)(1), without --
without notice.  The Court may issue a TRO without
written notice or oral notice to the adverse party only
if.  Now, you have notice.  This doesn't talk about
service.  This talks about notice.
MR. GANNAM:  But notice as a legal matter
includes at least service, Your Honor.  That's our point
is that notice has legal significance.  And in a case
where there has been no service there has been no notice.
And, therefore, under the TRO ruling reading it
with that interpretation, which we think is the correct
one, the plaintiff has to show why not providing notice,
which is at least service, is -- is permissible or
excusable under all of the circumstances.  And what we're
willing to show --
THE COURT:  The other case they served, they
walked over --
MR. GANNAM:  -- is that there was no --
THE COURT:  -- and hand delivered, which is
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what should have been done here, but it wasn't.  
Road blocks to getting to the merits.  I --
which is certainly -- I want to give everyone a decision,
an informed decision, as quickly as possible, but I want
to make sure that everybody has a right to argue whatever
they want to argue for.
So your two requests are overruled, denied.
What was your request to convert it, an oral
motion to convert the hearing to a TRO hearing?
MR. SHARP:  Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  Well, we're going to
take a five-minute recess.  I want you to take a gander
at finding out if there's been formal service by way of
certified mail, and then we'll reconvene at 12:30.
Do you mind if I keep these, Mr. Gannam?  I'll
read them.
MR. GANNAM:  You may keep them.
THE COURT:  Thank you.  
(Whereupon, a recess was taken at 12:20 p.m., and 
the proceedings continued at 12:30 p.m., on the record in 
open court, as follows.) 
THE COURT:  All right.  I will go ahead and
give these cases back to you, Mr. Gannam.  I see one of
them was one of my cases.  
All right.  Mr. Sharp, what did you find out?
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MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, if I may.  We have not
been able to confirm that Ms. Davis has, in fact, been
served.  Speaking with Mr. Mando, it seems like the
county's service was perfected Thursday night.  Mr. Canon
is looking into an alternative option.  But at this point
we cannot represent that she's been served.
THE COURT:  Well, I'm certainly not going to
enter any formal order until she's been served.  I think
that would be inappropriate.  But I'm here.  I do want to
hear the evidence today while I'm here.
I don't think it's necessary either to convert
the hearing to a TRO hearing.  I plan on giving the
defendants 21 days from the date that you entered your
appearance to file a response.  Because you entered your
appearance last week.  I know the local rules say 21 days
from date of service of the motion.  I think service of
the motion on counsel was the date you entered your
appearance.  You would have known about it -- getting on
ECF you would have known when the complaint was filed.
You would have gotten notice of the motion filing as of
the date you entered your appearance.
So a written response to the motion for the
preliminary injunction will be due on July 30th.
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, may I be heard on the
point of appearance?  We -- to be clear, we have not
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filed a general appearance.  We filed -- Mr. Christman
and I filed in our individual capacities motions for
pro hac vice admission, which was necessary for us to
even come to court and argue anything, whether it's
jurisdiction or anything else.  But we have not entered
an appearance for Ms. Davis as such.  It's simply a
motion for pro hac vice.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Well, I granted that.  
Well, okay, I'll rephrase.
MR. SHARP:  If I may, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Both defendants -- yes.
MR. SHARP:  I'm looking at record entry
number 8 and number 7.  The, "Wherefore, undersigned
counsel will be permitted to appear and practice in this
court as counsel for Defendant Kim Davis in the
above-referenced case."  Those motions is identical
language in both.  Those are granted.  I mean, that's --
THE COURT:  Right.  I granted those by gavel
order last week.  I did.
What did you find out, sir, anything?
MR. CANON:  We're working on it, Judge.  Yeah,
as far as I know, the county was served on -- 
THE COURT:  Please stand, please.
MR. CANON:  Yes, I'm sorry.  
The county was served on Thursday.  Apparently
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service went out on Monday, last Monday.  The county was
served on Thursday.
So as far as where the service is, stands for
as far as Ms. Davis goes personally, I assume it's
sitting in her mailbox.
THE COURT:  Well, she's apparently not in
Rowan County right now.  She's in Boyd County.  So she
probably doesn't have access to her mailbox.
At any rate, here's what I'm going to do.
Whether or not you were here just for -- to argue the
case, you will be arguing Mr. Gannan -- Gannam -- I'm
having a hard time with that.  Is it Gannam?  
MR. GANNAM:  Gannam.
THE COURT:  Gannam, okay.  A written response
by either the county or the Defendant Davis individually
will be due on July 30th.  I can always shorten or
lengthen the time by local rule by order, and I'm doing
that.  So the responses will be due on the 30th of July.
Your oral motion to convert the hearing to a
TRO motion will be denied.  I don't think it's necessary.
I'm going to hear the evidence today.  So you
can call your first witness.
MR. SHARP:  Thank you, Your Honor.
The plaintiffs call Dr. April Miller.
THE COURT:  All right.  Come around.
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    24APRIL MILLER, Ph.D. - DIRECT BY MR. SHARP
     (Whereupon, the witness, APRIL MILLER, Ph.D., was 
placed under oath by the clerk of the Court.) 
THE COURT:  Good afternoon.
THE WITNESS:  Hi.
THE COURT:  You may proceed.
MR. SHARP:  Thank you, Your Honor.
APRIL MILLER, 
having been first duly placed under oath, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHARP:  
Q. Ma'am, can you please identify yourself for the
Court?
A. April Miller.
Q. And do you have a professional title?
A. I have a Ph.D., so my professional title is doctor.
Q. Would you please spell your last name for the Court?
A. Miller, M-I-L-L-E-R.
Q. Dr. Miller, where do you live?
A. I live in Morehead, Kentucky.
Q. And how long have you lived there?
A. Nine years.
Q. Dr. Miller, I'm now going to ask you some questions
about your personal life.  First, are you currently in a
committed relationship?
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A. Yes.
Q. With whom?
A. Karen Roberts.
Q. How did the two of you meet?
A. We were work colleagues at the University of
Southern Mississippi.
Q. And how long have the two of you been in a
relationship?
A. A relationship, 11 years.
Q. Dr. Miller, do you and your partner intend to get
married?
A. Yes.
Q. When did the two of you decide to do so?
A. We talked about it on the 26th of June after the
Supreme Court ruling.
Q. Now, this may seem like an obvious question, but why
do the two of you want to get married?
A. Because we love each other, and we want to get
married.
Q. Are there any reasons why the two of you cannot
legally get married?
A. No.
Q. Are you both over the age of 18?
A. Yes.
Q. Neither of you are currently married to someone
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else?
A. Correct.
Q. And the two of you are not related by blood?
A. No.
Q. Now, I'm going to ask you a few questions about what
dealings, if any, you and your partner have had with the
Rowan County Clerk's office.  
First, have you or your partner had an occasion to
seek a marriage license --
MR. GANNAM:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
BY MR. SHARP:  
Q. Have you or your partner had an occasion to seek a
marriage license from the Rowan County Clerk's office?
A. Yes.  We went on June the 30th to seek a marriage
license.
Q. Did you do that in person?
A. Yes, we were both there.
Q. Before you sought the marriage license, were you
aware that the Rowan County Clerk's office had made
public statements about any policies regarding the
issuance of marriage licenses?
A. Yes.  On Monday, the 29th of June, there were
media -- media outlets had said -- stated that Kim Davis
had said she was not issuing licenses.
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Q. In these media reports was there any indication of
the reasons why that was the case?
MR. GANNAM:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
THE WITNESS:  I believe they stated that it was
her religious beliefs that kept her from issuing
licenses.
BY MR. SHARP:  
Q. And those beliefs kept her from issuing licenses to
whom?
A. To all couples in Rowan County.
Q. Can you please explain the circumstances
specifically under which you and your partner went to
seek a marriage license that day?
A. On the 26th of June when the Supreme Court ruled
that we now had the right to marry in all 50 states, my
partner and I talked about finally getting married and
having that right.
And on Monday when I heard that Kim Davis was not
issuing licenses --
MR. GANNAM:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
THE WITNESS:  -- my partner and I decided to go
down to the courthouse on Tuesday morning ourselves to
see if that was true or to see if on Tuesday she was
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issuing licenses.  It had not been confirmed Tuesday when
we were there that anybody had been denied that morning,
so we went in and requested a marriage license on
Tuesday, the 30th.
BY MR. SHARP:  
Q. Were you able to obtain a marriage license that day?
A. No.
Q. Did anyone from the clerk's -- did you interact with
anyone from the clerk's office in seeking to obtain a
marriage license?
A. We walked into the clerk's office.  We walked to the
desk, requested a marriage license from the person
sitting at the counter.
She got up and went to the back to speak with
Kim Davis in her office.  Spoke to Kim Davis.
She turned around and came back, and she said to us,
we are not issuing any marriage licenses at this time.
Q. Did they identify any reasons why that was the case?
A. No.
Q. How did it make you feel to be denied a marriage
license in your county of residence?
A. I was pretty furious.
Q. Have you or your partner sought to obtain a marriage
license in any other county?
A. No.
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Q. Why not?
A. We live in Morehead, Kentucky.  We live in
Rowan County.  This is where we do our business all the
time.  This is the same county clerk's office where we
purchase our car tags, and we register to vote, and this
is where we do our business.  I think it would be
degrading to have to go somewhere else to get my license
because of this.
Q. Dr. Miller, if you were able to obtain a marriage
license in Rowan County, would you and your partner then
get married?
A. Yes.
MR. SHARP:  Nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Cross?
Mr. Christman.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Thank you, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHRISTMAN:  
Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Miller.
My name is Jonathan Christman.  I represent
Ms. Davis in this case.
A. Hi.
Q. Ms. Miller, you did not try to obtain a marriage
license from Rowan County Judge/Executive Walter Blevins;
correct?
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A. I did speak with Walter Blevins on July 1st.
Q. Did you try to obtain a marriage license from
Mr. Blevins?
A. I was one of the people in the office at the time
that did ask for a marriage license, but other plaintiffs
and myself did request a license, yes, on July 1st.
Q. From Mr. Blevins?
A. Yes.
Q. Who else was there with you?
A. Plaintiffs Jody Fernandez and Kevin Holloway.
THE COURT:  This is the Rowan County
Judge/Executive?
THE WITNESS:  Rowan County Judge/Executive
Walter "Doc" Blevins.
THE COURT:  So you were able to get a license
from him?
THE WITNESS:  No, we did not get a license from
him.  We requested one from him.
THE COURT:  Oh, you requested one from him, but
he didn't give it to you?
THE WITNESS:  We did not receive licenses from
him.
THE COURT:  Okay.  All right.  Thank you.  I
wanted to make sure that was correct.  Thank you.
THE WITNESS:  Thank you.
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB   Doc #: 21   Filed: 07/16/15   Page: 30 of 112 - Page ID#: 129      Case: 15-5880     Document: 15-5     Filed: 08/19/2015    Page: 31 (95 of 313)
    31APRIL MILLER, Ph.D. - CROSS BY MR. CHRISTMAN
BY MR. CHRISTMAN:  
Q. You did not attempt to obtain a marriage license
from another county; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Rowan County is bordered by seven other counties
in -- of Kentucky; correct?
A. I'm not sure how many.
Q. And you decided to get married after the
Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell; correct?
A. Yes.  Previous to that I did not have the right to
get married in my state.
Q. And then you went to the Rowan County Clerk's office
to get married after hearing of Ms. Davis's deep
religious convictions?
A. I went to the Rowan County Clerk's office to get a
marriage license on July -- or June the 30th.
Had I heard about her convictions and that she was
not issuing marriage licenses?  Yes.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  No further questions.
THE COURT:  Thank you.  Any redirect?
MR. SHARP:  No, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  May this witness be
finally excused?
MR. MANDO:  Your Honor -- 
MR. SHARP:  Yes, sir.
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MR. MANDO:  Your Honor, excuse me. 
THE COURT:  Oh, I'm sorry.
MR. MANDO:  I did -- I did have one question,
Your Honor.
THE COURT:  That's fine, Mr. Mando.  Go ahead,
sir.
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MANDO:  
Q. Good afternoon, ma'am.
A. Hi.
Q. My name is Jeff Mando.  I represent Rowan County.
You mentioned you spoke with Judge/Executive
Walter Blevins after you were denied a marriage license
by the clerk's office.  
Is that correct, ma'am?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you spoke with Judge/Executive Blevins, did
he tell you that he could not issue a marriage license to
you because he did not have the authority to do so?
A. He told Jody and Kevin and myself that because
Kim Davis was not absence -- was not absent that he could
not issue a license.
Q. All right.  And did he explain to you that there was
a statute that only allows him to issue a marriage
license in the absence of the clerk, and since she was
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not absent from the county, he could not issue that
marriage license?
A. Correct.
MR. MANDO:  Thank you, ma'am.
THE COURT:  All right.  Thank you.
Anything else?
MR. SHARP:  Nothing further, Your Honor.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  No further questions.
THE COURT:  No, all right.
You may step down.  Thank you.
THE WITNESS:  Thank you.
THE COURT:  All right.  Next witness, please.
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, the plaintiffs call
Jody Fernandez.
THE COURT:  All right.
     (Whereupon, the witness, JODY FERNANDEZ, was placed 
under oath by the clerk of the Court.) 
THE COURT:  Good afternoon.
THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon.
THE COURT:  You may proceed.
MR. SHARP:  Thank you, Your Honor.
JODY FERNANDEZ, 
having been first duly placed under oath, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
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BY MR. SHARP:  
Q. Ma'am, could you please identify yourself for the
Court?
A. My name is Jody Fernandez.
Q. And could you please spell your last name?
A. F, as in Frank, E-R-N-A-N-D-E-Z.
Q. Ms. Fernandez, where do you live?
A. I live in Morehead, Kentucky.
Q. That's in Rowan County?
A. That is in Rowan County.
Q. And how long have you lived there?
A. I have lived there since 2008.
Q. Ms. Fernandez, I'm now going to ask you some
questions about your personal life as well.
Are you currently in a committed relationship with
another person?
A. Yes, I am, with Kevin Holloway.
Q. Is Kevin one of the other plaintiffs in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  How did the two of you first meet?
A. We met in 2005 in -- while we lived in Florida.  We
all lived in the same neighborhood.
Q. Okay.  And how long have the two of you been in a
relationship together?
A. Since 2006.
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Q. Ms. Fernandez, do you and Mr. Holloway intend to get
married?
A. Yes.
Q. Again, I'm afraid I have to ask.  Why?
A. Because we love each other.
Q. Are there any reasons why the two of you cannot get
married?
MR. GANNAM:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
THE WITNESS:  No.
BY MR. SHARP:  
Q. You're both over the age of 18?
A. Yes.
Q. Neither of you are currently married to someone
else?
A. No.
Q. The two of you are not related by blood?
A. No.
Q. Now, I'm going to ask you about any dealings you may
have had with the Rowan County Clerk's office.
Have you --
A. Go ahead.
Q. I'm sorry.  Have you or Mr. Holloway had an occasion
to seek a marriage license from the Rowan County Clerk's
office?
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MR. GANNAM:  Objection.
THE WITNESS:  Yes.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
THE WITNESS:  Yes.  We went on July 1st to seek
a marriage license.  Both of us went to the office.
BY MR. SHARP:  
Q. And can you please describe for the Court the
circumstances of what happened when -- did you go in
person?
A. We both went in person.  We entered the room.  We
asked the -- there was no one sitting at the desk so we
asked someone else about getting a marriage license.  
And she went back to the office and got Kim Davis,
and Kim Davis came out and told us she was not issuing
marriage licenses.
Q. Did Ms. Davis explain to you why that was the case?
A. No.
Q. What did you and Kevin do after that?
A. After that we walked down the hall, we went to
Dr. Blevins -- Judge Blevins's office, and requested a
marriage license from him.
Q. Okay.  And what did -- what were you informed there?
A. That he was unable to give us a license because
Kim Davis was available in the building.
Q. Is that the meeting that Dr. Miller just talked
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about?
A. Yes.
Q. Did -- other than this explanation for why the
county judge/executive could not issue a marriage
license, did Judge Blevins explain, give you any reasons
why the county clerk was not issuing marriage licenses?
A. No, he did not.
MR. GANNAM:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
BY MR. SHARP:  
Q. How did it make you feel to be denied a marriage
license on two occasions in the same day?
A. We were -- I was quite upset.  That date was --
would have been my father's 81st birthday, and it was an
important date for me.
Q. Have you or Kevin sought to obtain a marriage
license in any other county?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. We live in Rowan County; we work in Rowan County; we
pay taxes in Rowan County; we live walking distance to
the courthouse in Rowan County.  There seemed to be no
need for us to drive to another county to get married.
Q. If you were able to obtain a marriage license in
Rowan County, would you and Kevin get married?
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A. Absolutely.
MR. SHARP:  Nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Any cross?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Yes, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHRISTMAN:  
Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Fernandez.
My name is Jonathan Christman.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. If you were able to obtain a marriage license in
another county in Kentucky, would you and Kevin get
married?
A. We plan to get married, but we wanted to get married
in our county.
Q. So if you got a marriage license from Boyd County,
you would get married; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And how far did you drive to today's hearing?
A. From Morehead it took about an hour.  Mileage I
don't know.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  No further questions.
THE COURT:  Mr. Mando.
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MANDO:  
Q. Just briefly about this short meeting with
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Judge/Executive Blevins.
As I understand it, ma'am, he explained to you that
he was restricted by law.  He could not issue the license
because Ms. Davis was present in the county?
A. That's correct.
MR. MANDO:  All right.  Thank you, ma'am.
THE COURT:  You may step down.  Thank you.
All right.  Next witness.
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, if I may, defense
counsel previously indicated the defendant Kim Davis was
not in the courthouse and was available.  The Court later
seemed to indicate that she was in Boyd County.
THE COURT:  No, I just thought because Boyd --
that she was in Boyd County because I thought she was
here for the hearing.
MR. SHARP:  Well --
THE COURT:  That was my supposition I suppose.
MR. SHARP:  -- based on defense counsel's
representation that she wasn't in the courthouse, she was
available, we would call Defendant Kim Davis to the
stand, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Is she here?
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, Ms. Davis is not
available to testify.  We believe that her appearance
today would potentially waive her objection to service
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and this Court's jurisdiction; and, therefore, she will
not be here.
THE COURT:  All right.
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, I mean, we're prepared
to serve counsel for Ms. Davis.
THE COURT:  Well, they're not going to
accept service.  I mean, unless he's changed his tune,
which I -- are you willing to accept service on her
behalf?
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, the rules provide a
quid pro quo.  If waiver of service is requested, it
provides more time to the defendant to respond.  We
would -- 
THE COURT:  To respond to -- for the answer,
sure, but not for the motion.
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, we are not willing to
accept service at this point.
THE COURT:  No.
MR. SHARP:  I mean, I --
THE COURT:  Do you have any other witnesses to
call?
MR. SHARP:  We do, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Why don't you call your other
witnesses then?  
MR. SHARP:  Thank you.
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB   Doc #: 21   Filed: 07/16/15   Page: 40 of 112 - Page ID#: 139      Case: 15-5880     Document: 15-5     Filed: 08/19/2015    Page: 41 (105 of 313)
    41BARRY SPARTMAN - DIRECT BY MR. CANON
We now call Barry Spartman, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  Come around, sir.
BARRY SPARTMAN, 
having been first duly placed under oath, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CANON:  
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Spartman.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. Would you please identify yourself, and state your
full name for the Court?
A. Yes.  My name is Barry Spartman.
Q. Can you spell your last name, please?
A. Yes.  It's S-P-A-R-T-M-A-N.
Q. And, Mr. Spartman, how are you employed?
A. I work in Rowan County at Morehead State University.
Q. And do you also live in Rowan County?
A. Yes.
Q. And how long have you lived there?
A. I have lived in Rowan County for over 20 years.
Q. Very good.  And are you currently in a committed
relationship with anybody?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell the Court who that is?
A. Yes.  That is Aaron Skaggs.
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Q. And is Mr. Skaggs also a plaintiff in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. And how did the two of you first meet?
A. We met in college through mutual friends.
Q. And do you know approximately when that was?
A. It was around '98.
Q. And so the two -- how long have the two -- let me
ask you this.  How long have the two of you been in a
committed relationship?
A. We've been together for 21 years.
Q. And have you-all developed the intention to get
married?
A. Yes.
Q. And I know this seems like a silly question, but why
do you want to get married?
A. We've been in a very long-term relationship, and we
love each other, and we do want to spend the rest of our
lives together.
Q. And I think you said you've been living as a couple
for 21 years?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you first decide to get married?
A. We've talked about it before the Supreme Court
decision on and off.
Q. In -- 
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A. After the decision came down, that's when we
realized that if it actually come to be, that we would be
married.
Q. And is there -- is there any reason why the two of
you can't be married that you know of?
A. No.
Q. Now that the Obergefell decision is in?
A. No.
Q. You're not related by blood?
A. No.
Q. You're both over the age of 18?
A. Yes.
Q. And you're not currently married to someone else,
are you?
A. No.
Q. And let me ask you a couple of questions about the
dealings that you've had with the Rowan County Clerk's
office.  Have you spoken to anybody in that office
personally?
A. Yes.  We were prepared to go to the courthouse to
get a marriage license, and beforehand we called the
courthouse.
Q. Let me stop you there.  What day was that?
A. It was Tuesday, June 30th.
Q. Okay.  Go on.
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A. We wanted to -- since this was completely new to us,
we wanted to make sure that we had the correct documents
or anything that we may need to get the license rather
than go to the courthouse and not have what was
necessary.
Q. And what happened?
A. The person on the phone basically said that they
were not issuing licenses --
MR. GANNAM:  Objection.
THE WITNESS:  -- to anyone.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
Who did you call?
THE WITNESS:  The clerk's office.
THE COURT:  The Rowan County Clerk's office?
THE WITNESS:  Rowan County Clerk's office,
that's correct.
THE COURT:  And were told what by whoever
answered the phone?
THE WITNESS:  They said that they weren't
issuing any marriage licenses and don't bother coming
down.
THE COURT:  All right.  Overruled.
BY MR. CANON:  
Q. And so did you go down there anyway after that?
A. After that we were pretty disappointed and
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frustrated.
Q. Now, prior to that time had you received any
information that the Rowan County Clerk's office had
stopped issuing marriage licenses?
A. We had seen an article, yes.
Q. Okay.  And did you -- did you have any reason to
think what those -- what the reasons were for the clerk's
refusal to issue licenses?
MR. GANNAM:  Objection.
THE COURT:  What was the question?
MR. CANON:  The question was, did he have any
basis to believe -- for -- to understand what the reasons
were for the clerk to refuse to issue licenses.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Overruled.
THE WITNESS:  Yes.  There -- it was clearly
quoted that it was because of her deep religious beliefs.
BY MR. CANON:  
Q. And you say it was quoted.  You saw news articles,
or -- 
A. Yes.
Q. -- tell the Court about that.
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay.  And any other reasons you can think of?
A. No.  Basically -- I'm sorry.  There was also she
would not issue licenses that, therefore, she wasn't
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discriminating.
Q. And I take it you've not been able to obtain a
marriage license in Rowan County since then?
A. No.
Q. Did you attempt to obtain a license from the
county judge/executive?
A. No, we did not.  We did contact his office but did
not physically go there.
Q. Well, what happened when you contacted his office?
A. Basically the same response, that he could not
issue --
MR. GANNAM:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
THE WITNESS:  He could not issue a marriage
license.
BY MR. CANON:  
Q. And did he tell you why?
A. Because Kim Davis was not absent from her job.
Q. How did that make you feel to not be able to get a
marriage license in the county where you work and live
and pay taxes?
A. Pretty frustrated, kind of furious.
Q. Do you know if you can obtain a marriage license in
any other county?
A. Yes, I'm aware that we can.
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Q. Have you tried to do that?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. Because we pay taxes.  We've lived in Rowan County
and Morehead since the beginning of our relationship.
And that's our home, and that's where we want to obtain
that license and get married.
Q. Now, if you could get a license in Rowan County, you
would go get it, wouldn't you?
A. Yes.
MR. CANON:  Nothing further.
THE COURT:  Cross?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Yes, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHRISTMAN:  
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Spartman.
My name is John Christman.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. Mr. Spartman, there's nothing preventing you from
staying in a committed relationship, as you said, with
Mr. Skaggs; is that correct?
A. No.  Yes, that's correct, there's nothing.
Q. And nobody has stopped you from having a commitment
ceremony; correct?
A. That's correct.
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Q. And you haven't gone to any other county to try to
obtain a marriage license, that's correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  None of the neighboring counties around
Rowan County?
A. Correct.
Q. And you haven't come to Boyd County to try and
obtain a marriage license?
A. No.  It would be very inconvenient to drive an hour
for something we could get in our own home county.
Q. If you could get a marriage license from another
county, would you and Mr. Skaggs attempt to get married?
A. Yes, we would.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  No further questions.
Thank you.
THE COURT:  Mr. Mando.
MR. MANDO:  No questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  You may step down.
Thank you.
Next witness.
MR. SHARP:  No further witnesses, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  Any witnesses?
MR. GANNAM:  No, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  We're going to set a --
we're going to recess the evidentiary portion of this
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hearing in progress.
As soon as you file a notice of service of
Kim Davis, 24 hours after she's served we'll reconvene
this hearing in Covington.  So whenever that is.  The
only conflict would be tomorrow afternoon.  I'm going to
the All-Star game so I'm not going to be hearing it at
8:00 tomorrow night.
So we'll give you -- we'll have 24-hour notice,
and then we'll have the hearing in Covington whenever
she's served.
MR. SHARP:  Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor -- 
THE COURT:  Yes, sir.
MR. GANNAM:  -- may I request that that be
48 instead of 24, just because of the time it takes to
travel from our office in Florida to Covington?
And I would secondly request that should this
process coincide with this Thursday and Friday of this
week, I am due in Washington, D.C., for a deposition in
another case.  We just ask the Court to accommodate those
two requests as part of this process.
THE COURT:  Will the attorneys approach the
bench, please?
(Whereupon, a bench conference was had with the 
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Court and counsel out of the hearing of the open court, 
as follows.) 
THE COURT:  All right.  Let the record reflect
we're at the bench.
And I'm trying to be as accommodating as I can.
The service thing, I recognize that she hasn't been
served right now.
Is Ms. Davis, did you say she's not going to
testify today?  Is she available today?
MR. GANNAM:  Well, we won't produce her today,
Your Honor.
THE COURT:  You won't produce her.  Do you know
where she is?
MR. GANNAM:  I do know where she is, yes,
Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  You -- 
MR. GANNAM:  Well, actually, I don't know where
she is.  I know how to get in touch with her.
THE COURT:  Well, I'm just trying to -- and I
brought this up because I know Mr. Mando has heard me say
this.  I try to just -- I'm trying to get the train on
the tracks.  I'm trying to get the ball down the field.
I'm trying to get the evidence in that is necessary one
way or the other.  And we're all here.
I mean, you're asking me to accommodate your
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request, and I want to accommodate the lawyers as much as
I can because I want to be a judge that's accommodating,
not a judge that's obstructionist, not that I know any
that are.  But ultimately if she's here -- if we could
get her here to testify, it would help everyone.
MR. GANNAM:  I understand, Your Honor, and -- 
THE COURT:  And eventually she's going to be
served, and eventually we're going to hear the evidence.
I mean, it's a -- well, I mean, she can be hit by a truck
tomorrow and die and never appear.  I mean, that could be
a -- it could happen.
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, we also do not desire
to be an obstructionist.
THE COURT:  I'm not saying that you are.
MR. GANNAM:  But in this case this is a
complaint filed where they've sued her individually.
Their seeking punitive damages against her.  It's
certainly not --
THE COURT:  Are you seeking punitive damages?
MR. SHARP:  No, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  I haven't --
MR. GANNAM:  -- her responsibility to assist
the plaintiffs in their obligation to serve us.
THE COURT:  No, I know you're not, but we're
trying to accommodate everyone here, and --
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MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, we believe that her
appearing here today will prejudice her rights to object
to the Court not having jurisdiction over the prelim, and
that's the reason why.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Well, eventually she'll --
well --
MR. GANNAM:  She will -- she will appear,
Your Honor, and she will have to, and we want that day to
occur, but we don't want it to occur prematurely.  And we
will -- we will produce her at the appropriate time when
she's been served, and we have the ability for her to be
subject to the Court's jurisdiction.
MR. WATKINS:  Judge, I will -- 
THE COURT:  You need to speak into the
microphone.  I'm sorry.
MR. WATKINS:  I will be out of town July 25th
through August 2nd, if we can at least have a hearing
prior to then.
THE COURT:  Well, Mr. Mando would be --
hopefully you're not going anywhere.
MR. MANDO:  No, sir.
THE COURT:  Well, I'm going to be in Columbia,
Kentucky, on Thursday.  We can recess this in
Adair County, but I don't think we'll want to do that.  
Well -- and the service thing, I mean, I'm
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB   Doc #: 21   Filed: 07/16/15   Page: 52 of 112 - Page ID#: 151      Case: 15-5880     Document: 15-5     Filed: 08/19/2015    Page: 53 (117 of 313)
    53
   
not -- this could have been prevented just with personal
service.  I'm just -- it's -- so there's --
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor -- 
THE COURT:  -- enough to kind of -- there's
gifts for everyone here at the bench.  But I'm a little
bit --
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, with all due respect,
we had -- we had no reason to suspect that
Ms. Davis wouldn't pick up her mail as did the
county judge/executive.
THE COURT:  Well, if it's -- do you believe -- 
MR. SHARP:  I mean -- 
THE COURT:  -- that she just didn't pick up her
mail?
MR. SHARP:  Well, I don't know.  When we find
out, we'll -- when we get her here, we'll certainly ask
her.  Well, I mean, the county was served.
THE COURT:  Well, but once she's served she's
served.  I don't think it's -- it seems kind of petty.  I
mean, if everybody wants their --
MR. SHARP:  And we don't want to -- we're not
interested in fighting over issues that are not worthy of
fighting over, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Well, all right.  We're going to
hear argument.  I know we're recessing it, and I do want
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to hear kind of a preliminary -- your preliminary
thoughts on some issues that I have to raise with
counsel.
But what we'll do, your 48-hour request will be
granted.  I won't set anything earlier than next Monday.
MR. GANNAM:  Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  And what we'll do, if you would
file a notice of service -- and you can object to the
service if you think that it's not appropriate under the
rules, and then we'll litigate the service.  But once
she's formally served, file a notice within -- forthwith.
We'll contact -- we'll put on an order not earlier than
48 hours from that date.  It won't be this week.  It will
be no earlier than Monday.  But you're leaving on the
25th -- 
MR. WATKINS:  25th.  
THE COURT:  -- which would be --
MR. WATKINS:  That's a Saturday.
THE COURT:  So probably a day next week in
Covington.
All right.  Very well.  Thank you.
MR. WATKINS:  Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. GANNAM:  Thank you, Your Honor.
(Whereupon, the bench conference concluded, and 
the proceedings continued on the record in open court, 
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as follows.) 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Well, we are going to
reconvene the hearing in progress in Covington after
Ms. Davis is formally served.
As I indicated here at the bench, we'll set
that matter for a date not earlier than next Monday to
accommodate counsels' schedules.
Now, let me turn to my questions here.
And I will allow a written response.  I've
already indicated that will be due on the 30th of July.
All right.  In Obergefell -- is that the right
pronunciation of that?
MR. CANON:  O-ber-ge-fell, Judge.
THE COURT:  Ober -- 
MR. CANON:  Ge-fell.
THE COURT:  Obergefell?
MR. CANON:  Yes.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Obergefell, okay.  
I've read that case a couple of times, the four
dissents a couple of times.  It's clear that whether or
not anybody individually disagrees with the ruling, the
ruling is individuals have a fundamental constitutional
right to marry under the Fourth -- Fourteenth Amendment.
In this particular case we have a defendant who
has made public comments that she, because of her
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religious convictions, is not going to be issuing any
marriage licenses at all, which, I guess, takes equal
protection issue off the table potentially, but not the
fundamental right issue under the Fourteenth Amendment.
What is the government's compelling state
interest in her refusal to issue marriage licenses?
Either one of -- I mean, from the defendant's
standpoint.  I mean, that's your -- we've got a
fundamental right.  I mean, all of us have taken
Con Law 1 from law school, depending on whether or not it
impinges on what type of right it impinges on, that
dictates the standard of review under the case law.  
We've got a fundamental right involved.  I
mean, we're not contesting that.  That's what the
Supreme Court has held.  So what is the compelling state
interest?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Your Honor, the fundamental
right --
THE COURT:  Please stand, please.  Thank you.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  The compelling state interest
is only applicable in the context where strict scrutiny
would apply, and there are cases that plaintiffs cited in
their motion for preliminary injunction that the
fundamental right to marry, the strict scrutiny analysis
requiring a compelling government interest is a direct
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and substantial burden on the fundamental right to marry.
THE COURT:  Okay.  What's the substan -- what's
the compelling state interest?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Again, that's assuming --
THE COURT:  No, what's the compelling state
interest?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  We would argue that it's not a
compelling government interest that --
THE COURT:  Okay.  What's the standard that -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- needs to apply.
THE COURT:  -- applies then?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  The standard that should apply
here with respect to plaintiffs' request would be a
rational basis first.
THE COURT:  Why, if it involves a fundamental
right?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Because the fundamental right
to marriage cases you get the strict scrutiny if it's a
direct and substantial burden on the fundamental right to
marry.  Not every -- 
THE COURT:  Okay.  They've gone down to get a
license in the county they live, and she refuses to give
it.  Why isn't that a direct burden on their right?  
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Because it's not -- 
THE COURT:  Because they can go over to
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB   Doc #: 21   Filed: 07/16/15   Page: 57 of 112 - Page ID#: 156      Case: 15-5880     Document: 15-5     Filed: 08/19/2015    Page: 58 (122 of 313)
    58
   
Carter County or Fayette County and get the license?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Is that why?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  They can go to the neighboring
counties.  They can go to the -- 
THE COURT:  Why do they need to go to the
neighboring county?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Well, I'm explaining and
answering your question as to why it's not a direct and
substantial burden.  It calls for a substantial burden
analysis themselves on why their fundamental right to
marry is being directly and substantially burdened.  They
can go to neighboring counties.  They can go to numerous
other counties --
THE COURT:  So does the county -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- across the state. 
THE COURT:  Does the county reimburse them for
going to the neighboring county?  Is Kim Davis going to
write them a check for mileage to go to the other county?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Well, they haven't -- they
haven't made the attempt.  As the plaintiffs conceded,
none of them have even attempted to go to another county
to try to obtain a license.  All they've done is
exclusively try to go to the Rowan County Clerk's office.
A few of them testified that they did even try
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to go to Chief Judge/Executive Walter Blevins.  
And I would submit to the Court that under
Kentucky Revised Statute 402.240 it says that in the
absence of the county clerk or the vacancy of the office,
that the county judge or executive may issue marriage
licenses.
So that statute already -- under Kentucky law
there's already a provision for if the county clerk
cannot issue a license that --
THE COURT:  Why can't she issue the license?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Which license?
THE COURT:  Why can't Kim Davis issue the
marriage licenses?  Why?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Well, it depends on which
plaintiff we're talking about because for --
THE COURT:  Okay.  Well, let's say Plaintiff
April Miller, why can't she issue the license to
April Miller?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  For Ms. Miller -- overall
Ms. Davis stopped issuing all marriage licenses because
she wanted to ensure that people who were coming to seek
marriage licenses were treated equally, that they were
given the same treatment by -- 
THE COURT:  Okay.  But why can't -- why can't
she issue the one to Miller?
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MR. CHRISTMAN:  For -- in addition to that why
she can't issue the license to Miller is because
Ms. Miller wanted to be married to another woman.  And
the count -- the mandated form from Kentucky from the
Department of Libraries and Archives, the marriage form
itself, Ms. Davis has no choice, no discretion over the
license that has to be issued to a couple.  It's
prescribed from the governor's office through the
Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives, and it's
that form.  It's uniform under Kentucky statute.  I can
provide the citation.
THE COURT:  Okay.  What's wrong with the form?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  So the form requires the county
clerk on four occasions, or at a minimum at least two,
for every license that the county clerk issues she has to
give her approval at least two times on that license with
her name and affixing her signature, name, her sign of
approval for the marriage license.
THE COURT:  But is it a sign of approval, or is
it more a ministerial act?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  It's a sign of approval --
THE COURT:  Approval.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- because it's her name.  So
as a -- as a public record when that marriage license is
issued, it becomes solemnized by someone that can
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solemnize the marriage, and then comes back to be
recorded.  It's a public record in Rowan County that the
Rowan County Clerk's office has issued, is the one with
the authority to bless, approve, sign the marriage
license.
And that form requires Ms. Davis when two
individuals come in, or whoever comes in, asking for a
marriage license requires her, even -- and I said there
were two or four.  So the deputy clerks in her office
there is -- for four of the spaces that require her name
or signature to be on, two of those under Kentucky law
can be completed by the deputy clerks in a Kentucky
county office.
THE COURT:  Why -- in the absence of a clerk,
like if I go to my home county Campbell -- and we have a
new clerk.  Jim Luersen is the new clerk.  I think the
only time I've been down there is to vote absentee and to
get my driver's license.  The clerk -- I don't think I've
ever had any act -- ever -- I've never had any
interaction with the clerk himself.  I think it was
Tom Calme before that.  I never saw the clerk.  The
deputies would take my money and my information and then
issue my driver's license.  I mean, it may be signed by
the clerk, but it's not -- I mean, it's stamped by the
clerk.
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MR. CHRISTMAN:  Yeah.  There are --
THE COURT:  What are you -- what are you
talking about here?  
MR. CHRISTMAN:  There are --
THE COURT:  You said two or four.  You're
confusing me here.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Right.  And, I mean, I could --
we could show at the appropriate time what --
THE COURT:  How about now?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- a license --
THE COURT:  I think now is the appropriate
time.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  We
actually -- we actually have a copy of what the license
looked like immediately prior to the Obergefell decision
on June 26th, and then on June 30th with the governor of
Kentucky said, "I'm going to instruct and direct my
Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives to issue a
new form --"
THE COURT:  Okay.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  "-- because Kentucky is now
going to recognize and issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples."
THE COURT:  Right.  So now we're -- I think the
one that's really relevant now is the one that's
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post-6/30/2015.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Right.  And there's very little
that was changed.  We just wanted to show that to
Your Honor that there is very little that changed before
and after.
But there are four spots.  You'll see in the
middle of the form with the one that is redacted because
it was easier to draw your attention to.  
THE COURT:  Yes.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Where it says, issued this
month, day, year, in the office of, and then it says,
name, comma, county.  And in those spots on every form is
Kim Davis.  Every marriage license form that comes out of
Rowan County has to have her name right there.  That's
prescribed by -- Kentucky marriage law requires her name
there.
Immediately below that is where it says
recorder's name, and that is a spot that under Kentucky
marriage law allows either the county clerk's name to be
there or a deputy clerk.
THE COURT:  Okay.  So if the statute was
amended to allow for a deputy clerk to sign off on all of
this, would that change all of your opinion of this case?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  What -- what it would change if
you take -- if you take Kim Davis's requirement of having
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affix her name and approval of that marriage off of the
license and put it onto the hands and the authority of
somebody else, that's not her name, it's not her
approval, she doesn't have to bless that marriage,
then -- 
THE COURT:  Well, she's not blessing anything.
She's just signing it as a representative of the county.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Yeah, she's approving.  Under
the statute is what it says, that --
THE COURT:  Well, you keep using the word
"bless."  I mean -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- under the authority --
THE COURT:  -- blessing is something we talk
about in church.  I mean, she's signing it because she's
the county clerk.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  She's authorized.  The statutes
use the word authorized -- 
THE COURT:  Right.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- approved.
THE COURT:  Right.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  And so, yeah, if you remove --
if the State of Kentucky or the Commonwealth of Kentucky
removes the statutory requirement that a county clerk
must authorize and approve these licenses, then that
would eliminate for Ms. Davis -- when Ms. Miller walked
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in for a marriage license, that would eliminate the
religious conscientious objection that Ms. Davis has to
having her name, signature, and approval on that license.
There are -- there are other ways -- again,
there are less restrictive means, other ways in which
Ms. Davis's religious objection can be accommodated.  For
example -- 
THE COURT:  Well, is that the -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- you were actually talking
about your driver's license.  There are numbers of things
that people can get in a county.  In fact, one of them is
a fishing license.  Well -- 
THE COURT:  I do that online.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  You can do it online, and
that's certainly an option that's out there.  Other --
other states across the country have done this where they
move marriage out of a particular county clerk's office
and put it in the hands of the state or the Commonwealth
that people sitting in their living room, you know, can
go on their iPad and get a marriage license as long as
they verify who they are, and they pay the fee.
THE COURT:  No, those are -- these are all
prospective things that could impact this case.  I mean,
if the state were to go to online marriage licenses and
have the -- I guess it would be the -- is there a
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commissioner of that particular -- who was it that prints
out these forms?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  It comes from the Kentucky
Department of Libraries and Archives.  It's a branch -- 
THE COURT:  Yeah.  Is there a commissioner of
Department of Libraries --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  There is -- 
THE COURT:  -- and Archives?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  There is a commissioner.
There's a commissioner that --
THE COURT:  That commissioner would sign off on
all of those I suppose.  If you went to an online system,
I would assume that that's what would be who would sign
that.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  And the -- yeah, the license
would come issued and -- 
THE COURT:  All right.  
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- approved out of the
Commonwealth's office.  There are several other exempt --
there are --
THE COURT:  You're going to have to keep your
voice up because it's getting hot in here.  Why don't you
come over to the podium so we can hear you.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  That -- Your Honor, that was --
that's one of the options that's available.  
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And actually I was briefly about to mention
that there are several other licenses, different things,
that people can get from a county, and one of them is a
fishing license.  And Kentucky actually has an exemption
for county clerks that they can choose to submit
something in writing to this -- to the Commonwealth that
they can exempt themselves from their requirement to
actually issue a fishing license.
The cite for that would be Kentucky Revised
Statute 150.195.  So you --
THE COURT:  Why would they ever to that?  Do
they have an objection to issuing a fishing license?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Well, people might have
different kinds of objection to different things.  And
what it shows, and evidence is, is that the legislature
and the governor know how to sit down and figure out how
to accommodate different exemptions.
THE COURT:  Is that something that can be done
by executive order?  
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Actually --
THE COURT:  Does anybody know?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Yes.  In this country there are
two examples at least already in Louisiana, not too far
from here, where Governor Jindal--
THE COURT:  Well, it's pretty far from here.
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MR. CHRISTMAN:  I'm coming from Florida so
Louisiana is not too far from here.  
Where Bobby Jindal, the governor in that state,
actually issued an executive order that was entitled
Marriage and Conscience Order giving exemptions to a
whole litany of different people that would qualify.
Recently, after the Obergefell decision,
Governor Brownback in Kansas also issued an executive
order related to religious conscience and religious
exemption.  Both of the gubernatorial candidates in this
state in recent news articles have talked about when --
THE COURT:  In what state?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Kentucky.
THE COURT:  We only have one now.  I mean,
Bevin, didn't he win the primary?  Who's the other one?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  I believe it was Bevin is the
republican candidate, and the --
THE COURT:  Oh, Jack Conway.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- current attorney general
is -- 
THE COURT:  Oh, okay, Jack Conway, okay, okay. 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- running for governor.  
THE COURT:  I was just thinking Republicans
because --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  I apologize for devolving into
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Kentucky politics for the moment.  I'm certainly not
an --
THE COURT:  I'm familiar with Kentucky
politics.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- expert on them.  But both --
both of them have made public statements that related to
religious conscience about the legislature taking this
up, thinking about it to both work with what the
Supreme Court has said in Obergefell, but also then work
with a person like Kim Davis who has to affix her name
and approval on every license.  And that's -- that's
what's at issue here.  We're not talking about -- as
plaintiffs conceded and admitted in their testimony, they
can get a license other places.  They can obtain it.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky is not here saying
we're not going to issue you a license.  That's not what
Kentucky says.
In fact, what Kentucky says through
Governor Beshear, through Attorney General Conway, is
that we are recognizing same-sex marriages, both those
here in Kentucky, as well as all of the other states, if
you move to Kentucky, we will recognize your same-sex
marriage.
So Kentucky is not saying you can't get a
marriage license.  And that's what's different going back
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to some of those --
THE COURT:  The county -- well, what's
happening here is the county clerk is saying she's not
going to issue it.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Because of -- because -- she's
not issuing any licenses right now because she wants to
comply with her obligations and duties to treat people
equally.
THE COURT:  Well, by doing that she's denying
the rights to anyone to get a marriage license in her
county.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Well, it goes back to the
direct and substantial burden, and is that fundamental
right to marry being directly and substantially burdened?
They can go to these other counties.  They'll get -- they
can get licenses there.  They can go to Rowan County and
go to the chief -- the county judge, the county
executive, who under Kentucky law, under current Kentucky
law, he may issue the license.
THE COURT:  Even if she's sitting downstairs?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  What the statute says is in the
absence of --
THE COURT:  Or upstairs, wherever it is.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Any absence of the county
clerk, the county -- the county judge or executive may --
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THE COURT:  How is that defined absence?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- issue the license.  The
statute -- 
THE COURT:  Is that an absence, physically
absent, or just because she has a conscientious objection
to issuing a license?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Your Honor, I think it's both.
The statute does not define absence so it's left for
interpretation.  It says, "in the absence of county clerk
or vacancy in the office."  So vacancy in the office
needs to be treated separately.
In other words, there's an instance where we
can have a gap in time where there's nobody in the
position of county clerk.  That's vacancy.  So in the
absence --
THE COURT:  Someone resigns.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Someone resigns.
THE COURT:  Right.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Various things could happen
that somebody -- there's nobody in the office, you have
to call special election.
Absence can happen in several different ways.
Somebody could be absent for a medical reason.  Somebody
could be absent because of a religious conscious
objection.  They could be absent because they're on
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vacation.  There are several ways in which somebody could
be absent from being able to be the county clerk who
issues the license.
And what Kentucky marriage law then provides
is if the county clerk is absent, you can go to the
chief judge and that chief judge may then issue a license
to you through a memorandum.  
And what the plaintiffs have testified to
is that they went to the chief judge, the county
judge/executive, and he said no.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Let me ask this.  Let me ask
this question.  You represent Ms. Davis in her individual
and official capacity to the extent that she's ultimately
going to be served, both official and individual
capacity; correct?
MR. GANNAM:  Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.  If you bring -- you brought
this action under 1983 and have requested attorneys'
fees; correct?
MR. SHARP:  Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  All right.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Your Honor, so there is no
evidence that -- other than the admission now that the
plaintiffs actually tried the option in Rowan County.  So
there was another option that the law provided to them,
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that Mr. Blevins chose not to issue the license.
Mr. Blevins isn't before this Court so I'm not going to
presume upon his reasons for not issuing the license.
But there is that option, along with all these other
counties.  
And by the governor's own statements that this
issue about individuals within Kentucky their inability
to obtain a marriage license, again, it's not -- this is
not the pre-Obergefell world.  If a same-sex couple
walked into one of the 120 Kentucky counties on
June 25th, 2015, not a single one of them could have
gotten a marriage license from Kentucky on that day.
Because why?  At that point the Kentucky
Constitution said what marriage was between one man and
one woman.  Kentucky statute said that.  
THE COURT:  Well, that's -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Kentucky Supreme Court, so --
THE COURT:  That's all well and good, but
that's pre-Supreme Court decision.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Right.  And so it's to show
that -- and that county clerk in that instance
couldn't -- wasn't even permitted under the law, didn't
have any ability to issue the license.
Now the governor has come out, Kentucky has
come out and said we're recognizing and we're issuing
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marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and here's the
form you must use, mandatory, prescribed.  And that form
requires Kim Davis to put her name and her approval on
it.
The governor said this is not a widespread
issue, that this is limited in terms of the counties
where the county clerks, one of whom is Ms. Davis, is
unwilling to issue the marriage license.  This is a much
different world from before.  And that's why it goes back
to the fundamental right to marry is not being
substantially burden because --
THE COURT:  Well --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- in those cases it was to a
class.  It was to classes of people on statewide
policies.  And in --
THE COURT:  Well, they filed a motion for
class cert -- well, you filed it as a purported class
action.  I mean, the class is very small right now
potentially --  
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Right.
THE COURT:  -- because of 119 other counties
are not objecting.
Is that fair?  
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, the proposed class is
defined in the complaint as present and future
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individuals who would seek to obtain a marriage license
in Rowan County.  The proposed classes would not be
statewide.
THE COURT:  It would just be one county?
MR. SHARP:  One county.
THE COURT:  Right.  
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Kentucky law does not require
these couples to get a marriage license in Rowan County.
Kentucky law --
THE COURT:  I understand that.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- let's them go wherever.
THE COURT:  I understand that, I do.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Loving versus Virginia, all
these fundamental right-to-marry cases all dealt with
statewide policies that prohibited groups of people by
class identification from being married.  Loving versus
Virginia was a Virginia law, a ban on interracial
marriages.
THE COURT:  Right, right.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Zablocki was a Wisconsin law
that prevented parents who had support obligations still
owed to children that they had support -- child support
obligations to, if that wasn't paid in full, they
couldn't get a license.  It was a statewide policy.
In the Turner v. Safley case, which they cited
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in their papers, it was a Missouri statewide regulation.
In the case that was up at the Supreme Court in
Obergefell rising from Kentucky, it was a statewide
answer.
Here we're not talking about statewide.  What's
statewide as the general policy and the general rule is
what Governor Beshear said, what Attorney General Conway
said, is that marriage for any two people, subject to
some other requirements, that it's open for all, that
here's the form.  You can walk -- you can go get married,
and we'll recognize your marriage.  We'll give all the
privileges, all the benefits that come from marriage.
Kentucky can do it.  These people can -- these plaintiffs
can go to the neighboring counties.  They can go to these
other things.
THE COURT:  Well, why should they have to?  Why
should they have to?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Four -- there are four sets of
couples who are plaintiffs in this case.  Again, I'll go
back to as my initial answer the reason for four is
because Ms. Davis does not want to issue -- does not want
to make any steps that would be seen as not treating
couples equally so --
THE COURT:  Right.  Now, how many --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- she does --
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THE COURT:  Hold on, hold on.  When was she
elected?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  She was elected in November of
2014 and --
THE COURT:  So she has -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- took office --
THE COURT:  Is it a four-year term?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  It's a four-year term.
THE COURT:  So for the next four years no
marriage licenses at all in Rowan County?  Is that -- is
that what's going to happen?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  I believe -- I believe that
there's an easier solution, and there are -- and it --
THE COURT:  Well, what's the -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- can be easily resolved.
THE COURT:  -- easier solution?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Well, we talked about some
other less restrictive alternatives and means that can
happen, is the -- remember, in Rowan County they can get
a license.  They can get one from Judge Blevins as well.
THE COURT:  Well, that's something I want to -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Apparently they're saying --
THE COURT:  That's something I want to explore
at some point with Mr. Mando.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  We'll cabin that.
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So another option is that, as I mentioned
earlier, there are other legislative and executive
options that are available that as that --
THE COURT:  Well, they may not -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- other states -- 
THE COURT:  -- be available now.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  They're not available today,
but states are already working to take steps, and both of
the candidates have indicated that this is something that
they want to --
THE COURT:  Well, that's probably not going to
happen -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- to take up and address.
THE COURT:  -- until the spring anyway.  That
wouldn't happen until the spring.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Yeah.
THE COURT:  I can't imagine them calling a
legislative session for this one issue.  That would seem
a little --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  And the current -- 
THE COURT:  -- bit expensive.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Admittedly, the current
governor has said that he will not call a current -- a
special session right now for it.
But there are other -- there are other ways for
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licenses to begin to get issued because the governor can
work with the KDLA -- 
THE COURT:  Okay.  
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- to revise the form in the
interim and, again, going back to the four couples.
So that's why everybody -- that's why no one is
getting a marriage license with Kim Davis's authorization
and signature right now.
Now, for the two couples who came -- there is
one couple that was two women and another couple that was
two men.  For those two couples Ms. Davis has a sincerely
held religious belief and a religious conscience
objection that prevents her name and her affixing her
name and signature to those licenses.  She does not --
we'll present evidence that she does not have a
religious -- a sincerely held religious belief,
conscientious objection, to issuing a license to a couple
that's one man and one woman because --
THE COURT:  Do you know what religion she is?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  She's a professing Christian,
Your Honor.
THE COURT:  She's a Christian, okay.  All
right, all right.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  And when she took office as the
elected county clerk, she -- at the time -- the day she
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took office it was January 1st, 2015.  Or maybe it wasn't
the 1st.  It was the first Monday of January in the new
year.  When she took office at that moment, what marriage
was in Kentucky was one man, one woman.  The
constitutional amendment, the legislative act, the
Sixth Circuit case at that point had overruled
Judge Heyburn's decision from the Western District, had
reversed that.  
So there was no question at that point what the
law of marriage in Kentucky was.  And that law comported
with what Ms. Davis's sincerely held religious beliefs
were at that moment.
After she took office, and only after, is when
the Supreme Court even granted certiorari in the
Obergefell case.  That happened on January 16th of 2015.
And we'll present evidence from Ms. Davis that
from the moment the Obergefell decision, the cert
petition was granted, knowing that Kentucky's law there
was going to be a decision on it, that Ms. Davis began to
take steps that she could to alert legislators in
Kentucky, representatives, that depending on how this
goes, this is going to be a real issue for me because of
my religious, conscientious objection and what I believe
marriage to be.
She swore an oath to the Constitution, the
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United States Constitution, the Kentucky Constitution, so
help me God, that the entire oath was an oath that was --
it's built into the oath is inherent inalienable
protections for her conscience, for her religious
liberties, for her freedom.
THE COURT:  Well, she -- didn't she -- you
mentioned the oath.  Did the oath require her to uphold
the Constitution?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  And she is upholding the
Constitution.
THE COURT:  Well, now, the -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  What she took an oath -- 
THE COURT:  -- definition of fundamental right
to marry has changed in the last two weeks.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  The Supreme -- 
THE COURT:  Well, the Supreme Court hasn't
changed.  It's been --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  The Supreme -- 
THE COURT:  -- the Supreme Court has upheld the
Fourteenth Amendment due process, fundamental right to
marry same-sex couples.  That's different now than it was
in March of this year.  So the Constitution -- she took
an oath to uphold the Constitution.  The Constitution has
now been expanded, if you will, to include same-sex
marriage.
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MR. CHRISTMAN:  Your Honor, I would submit that
the Constitution only expands by way of amendment and -- 
THE COURT:  Well, okay.  Listen, we're --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- she took an oath.  I don't
want -- 
THE COURT:  -- not going to --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- to -- you said -- 
COURT REPORTER:  I can only take one at a time.  
THE COURT:  Yes, thank you.
From the standpoint -- you're talking to
somebody who generally speaking is -- I look at the
Constitution and somebody can say it changes, it's a
living, breathing document.  Some people say that.  Some
people say it's what it says is what it should be.  And
we probably got lots of people in this room that agree
with one or the other.
Now, I took an oath to uphold the law 13 plus
years ago.  The Supreme Court in matters like this has
the last say.
Now, from a -- in a civilized society we set it
up that way.  We've got district courts, we have
appellate courts, and then we have the Supreme Court.
And if you get to the Supreme Court and they
make a final ruling -- and I apologize for using the word
amendment because I know how the constitutional amendment
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process works.  I did go to law school.  I'm pretty
familiar with that.  I'm sure you're aware of it as well.  
But the Supreme Court made its ruling.  That's
what from a constitutional Fourteenth Amendment
perspective there's a fundamental right to marry to
both same and opposite-sex couples.  That's what the
Supreme Court says the Constitution includes now, whether
it be -- it's not an amendment to the Constitution, but
it's held to be a fundamental right.
I'm here to uphold the Constitution, among
other things.  Individuals who take oaths who are there
to uphold the Constitution have to do that as well.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Yes.
THE COURT:  So, I mean, I'm trying to follow
your point.  I mean, she took this oath to uphold the
Constitution.  The Constitution may not be what it was
when she took office.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Yes, Your Honor, that's correct
in terms of how the Supreme Court is interpreting the
Constitution.
THE COURT:  Correct, correct.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  But what was also in effect on
January 1st, as well June 26th and today, was the
First Amendment of the United States.
THE COURT:  All right.  So we have a
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conflict --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  So there are --
THE COURT:  -- First Amendment versus
Fourteenth Amendment.  We're getting somewhere.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  And what the Supreme Court said
in Obergefell --
THE COURT:  Page 27.  I've read it multiple
times.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- the one unanimous -- the one
unanimous ruling from that court was that religious
liberties, religious freedoms are still protected in this
country.  
THE COURT:  Right, pastors -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  And that when --
THE COURT:  -- and churches, all agree.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Well, I mean, there's -- how
far does religious freedom and religious liberty go?  
Religious conscience objections have been and
are accepted constitutionally for public employees, for
public officials that -- when you take office, you don't
waive and suddenly shed your constitutional rights,
freedoms, and liberties at the door of the government
courthouse --
THE COURT:  Sometimes you have to.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- when you walk in.  There -- 
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THE COURT:  I mean, if I'm telling -- if I'm
picking a jury, I got to be careful what I say sometimes.
When I'm in this courtroom, I've got to be
careful what I say sometimes.  I mean, I can't profess
religion from this bench.  I would never try to because
that would be inappropriate.
I recognize that there's a conflict here.  The
Supreme Court recognizes a conflict.  If you read
Justice Thomas's dissent, I mean, he may very well be a
prophet.  I mean, he -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Your Honor, he predicted this
very --
THE COURT:  -- says, "It appears all but
inevitable that the two will come into conflict."  That
is being these two Fourteenth and First Amendment.
"Government and religious institutions, particularly as
individuals and churches are confronted with demands to
participate and endorse civil marriages between same-sex
couples."
So this is just the first, according to
Justice Thomas, of many situations where there may be a
conflict going forward.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  So, I mean, I'm -- I'm aware of
that.  I am trying to get -- I would love for this to be
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a situation where if Kim Davis has a conflict, a deeply
held religious belief, that she can't sign off on these
marriage licenses, they go down the hall to the
judge/executive, and he signs it.  Then we don't have to
worry about an attorney fee petition where Rowan County
might be on the hook to sign -- to pay their attorneys'
fees.  I mean, there's a lot in play here potentially.  I
recognize that.
So, I mean, I'm going to go back to the very
first question that I asked that you then, as a good
advocate will, you kind of answered in a way that didn't
really answer the question.
But is there a compelling state interest in her
denying these marriage licenses?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Yes, there is, and that
compelling --
THE COURT:  What is that?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- state interest is protecting
the individual religious freedoms of every person in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.  One of those people is
Kim Davis.
THE COURT:  Okay.  So that's your answer?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  That is a -- that is the
compelling interest of the highest degree because it goes
to the very first freedoms that are articulated in the
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United States Constitution, as well as the Kentucky
Constitution, which says, "The civil rights, privileges,
or capacities of no person shall not be taken away, or in
anywise diminished or enlarged, on account of his belief
or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma, or teaching.
No human authorities shall, in any case whatever, control
or interfere with the rights of conscience."
That Kentucky has a compelling government
interest of upholding the rights of conscience, the
rights of religious freedom, rights of religious liberty,
free speech implications here because she's actually
putting her name and signature again on a form.
It is a -- if Kentucky is forcing her to do it,
Kentucky is compelling her, forcing her to speak as to a
view, a message, an idea, that -- a belief that she does
not agree with.
In addition to the constitutional protections,
in Kentucky enacted in 2013 over Governor Beshear's veto
overwhelmingly -- I think the votes were approximately
75 plus percent or 80 percent over the veto -- enacting a
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prevents the
government, prevents Kentucky, from burdening a person's
religious freedom.
THE COURT:  Now, a -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  They -- 
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THE COURT:  -- person's religious freedom in
what regard?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  The statute goes on.  "To act
or refuse to act motivated by a sincerely held religious
belief."  
So when you get to the same-sex couple that
wants Ms. Davis personally to affix her name and approval
on it, and Kentucky is saying you must do it because this
is the form, and that's the only acceptable form, and
nothing else can be a marriage license in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, what the government of Kentucky
is doing is saying to Kim Davis you have to act in a way
that violates your sincerely held religious belief.
And she says, no, the Kentucky Religious
Freedom Restoration Act protects me from refusing to act
in a certain way, motivated by a sincerely held religious
belief, which we will present and demonstrate at the
appropriate time, unless -- now, there is an unless.
When Ms. Davis says, I have a sincerely held
religious belief, I have a conscious objection, that
doesn't end this case.  Because the government of
Kentucky then can prove by a compelling, clear and
convincing evidence that it has a compelling government
interest and has used the least restrictive means.
So when Ms. Davis steps up and says, I submit
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that I have a sincerely held religious belief that
prevents me from putting my name and signature and
approval on this license, the government of Kentucky can
come in and make an argument that as a state, if they
want to argue, and I don't think they do, because the
candidates have said they want to recognize religious
conscience, but they would have to make some argument
that the Kentucky has a compelling government interest to
force Ms. Davis to violate her individual religious
liberties, protections.  But they have to do it in the
least restrictive means.  Not only do they have to show a
compelling government interest, they have to do it in the
least restrictive means.
In the Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby case from a
year ago, they interpreted the federal RFRA, which is
very similar and analogous to what Kentucky enacted.  But
the Kentucky statute even puts government on a higher
burden.  It's clear and convincing is what the burden of
proof is for Kentucky to show.
And in the Hobby Lobby case, it talked very
much about how -- how invasive and difficult it is to
satisfy the least restrictive means, that Kentucky is
going to have to show that there was no other way for
these four couples to get a license unless Kim Davis
personally signs, approves, and do it, that there's no
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other least restrictive means because --
THE COURT:  Well, I don't know why.  I'm
still -- you pointed --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- they've already -- 
THE COURT:  -- to this form, marriage
certificate.  How many clerk's deputies does she have, do
you know?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Your Honor, she has -- she has
six deputy clerks currently employed.  The numbers --
THE COURT:  Okay.  How many share -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- sometimes fluctuate.
THE COURT:  How many share her deep religious
conscientious objection?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Your Honor, I don't know the
answer to that question.
THE COURT:  Because you only represent her?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Do you know the answer to
that, Mr. Mando?
MR. MANDO:  I'm sorry?
THE COURT:  Do you know how many of her six
deputies share her religious convictions?
MR. MANDO:  No, I do not, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Do not?
MR. MANDO:  No.
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MR. CHRISTMAN:  Okay.  Your Honor -- 
THE COURT:  That might be an answer you might
want to get when she testifies -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  What I -- what I --
THE COURT:  -- the next hearing.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- would also submit is if
those deputy clerks also themselves have a sincerely held
religious belief, that Kim Davis in that case as the
employer of those individuals has a compelling government
interest herself to protect the individual consciences
and rights of those employees because of Kentucky Civil
Rights laws and other -- and constitutional protections
that she has.  She swore an oath to the Constitution -- 
THE COURT:  Okay.  
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- to protect her religious
liberties but also others.  And so if an employee of hers
steps up and says, well, I have a religious conscientious
objection as well, as the employer in that instance
Ms. Davis would have to figure out a way, or try to
figure out a way, to accommodate that interest.  
But here again, I go back to the other -- the
other ways in which Kentucky can --
THE COURT:  Well, we've talked -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- issue a license without --
THE COURT:  -- about that ad nauseam.
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MR. CHRISTMAN:  So those individuals are not
currently before this Court.
THE COURT:  No, they're not, they're not.  But
I'm -- part of my job is to try to figure out a way to
resolve all of this without lots of paper being burned,
with briefs, and lots of potential attorneys' fees being
litigated.  And I'm thinking of that as I listen to you
argue of ways to try to resolve this.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  And I go back to what we talked
about earlier about this is not -- this is not -- again,
it's not a statewide policy or mandate -- 
THE COURT:  No, we're limited to one -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- that's at issue.  We're
talking about -- 
THE COURT:  -- county, in --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  We're talking about --
THE COURT:  -- Rowan County, yes, sir.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- one county.  So, again, if
there is a scenario in place where there is a county
clerk that has a religious objection and demonstrates
that, and that government hasn't shown a compelling
government interest or a least restrictive means to
overturn it, and it turns out in the facts and the record
to be demonstrated later on that other deputy clerks also
have a sincerely held belief --
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THE COURT:  So are you thinking -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- over this --
THE COURT:  -- that the other six are going to
have the same belief she has?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  I -- again, I don't know.
They're not before this Court.  The plaintiffs --
THE COURT:  It sounds to me like you think they
all will have it.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  I don't think that, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  You don't think that?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  I don't.
THE COURT:  Okay.  So you think there may be a
deputy clerk in Rowan County that would be willing to
issue a license to a same-sex marriage?
MR. CHRISTMAN:  More importantly than a deputy
clerk is the chief judge, the county executive who -- 
THE COURT:  Well, that's something -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- publicly on record --
THE COURT:  Okay.  Well, let's -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- as saying he would.
THE COURT:  I think I've heard enough from you
here.  I mean, I don't -- not that I'm mad at you.  I
just want to give the others an opportunity --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  I'm not -- 
THE COURT:  -- to speak.
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MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- going to take that as a slap
across the face, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  It's not a slap across the face,
sir.  I just want to give these other -- 
MR. CHRISTMAN:  I appreciate -- 
THE COURT:  -- folks an opportunity to talk.
MR. CHRISTMAN:  -- it.  Thank you very much,
Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  Thank you.
Mr. Mando, clear up this statute thing.  I
wasn't prepared to discuss this particular statute that
you referenced, or Mr. Christman mentioned about the
judge/executive having the ability to issue licenses in
the absence of the clerk herself.
MR. MANDO:  Right.  I believe the statute,
Your Honor -- and I don't have it with me -- but I think
it's 402.240.
THE COURT:  Russ, could you turn down the air,
please?  
Thank you.
MR. MANDO:  And that statute, Your Honor,
provides that the judge/executive may issue a marriage
license in the -- when there's a vacancy in office or the
absence of the county clerk.
In this particular case the evidence that I've
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heard from the bench -- from the witness stand so far is
that Ms. Davis was, in fact, present when the plaintiffs
called and/or visited the office to secure the license.  
And the testimony from the witness stand was is
that judge/executive understood what the limitations on
his authority were, that he could not issue that if, in
fact, Ms. Davis was not absent.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  
MR. MANDO:  And she wasn't.
THE COURT:  Is absence -- I don't think absence
is defined though.
MR. MANDO:  I don't believe it is, but it's --
absence to me is she's not there.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  
MR. MANDO:  She's gone.
THE COURT:  Well, if -- so if these two
same-sex couples hypothetically were to go to Morehead on
a day that she was at lunch, or not at the courthouse for
whatever reason, doctor appointment, medical appointment
with a child, something, vacation, and Walter Blevins was
there, he could -- he would issue a license to them in
her absence?
MR. MANDO:  It depends on -- in that
particular situation, I mean -- again, I think absence
means she's not there.  I think the interprets of the
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General Assembly would be if she is out of the country,
if she is incapacitated in some way.
THE COURT:  Right.
MR. MANDO:  It doesn't mean, I don't think,
from trying to get commonsense from what the General
Assembly is trying to say, I don't think it means she's
simply out for lunch.  In that case they should come back
at 1 o'clock and secure their licenses.
THE COURT:  I understand that.  I was being a
little bit flippant.
MR. MANDO:  But the statute says that he --
that he met.  He doesn't have to issue that particular
license.
THE COURT:  Are you aware of any conscientious,
religious deeply held belief that the judge/executive has
on this issue?  Has he made any public comments at all?
MR. MANDO:  No.
THE COURT:  No?  
MR. MANDO:  No.  The county's position on this,
Your Honor, is that they have no authority except for
this limited exception in the statute for the
judge/executive.  The county itself has no authority to
issue marriage licenses to people who apply or to
restrict the clerk to forebear from issuing licenses when
they are sought.
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Instead, the county clerk is a separate
constitutional office under the Kentucky Constitution.  
The fiscal court of Carter -- of Rowan County
and Judge/Executive Blevins have no authority to weigh in
here and tell her what not to do or what to do with
regard to her religious objections to issuing these
licenses.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Who -- hypothetically, if
the plaintiffs prevail in this case, who would be
responsible for the attorneys' fees under the statute?
Would it be the county?  Would it be --
MR. MANDO:  There's two potentials there,
Your Honor.  Because the more I've listened to the
testimony today and thought about this, hearing the
evidence, it sounds to me like there's potential that the
county clerk in terms of issuing this license could be
considered a state actor.  Because, according to the
evidence I heard today, the license forms come from the
KDLA, Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives, an
executive branch of Kentucky state government.
The governor issued a directive to the county
clerks to issue -- for the clerks to issue the licenses.  
Those types of forms, directives are not coming
from the fiscal court.  And, therefore, if that ends up
being the proof, that's not a policy, custom, or practice
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of the county, which would expose the county to that
attorney fee exposure.
I do, however, acknowledge the counter-argument
that she is a separately elected county clerk, and there
is certainly a potential exposure that the county, the
county clerk's office, her budget could be at risk if
attorney fees are awarded.
THE COURT:  All right.  Thank you.
MR. MANDO:  Thank you.
THE COURT:  All right.  I'm not going to let
you off without some questions here, Mr. Sharp.
Could the defendants comply with Obergefell by
having someone else in the clerk's office issue the
license?
MR. SHARP:  That's not the world we live in,
Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Well, is it?  I mean, I finally got
Mr. Christman to answer a question after a little bit of
discussion.  But, I mean, is that -- I know other states
are trying to accommodate the religious conflict that
exists here between the First Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment.  And there's -- history is littered
with situations where you've got one constitutional claim
pitted up against another constitutional claim.  And we
have that to a certain extent here.  I mean, they've
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raised it.
Now, whether or not she has a legitimate
religious conviction or not, I mean, they say she does.
So -- and on page 27 of the decision that I
quoted from earlier, this is the majority.  I mean, this
is Kennedy writing.  "The First Amendment ensures that
religious organizations and persons are given proper
protection as they seek to teach the principles that are
so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths
and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family
structure that they have long revered."
It goes on to state, "It must be emphasized
that the religion -- that religions and those who adhere
to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with
utmost, sincere conviction that, by devine precepts,
same-sex marriage should not be condoned."
So, I mean, that -- I've read the decision
multiple times, and there are going to be situations
where it's difficult to reconcile a -- in this case, a
particular defendant's First Amendment right as set forth
in -- well, reconcile the fundamental right that the
Supreme Court in Obergefell found with that
First Amendment right.
I mean, it -- there is -- even the
Supreme Court seemed to recognize that there could be
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conflicts.  
MR. SHARP:  I don't think it's as complicated
as that, Your Honor.  The -- Justice Kennedy's opinion
says that, you know, they may continue to advocate, not
that they may continue to impose their religious beliefs
on others when they are, in fact, employed and an actor
of the government.
This case is really quite simple.  And the
political proposals that have been offered by opposing
counsel about solutions to this, you know, that's for the
General Assembly.  That's for the political branches of
government.
Today we're dealing with a very simple
situation, and that is whether or not it is unlawful for
a government official for personal religious reasons to
impose a substantial burden on individuals' right to
marry by withholding an essential government service.
And that's really what this is about.
I mean, aside from the legally articulated
interest of protecting, you know, all the clerks' right
to the free exercise of religion, I mean, Ms. Davis
herself has said she opposes on religious grounds
same-sex marriage.  She has said she would never affix
her name to a same-sex marriage license.  
Opposite-sex couples got swept up in
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Ms. Davis's policy because she said she didn't want to
discriminate against same-sex couples.  So she broadened
the class of individuals whose rights she decided to
violate.
She does not get to impose her religious views
on others.  It's as simple as that.  They have a
fundamental right to marry.  And she, as a government
official, crosses the line when for personal religious
reasons she withholds a government benefit that they are
otherwise entitled to receive.  
Particularly, where, as here, the government
entitlement is a legally required prerequisite for those
individuals to exercise their own constitutionally
protected fundamental right to marry.
THE COURT:  So if -- going back to the original
question I asked you though, if someone else in the
clerk's office would sign off on that marriage license,
would that be enough?
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, I will tell you that I
think that would depend largely on the facts because
there is a -- there would very much be an equal
protection concern insofar as separate but equal.  
You know, the notion that Kim Davis could with
a wink and a nod go on break, and this other clerk deal
with the same-sex couples is offensive insofar as --
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THE COURT:  Okay.  If it's offensive, there's
a --
MR. SHARP:  I mean, to the extent the same-sex
couples have to accommodate Kim Davis's schedule, be it
vacation or break or lunch so they can avail themselves
of their fundamental --
THE COURT:  I understand.  
MR. SHARP:  -- right to marry, that's not what
the First Amendment free exercise provides.
THE COURT:  Well, I know that some states are
allowing that to occur.
MR. SHARP:  If -- 
THE COURT:  Some counties, I guess, are
allowing that to occur; not in Kentucky but in other
places.
MR. SHARP:  If the General Assembly crafted
such a thing, I mean, it would be impossible for me to
offer any conjecture about what that would look like at
this point.
THE COURT:  Well, it seems like the license
itself -- and I'm not trying to -- I mean, obviously, the
choice of the sacrament of marriage and getting married
is much more important than making sure you have your
fishing license to go fish at Cave Run there in Zilpo
in Rowan County.  Make sure -- I mean, there are two
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different -- there's two licenses.  One you pay whatever,
$25 or whatever the fee is, and you go fish.  The other
one is something that lasts a lifetime, much more
significant.
But at the end of the day the piece of paper,
the license itself, is just a piece paper that's signed
by whoever the clerk happens to be.  So it's -- that's
why these ideas of making it just online, if you're
really just dealing with a piece of paper, it seems like
that would be the best way to do it.
Now, again, that's a legislative choice, an
executive choice.  We're here in the judicial branch, so
those are all things that could impact potentially this
case going forward.
But I'm -- the idea of trying to accommodate
the defendant's First Amendment right, which even the
Supreme Court says, she does have a First Amendment
right.  Now, whether or not she -- it allows her to
exercise that in her capacity as the Rowan County Clerk,
I mean, the Supreme Court talks about individuals and
churches.  It talks about -- let's see.  Well, I'm just
not so sure that -- like, for instance, pastors who want
to not -- who don't want to officiate over same-sex
marriage, I don't think that this case requires a pastor
in a church to officiate over same sex.  They still can
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say, no, I don't want to do it.  
And I have someone I knew from college who just
officiated over a same-sex marriage in Covington, one of
the district judges, a family court judge.  And that was
her right to do that if she wanted to.  Now, I don't know
if you could compel her to do that.  But she's a judge.
No one has asked me one way or the other.
But I'm just thinking that her First Amendment
right I'm going to need to -- hopefully you can address
this in your written filing.  I mean, you finally
answered my question about what the substantial
government interest is when you were talking earlier
about her individual First Amendment right.  I mean, and
the government has a compelling interest in allowing that
to occur.  I mean, that seems to be her individual right,
not the state's right, but -- 
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, that -- and I think
that's exactly correct.  I mean, we're not talking
about we're -- that analysis, whether it be strict
scrutiny, compelling interest, intermediate scrutiny,
important interest, or rational basis, legitimate
interest --
THE COURT:  It's not rational basis.  It has to
be something higher than that.
MR. SHARP:  It's state -- exactly.  It's state
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interest.  What is the state interest at stake?  
What we have here is Ms. Davis's personal
interest.  Her personal religious beliefs conflict with
her obligations to issue same-sex marriage licenses on
the same terms as opposite-sex couples.
I mean, it's evident in her own public
statements.  It's not coincidence that this blanket
prohibition on issuing marriage licenses occurred after
Obergefell.
So -- and to the extent that opposing counsel
suggest, well, the plaintiffs can simply drive to another
county or they can walk down the hall.  I mean, A, they
have walked down the hall, and the county judge/executive
has said, I'm in charge of enforcing or applying this
statute, she's not absent, can't, won't issue you a
marriage license.
Ms. Davis through her religious beliefs does
not get to impose those on the plaintiff.  She does not
get to dictate the manner in which they have to exercise
their own fundamental right.
When she voluntarily seeked public office,
elected or employment or otherwise, she is no longer
acting as citizen vis-a-vis government sovereign.  She's
acting as government herself, vis-a-vis the residence of
Rowan County.
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And when she has to comply with the legal
requirements of her office, that is her employment.
And the cases cited about, you know, burden on
the right to marry, you know, and whether it's a
substantial and direct, I mean, it doesn't get more
substantial and direct than when the county clerk
responsible for issuing marriage licenses refuses to
issue them, particularly where the plaintiffs have to
obtain those in order to avail themselves of the right to
marry in the first place.
The suggestion that they should simply go to
another county is totally inadequate and misses the
point.
It then confers on county clerks the apparent
authority, you know, at what point does the Court decide
whether or not there's enough counties available to issue
marriage licenses?
I mean, the media has reported, you know,
somewhere in the neighborhood of 60 county clerks who
have indicated that perhaps they have objections.
But, you know, in any event, Ms. Davis's legal
obligations to perform the functions of her office,
though conflicting with her personal religious beliefs,
is not -- her personal religious beliefs or opposition to
it is not in and of itself a state interest.
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THE COURT:  Okay.  One of the things I want
someone to produce, and I don't know if it's going to be
Ms. Davis or the county itself or both, what are her
obligations as the county clerk?  What are her, I guess,
job duties, if you will?  Is there a -- 
MR. SHARP:  Vis-a-vis marriage licenses or more
broadly?
THE COURT:  No, just -- well, I mean, vis-a-vis
marriage licenses.  I mean, just something that if you
have something -- if it's like a job description, or I
don't know if it would be a regulation or administrative
regulation, I don't know what it would be.  Perhaps --
and that can be produced the next time we meet.  You
don't have to produce it today.
I -- is there anything else you want to say?  I
don't want to keep everybody too long.
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, I believe -- again, the
focus here is on whether or not Ms. Davis can withhold
government benefits based on her religious beliefs.  The
fact that she has included in this blanket policy
opposite sex couples is of no consequence.  It's the
interest that's served by her policy is personal,
personal religious beliefs.  And it simply is untenable
in so far as it imposes an unlawful burden on plaintiffs'
right to get married.
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Thank you.
THE COURT:  All right.  Okay.  Well, here is
what we're going to do.  This -- the evidentiary portion
of this hearing will be continued in progress.  Like I
said, as soon as we find that -- or learn that she has
been properly served, file a notice of that with the
Court.  We'll set a follow-up evidentiary hearing in
Covington not earlier than Monday of next week.  I do
have Court on the 21st.  I know of a final pretrial in an
employment case.  I'm not sure what time that is.  
Do you recall what time that is set, morning?
LAW CLERK:  10:00.
THE COURT:  10:00, okay.  It will be no earlier
than Monday.  I'll have my clerk contact counsel.  
Are you going to enter a formal entry of
appearance?
MR. MANDO:  I will make sure that's done
tomorrow as soon as I return to the office.
THE COURT:  Okay, great.  And then we'll
contact counsel just by phone just to get a time that
will work.  I want to try to expedite this as much as I
can.
All right.  Can I see counsel -- oh, yes, sir.
MR. MANDO:  Just one more thing, Your Honor. 
The county is interested in reducing expense,
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being efficient as we possibly can.  We know there's
another lawsuit that was filed.  I think it was filed by
Attorney Joe Buckles who's out of Lexington.
THE COURT:  Right.
MR. MANDO:  I haven't had a chance to get it
downloaded yet.  I think it was maybe filed Friday.
THE COURT:  I have a copy in my office if you
want a copy of it.
MR. MANDO:  I'm not sure if it's -- if they've
asked for injunctive relief.
THE COURT:  They have not.
MR. MANDO:  All right.  I'm just saying that if
there -- we would be interested in some consolidation,
again, to minimize expense to the county, to save
resources.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Any objection to that?  It's
15-46.
MR. SHARP:  I'm sorry, Your Honor, consolidate
the later filed case?
THE COURT:  Well, it's assigned to me.
Judge Wilhoit refused in that case as well so -- in fact,
it's related.  
MR. SHARP:  No objection.
MR. GANNAM:  Your Honor, I think we would have
to -- there's complexities with the punitive class action
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on one hand and an individual action on the other.  Would
they be class reps?  I just think we would need to see a
proper motion for consolidation.
THE COURT:  Well, I'm thinking that this case
is going to be resolved well before we get to any motion
for class certification.
MR. SHARP:  Your Honor, if I may.  The proposed
class is 23(b)(2), prospective injunctive relief.
THE COURT:  It would likely include them
anyway.
MR. SHARP:  They are only seeking damages
actions in that subsequent case.  I mean, yes, they would
presumably be class members unless and until they get
married.  But they would have an independent cause of
action for their damages claims aside from the class
action.
THE COURT:  Well --
MR. CHRISTMAN:  Your Honor, those plaintiffs
haven't asked for injunctive relief so if they're going
to be joined in the action in any way, Your Honor, we
would ask that they, you know, have to file their own
motion in order to be --
THE COURT:  Well, since they are both assigned
to me, they are related.  I'm not necessarily going to
join them at this point.  It makes sense to at least
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consider that at some point.
I would like to see the attorneys in my office
after this hearing.
MR. SHARP:  If I may, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Yes, sir.
MR. SHARP:  One final thing.  I think the Court
had ordered that the response be due July the 30th
presuming -- July 30.  We would just ask for an expedited
reply time of --
THE COURT:  Seven days?
MR. SHARP:  Seven days is fine.
THE COURT:  All right.  Seven days.
MR. SHARP:  Thank you. 
THE COURT:  Very well.  We will be in recess.
MR. SHARP:  Thank you.
     (Whereupon, the proceedings adjourned at 12:20 p.m.) 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, Peggy W. Weber, certify that the foregoing is a
correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the
above-entitled matter.
 
 
July 16, 2015                 s/Peggy W. Weber            
   DATE           PEGGY W. WEBER, RPR 
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(Proceedings commenced at 9:59 a.m.)
THE COURT: Good morning. Madam Clerk, if you would
call the matter for preliminary injunction hearing.
DEPUTY CLERK: Ashland Civil 15-44, April Miller,
et al., versus Kim Davis, et al.
THE COURT: Why don't we have entries of appearance,
please.
MR. SHARP: Your Honor, Bill Sharp on behalf of
plaintiffs.
MR. CANON: Judge, Dan Canon here for the plaintiffs.
MR. GANNAM: Roger Gannam for the defendant, Kim
Davis.
MR. CHRISTMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. John
Christman also for Kim Davis.
MR. DONAHUE: A.C. Donahue on behalf of the
defendant, Kim Davis, Your Honor.
MR. MANDO: Jeff Mando for the defendant, Rowan
County, Your Honor.
MR. WATKINS: Cecil Watkins for the defendant, Rowan
County, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You're Miss Davis?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: We continued the hearing today because
you had not been formally served last week. Your attorneys
made some motions regarding that, which the Court previously
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denied. But we're here now. You're here. You've been
served.
The purpose of today's hearing is to hear any proof that
you have or that Rowan County has on behalf of either yourself
or the county.
I had asked, I think it was you, Mr. Mando, last week
about the oath of the duties of the county clerk, if there was
something formal that I could see. I know we had talked
generally about that. I can't remember if it was you or
Mr. Gannam's client. Someone was going to bring today
something that showed the formal duties of the clerk.
I can't remember who I left that with at the end of the
hearing.
MR. MANDO: Your Honor, I took that -- I apologize,
but I took that upon Miss Davis and her lawyer, since she is
the county clerk, to provide the list of duties. I do have
some statutes that I think we would all agree apply to the
county clerk for issuing of marriage licenses.
THE COURT: You had sent me that or shown me that
last week. That was just the one that allowed the county
judge, in her absence, to act.
MR. MANDO: 402.240 that talks about the permissive
nature of the judge executive to issue a marriage license in
the absence of the county clerk or in the vacancy of the
office. We talked about that and I showed you a copy.
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THE COURT: You did. This is a separate statute
you're referring to?
MR. MANDO: There are two other statutes that I think
also I would talk about, which would be KRS 402.080, which
talks about the issuance of the marriage license shall be
issued by the county clerk. And 402.100 talks about the form
that must be used by the county clerk as prescribed by the
State Department of Library and Archives.
THE COURT: I recall that. And someone submitted --
I think it was you, Mr. Gannam -- the actual form itself, and
it had some blocked-out sections. There's a new one that had
first party, second party that's, I guess, being used now
since the Supreme Court's decision.
MR. GANNAM: That's correct, Your Honor. We're
prepared to, through Miss Davis, put on testimony today of all
her duties as well as formally admit the forms into evidence.
THE COURT: That's fine. I just couldn't remember
who I left that task with. I guess it's you, Mr. Gannam.
We'll allow you to call your first witness.
MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, before we begin, I wanted to
say that the defendant is prepared to argue at this point that
the motion could be denied based on the plaintiffs' failure to
carry their burden of proving the elements necessary for a
preliminary injunction. If the Court would hear argument on
that point now, before we proceed to put on our evidence,
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we're prepared to do that.
THE COURT: That motion will be denied.
MR. GANNAM: Thank you, Your Honor. We will call our
first witness, who will be County Judge Executive Blevins.
THE COURT: All right. Come around, sir.
WALTER BLEVINS, JR., DEFENSE WITNESS, SWORN
THE COURT: You may proceed.
Good morning, sir.
THE WITNESS: Good morning.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Good morning. My name is Roger Gannam. I'm one of the
attorneys representing Kim Davis in this lawsuit. Will you
please state your full name for the record?
A. Walter Blevins, Jr.
Q. And what is your title?
A. Rowan County Judge Executive.
Q. And what is your business address, Judge Blevins?
A. 600 West Main Street, Morehead, Kentucky, 40351.
Q. Is your position as county judge executive an elected
position?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When were you elected?
A. November of last year. I don't know the exact date. I
think it was maybe the 8th.
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Q. And how long is your term?
A. Four-year term.
Q. Judge Blevins, can you just generally describe the
duties, responsibilities of your office?
A. Well, I'm kind of like the mayor of the county. I'm the
chairman of the board, more or less, in the fiscal court
meetings. My job really is to advocate to the county and to
try to bring, hopefully, jobs and opportunity to the
community, help in any kind of disasters that occur, and just
try to do the duties of the judge.
Q. You mentioned presiding over the fiscal court. Are there
any other boards or committees that you preside over?
A. Yeah, there's several. I'm on the Gateway Ad Board. I'm
on the Gateway Services Community Board. I'm on the -- I
appoint many of the boards and attend many of the board
meetings. The airport board, I serve on it, or attend the
meetings. The district health board, the county health board.
I'm on several boards.
Q. Would it be fair to say that you are the highest elected
official in Rowan County?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm going to read to you from Kentucky Revised Statute
402.240 and then ask you some questions about it. The title
of the statute is County Judge Executive to Issue License in
Absence of Clerk. It reads, In the absence of the county
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clerk, or during a vacancy in the office, the county judge
executive may issue the license and, in so doing, he shall
perform the duties and incur all the responsibilities of the
clerk. The county judge executive shall return a memorandum
thereof to the clerk and the memorandum shall be recorded as
if the license was issued by the clerk. Are you familiar with
this statute, Judge Blevins?
A. Yes.
Q. And according to the statute, is it your understanding
that you have authority to issue a marriage license in the
absence of the county clerk?
A. According to the statute. I don't know if it's been used
by any other judge executive, though.
Q. What is your understanding of the word "absence" in the
term, "in the absence of the county clerk"?
A. Since she has deputy clerks, and I know that at least her
mother at times, when she was gone on vacation, she would
allow the deputy clerks to perform that duty. So I don't
think the judge executive office, as far as I know, has ever
done that.
Q. So but when it says in the absence of the county clerk,
what would have to occur for the county clerk to be absent,
based on your understanding of that statute?
A. Say that again. Let me make sure I understand the
question.
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Q. Where the statute says, "in the absence of the county
clerk, the county judge executive may issue a marriage
license," what is your understanding of what the word
"absence" means?
A. I would say absent would be due to health reasons, due to
being out of office or if the clerk passed away or something
like that, it would absent then.
Q. The statute also talks about a vacancy in office, which I
would submit would occur if the clerk were to die, as you
said, or were to leave office completely. Apart from that,
you talked about an absence for health reasons. Are there any
other circumstances that you would understand to mean "absent"
as it's used in that statute?
A. If she was in the hospital or if she was on vacation, I
would assume she would be absent. But again, the judge
executive, as far as I know, has never performed that duty.
I'm in and out of the office quite often. I'm not there on a
regular, eight-hour day because of meetings and going to
Frankfort and continuing education, of course, I have to take.
So in that respect, when she's not there, her clerks are
there to -- the office is still open. Her clerks are there
performing those duties.
Q. During the regular business hours of the clerk's office,
are you aware of any time that the clerk, Kim Davis, has not
been there but that there were not deputy clerks there to
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perform her duties?
A. I can't, I can't remember a time that's occurred.
Q. Is your understanding of the meaning of that statute, KRS
402.240, based on any court decision that you've read or
received?
A. Again, I can't remember any of those.
Q. Have you received an opinion of the attorney general of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky regarding interpretation of that
statute?
A. Yes. I think I had a conversation, a telephone
conversation with the county attorney and some people out of
the attorney general's office.
Q. When did that conversation occur?
A. That was shortly after this case became prominent in the
newspaper that marriage licenses were not going to be given
out in Rowan County. And we're basically on new ground. I
wanted to find out as much as I could about this issue.
Q. Who did you speak with in the attorney general's office?
A. I can't remember their -- county attorney might remember
who he had on the phone when I talked to him. Also, I talked
to my KACO attorney, and he basically said that there was no
way that -- county judges are not there to perform that duty.
And in an absence, if it was that kind of an absence, that I
would appoint someone to perform those duties.
Q. Have are you received any kind of formal, written opinion
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from the attorney general's office?
A. No, I have not.
Q. Are you aware that the Rowan County Clerk, Kim Davis, is
not issuing any marriage licenses?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Are you aware that she has directed her deputy clerks
also not to issue marriage licenses?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Since Kim Davis discontinuing -- discontinued issuing
marriage licenses out of her office, have you been requested
to issue any marriage licenses?
A. I have people -- one couple came by the office after
being denied and asked if I could do it. I said, well, she's
not absent. I cannot do that.
Q. Any besides that one couple?
A. That's the only couple I remember that came actually to
the office. I think she -- they were accompanied by another
individual who I think she's one of the plaintiff -- or I
guess, yeah, one of the plaintiffs in the case. She was with
them.
Q. Is your interpretation of the word "absent" as used in
KRS 402.240 the only reason why you did not issue the license
upon that request?
A. Well, I've never issued a license like that. I'm not
sure I would have the proper paperwork to even do it. So I --
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that would be one of the main reasons is not having any
knowledge of how to do -- how to fill it out and the proper
procedure I'd have to go through.
Q. Do you agree that there are circumstances where,
according to the statute, you would have the legal authority
to issue a marriage license?
A. Again, I would probably appoint someone to take those
duties over. So it would basically be if she was absent for
an extended period of time or if for some reason she wasn't
able to perform her duties, then I would appoint someone.
Q. I'm going to read to you another statute. It's
KRS 63.220, Vacancies in County Offices. It says, A vacancy
in the office of sheriff, coroner, surveyor, county clerk,
county attorney, jailer, or constable shall be filled by the
county judge executive or by the mayor in a consolidated local
government.
Are you familiar with that statute?
A. Yes.
Q. Would that be the statute that you would rely upon to
fill a vacancy in the clerk's office?
A. Yes. That's how -- that's the same statute that I would
use for any -- any of those individuals or elected office
holders, it would be up to me to appoint someone to fill
their -- fulfill their duties until another election.
Q. Are you aware of any statute that gives you the authority
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to appoint a replacement clerk if she is merely absent but not
vacant from office?
A. I think those -- I'm really not. I think those clerks
are basically under her purview. When she's not there, they
take over the duties.
Q. So going back to -- we've covered that you have the
authority to appoint someone to fill a vacancy in the clerk's
office. But in a circumstance where the clerk is merely
absent, as that's defined in the statute, would you agree that
you have authority in that situation to issue the license
yourself?
A. I'm not sure on that myself because I don't have those --
the software to print it. I asked my secretary about this.
She said we don't have the software to print them out. I
would have to go to the clerk's office, I assume get one of
the deputies.
I don't understand why I -- the deputies normally take
over her job description when she's absent, like an illness or
vacation, so I assume continue with them.
Q. Are you aware that there's a statute dictating that the
form of marriage license to be used by the clerk's office is
created by the Kentucky Department of Library and Archives?
A. Yes, I found that out about a week or two ago.
Q. Are you aware of any statute that dictates who provides
the form of memorandum that's mentioned in the statute giving
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the county judge executive authority to issue a marriage
license in the absence or vacancy of the clerk?
A. No, I'm not, sir.
Q. Assuming there is a situation where you do have the
authority to issue a marriage license, would you have a
religious objection to issuing that license to a same-sex
couple?
MR. MANDO: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I would follow the law. If the law
says I have to give them to everyone, I would do that. But
morally, it's a tough decision for me, because I'm taught in
my Bible that marriage is between a man and a woman. I would
still follow the law.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. And so is your answer that yes, you would issue that
license to a same-sex couple?
A. I would issue those license.
MR. GANNAM: No further questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I guess processing-wise, do you all want
to ask any questions, Mr. Mando? Then I'll turn to the
plaintiffs.
MR. MANDO: I just have a couple questions, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
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CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. MANDO:
Q. First, Judge Blevins, to clarify something, when you had
the conversation with the county attorney and some state
officials, you said it was the attorney general's. Could that
have been the Department of Local Government that you had the
conversation with?
A. I'd have to ask my counsel over there to make sure,
because I've had a lot of phone calls and discussions with
people.
Do you remember, Cecil?
Q. You just have to answer based on your own recollection.
A. It could have been the Department of Local Government.
It could have been the attorney general's office. I'm not
positive on that, no.
Q. When the plaintiffs -- when the plaintiffs in this case
came to see you about securing a marriage license late June,
early July, at that time, was Kim Davis absent from the county
or absent from her office?
A. No, she was not.
Q. Did you feel you had the authority, in that situation, to
issue the license?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Had you ever issued a marriage license in the past?
A. No, I have not.
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Q. And as you read the statute, are you required to issue
the marriage license?
A. Only in her absence, and I felt with the deputy clerks
she has, it would not be -- they take over when she's not
there so it would still be in her office's duties.
Q. Is it your understanding that the county clerk is a
separately elected constitutional office under the -- in
Kentucky?
A. That's correct.
MR. MANDO: No further questions at this time, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Cross.
MR. SHARP: Thank you, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHARP:
Q. Judge Executive Blevins, good morning. Let me ask you,
how did you first learn of the policy that you've testified
about in the clerk's office?
A. It was after the denial of a marriage license by Miss
Davis.
Q. Did you learn about it from Miss Davis herself?
A. No, I don't believe I did.
Q. Did she send you a memorandum telling you what the policy
was?
A. I don't remember receiving anything.
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Q. Did she consult with you prior to adopting the policy for
your input?
A. Kim and I have conversations, and she did tell me early
on, before the decision was made, that if it was to allow
same-sex marriage that she could not do that in her moral
judgment. She just could not do it.
Q. And when did you have this conversation with her?
A. It's been -- it was probably shortly after we got sworn
in, I think she brought the issue to me and talked about it.
And she did tell me also that I think she -- I don't know if
it was that early in the process, but I know she later told me
she had contacted all the state representatives and all the
state senators in regards to this issue, that she was hoping
something would be done because morally, she just could not do
it.
Q. When you said you spoke with her about this after the
decision, are you talking about the Obergefell decision?
A. Yes.
Q. Let's talk a little bit about the clerk's office. How
many deputy clerks are employed in the Rowan County Clerk's
Office?
A. I don't have the exact number, but there's probably six
or seven, at least.
Q. And how is that office funded?
A. It's funded through their fees. They collect fees for
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marriage license, for hunting, fishing license, for any kind
of registration of vehicles, all those types of different
things that they perform, those type of duties. And they get
a fee for that, and that's basically how they're funded.
Q. And what role, if any, does the Rowan County Fiscal Court
have in the county clerk's budget?
A. We approve their budget, and that's about all. The only,
really, power we have is she submits a budget. And along with
myself and four magistrates, we pass the budget.
Q. So the funding mechanism is from county funds, then?
MR. MANDO: Objection.
THE COURT: Grounds?
MR. MANDO: He just said the funds we are generated
through fees that were issued.
THE COURT: So asked and answered?
MR. MANDO: Yes.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. SHARP:
Q. Am I correct the county would be responsible for any
judgment levied against the county clerk's office?
MR. MANDO: Objection. Calls for a conclusion of
law.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. SHARP:
Q. Now, you're familiar also with the directive that the
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Governor of Kentucky sent to all the county clerks on June 26,
correct?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. And you're aware that the policy that's been adopted by
Rowan County Clerk's Office is in direct conflict with the
governor's directive?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Do you have any authority to sanction or otherwise
censure the elected county clerk?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Prior to the Obergefell decision, were there any problems
with the Rowan County Clerk's Office issuing marriage
licenses?
A. No, not that I know of.
Q. When you had this conversation with Miss Davis following
the Obergefell decision, did she explain why she intended to
adopt this policy?
MR. CHRISTMAN: Objection. Misstates testimony.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question?
MR. SHARP: Sure.
BY MR. SHARP:
Q. When you had this conversation with Miss Davis following
the Obergefell decision, did she explain why she was adopting
this policy?
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A. Yes. We talked for quite a while, and Kim's very
religious, and she was not going to issue any license to
anyone because she didn't want to, basically, not issue them
to one group that are man and woman versus same-sex marriages,
and she just wasn't going to issue any licenses because she
didn't want to discriminate in that respect.
She was concerned that the -- a 5-to-4 decision is a very
close decision by the Supreme Court, and she was concerned --
she had some question, I think she told me it was 30 days
after their decision, they could actually make a change in
that decision if they -- if other information was brought
forward. And she was concerned that -- I think she even said
some of the Supreme Court members probably should have excused
themselves from the ruling.
THE COURT: Did she explain why she thinks that
Supreme Court justices should have recused themselves from the
ruling?
THE WITNESS: I don't think she got into detail on
that, but she did have some concerns that some of them maybe
should have recused themselves. I don't know if we actually
talked about the details on it. She can probably answer that
better than me.
THE COURT: All right, go ahead.
BY MR. SHARP:
Q. So am I correct her religious objection went to issuing
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marriage licenses to same-sex couples?
A. Yes, I would say that's correct.
Q. And her decision to stop issuing them altogether, even to
opposite-sex couples, was so as to not discriminate?
A. I would say that's correct.
Q. The conversation that you had, was that generally
consistent with the statements she made to the media following
that conversation?
A. I would say they are.
Q. As far as you are aware, is this policy still in place in
Rowan County?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Have you issued any marriage licenses in her stead since
it was adopted?
A. No, I have not.
Q. Let me ask you some specific questions about absence.
Since June the 26th, are you aware of whether or not
Mrs. Davis has been to work?
A. As far as I know, she's there every day. If she's missed
a day, I wasn't aware of it. Of course, I'm gone pretty often
to meetings. I'm just not there in the courthouse at times.
I wouldn't be absolutely sure. I know she was absent on the
last court date. Of course, I was out of the office as well,
went to attend the court hearing, let the judge know I was
concerned about this issue as well. I didn't want to be --
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the county to be sued and not show up for court. And today,
she's absent from the court and so am I.
Q. Now, when she's not physically in the office, does the
office -- does the county clerk's office close?
A. No. It remains open. At least it has in past years.
I'm not sure -- I would assume it would continue to be open
when she's not there.
Q. Other than the marriage licenses, does the county clerk's
office in Rowan County continue to do business and perform its
other duties?
A. Yes.
Q. Has Miss Davis been on extended leave since June the
26th?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Has she otherwise been unable to perform her job duties
since June the 26th?
A. No. She's been available and able.
MR. SHARP: Nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Any redirect?
MR. GANNAM: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: May this witness be finally excused?
MR. MANDO: Yes, sir.
MR. SHARP: Your Honor, we would ask --
MR. GANNAM: As far as we're concerned, yes, Your
Honor.
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MR. SHARP: Your Honor, we would ask him to be
subject to recall, pending Miss Davis's testimony.
THE COURT: Can you stick around?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Thank you. Next witness, please.
MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, the defense calls Kim Davis.
THE COURT: All right. Come around, ma'am.
KIMBERLY DAVIS, DEFENDANT, SWORN
THE COURT: Good morning, ma'am.
THE WITNESS: Good morning.
THE COURT: You may proceed.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Good morning, Miss Davis.
A. Good morning.
Q. Please state your full name for the record.
A. Kimberly Davis.
THE COURT: Try to keep your voice up, please.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Thank you.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. What is your title, Miss Davis?
A. I'm the Rowan County Clerk.
Q. And your business address?
A. 600 West Main Street, Room 102, Morehead, Kentucky,
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40351.
Q. When were you elected to the position of Rowan County
Clerk?
A. Final election was November 4th of 2014, and took office
in January.
Q. January of this year?
A. January 5th, yes, sir.
Q. Were you an employee of the clerk's office prior to being
elected as the clerk?
A. Yes.
Q. How long did you work in the clerk's office?
A. Almost 27 years.
Q. Can you describe generally what are the functions of the
county clerk?
A. The clerk is a pass-through collection agency for many
departments; Department of Revenue, Transportation Cabinet,
Fish and Wildlife. We -- I bring archives, we record deeds,
mortgages, all land records. We're responsible for
maintaining voter registration records, overseeing elections.
There's just a plethora of stuff we do. Motor vehicle
registration, delinquent taxes. We generate property tax
bills, franchise tax bills for collection and then we -- those
fees that we collect, we send out every month by the -- you
know, the reports are due the 10th of the month.
But at the end of that month prior, you know, we have to
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allocate all those monies out and write checks to every taxing
district to Frankfort for all the fees we've collected for
them. There's daily reports, weekly reports, monthly reports,
quarterly reports, end of year reports.
Q. And does the clerk's office retain a portion of what it
collects as compensation or as its own fees?
A. Yeah. The clerk's office is a fee office. Every year,
starting on January 1, we start out with zero dollars. So
every penny that comes into the clerk's office is money that
we have generated and collected from our services.
Q. So does the clerk's office receive checks from the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, for example?
A. No.
Q. Does the clerk's office receive any other checks other
than from fees that it collects itself?
A. No. We get -- we do get a check for preparing tax bills
from the Department of Revenue, which is a fee of our office
and just goes into our office, but we don't get any money from
anyone else.
The Secretary of State, State Board of Elections also
gives us so much money for each registered voter. I think
this year, I got $162.
Q. For all registered voters in Rowan County?
A. Um-hmm.
Q. Does the clerk's office also issue marriage licenses?
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A. We do.
Q. What is the fee collected by the clerk's office for a
marriage license?
A. It's $35.50.
Q. And out of that fee, how does that break down?
A. The clerk retains $21.17, and the state gets $14.33.
Q. So does the clerk's office receive fees for marriage
licenses other than the license that it issues itself?
A. No.
Q. Does the clerk's office receive any funding on the
subject of marriage other than from the licenses that it
issues itself?
A. No.
Q. How many employees do you have in the clerk's office?
A. I have six full-time employees. I have one girl that's
hired on a 1099 to do grant work for me.
Q. And what do -- your full-time employees, are those called
deputy clerks?
A. They are.
Q. What is the total revenue in your 2015 budget?
A. We had budgeted $4.2 million.
Q. And year-to-date, is your office carrying a surplus or a
deficit?
A. We're actually 700 -- as of the end of June, we were $733
above on our receipts and everything. So our office is really
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very -- doing very well.
Q. Did you mean 733,000?
A. 733,000, yes, sir.
Q. So that's a surplus currently?
A. It is.
Q. If you get to the end of the year and you have a surplus,
what happens to those funds?
A. Those fees are turned over to the county -- the fiscal
court as excess fees.
Q. Do you know how much revenue your office collected from
the issuance of marriage licenses last year?
A. The total that we took in was $4,500. We sold 212
licenses in 2014.
Q. So if, in 2015, if you were to hit that same, that same
number, is my math correct that that would be 0.1 percent of
the total budget for the clerk's office?
A. Yeah.
Q. Is that a yes?
A. Yes.
Q. How many licenses did the clerk's office issue in the
first half of this year?
A. Ninety-nine.
Q. So compared to 212 for all of last year, would you say
that it's comparable?
A. Yeah. Yes.
Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB   Doc #: 26   Filed: 07/23/15   Page: 27 of 83 - Page ID#: 243      Case: 15-5880     Document: 15-6     Filed: 08/19/2015    Page: 28 (205 of 313)
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
DAVIS - Direct 28
Q. Do all six of the deputy clerks perform the task of
issuing marriage licenses?
A. Yes.
Q. If you just limited that task to one of your deputy
clerks, approximately how many hours a week would that deputy
spend issuing marriage licenses?
A. Maybe one hour.
Q. One hour a week for one employee?
A. Um-hmm.
Q. And that would handle all marriage licenses issued by the
Rowan County Clerk's Office?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I trust that the volume of marriage licenses that
your office issues isn't exactly the same every month, right?
A. No, it's not.
Q. What is the busiest month this year, to date?
A. May and June were very close.
Q. And in those months, those were the busiest so far this
year?
A. Um-hmm.
Q. And in, let's just say June, for example, in the month of
June, with that increased volume, would one employee in your
office still be able to handle all of that volume?
A. Yes. It only takes about five to seven minutes to issue
a marriage license, to get the information, populate it in the
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computer system, print it out, have them proof it, sign it,
collect their money, and they're gone.
Q. And in these months of May and June, where the volume is
higher, approximately how many licenses were issued in each of
those months?
A. Probably 18, 20 at the most.
Q. Miss Davis, I want to ask you now about your religious
practices. First of all, what religion do you practice?
A. I'm Apostolic.
Q. And is Apostolic, is that a subset of the Christian
religion?
A. It is.
Q. As part of your Christian faith, do you attend a church?
A. I do.
Q. How often?
A. Every time the doors are open.
Q. At least weekly, then?
A. We have Bible study on Tuesday, church on Wednesday,
church on Sunday.
Q. And was that your practice before taking office as the
Rowan County Clerk?
A. Yes.
Q. Has that been your continued practice since taking
office?
A. Yes.
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Q. Do you participate in any Christian ministries outside of
your church itself?
A. I do.
Q. Give me an example.
A. Every Monday night, since October of 2013, I go to the
jail, visit the ladies there, do Bible study with them.
Q. Are you aware of some of the offenses committed by the
women in the jail --
MR. SHARP: Objection, Your Honor. Relevance.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, the plaintiffs have alleged
in this case that Miss Davis has treated them with malice, and
I believe that her activities according to her religious
beliefs are relevant to the question of whether she is not
issuing licenses based out of malice.
THE COURT: She goes to the jail, ministers to women
at the jail. I think that's sufficient. What they're in for,
I'm sure they're in for Class D felonies or on pretrial
detention for more serious offenses. I don't think the actual
offenses are really relevant.
MR. GANNAM: I'll move on, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Miss Davis, do you get paid for visiting the jail?
A. No.
Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB   Doc #: 26   Filed: 07/23/15   Page: 30 of 83 - Page ID#: 246      Case: 15-5880     Document: 15-6     Filed: 08/19/2015    Page: 31 (208 of 313)
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
DAVIS - Direct 31
Q. How do you feel towards these women who you minister to
there?
A. I love them. They're the best part of my Monday.
Q. Does the fact that they've done bad things, perhaps even
felonies, affect how you feel towards them?
A. No, not at all.
Q. Miss Davis, do your Christian beliefs include a belief
about the definition of marriage?
A. Yes, they do.
Q. And according to your Christian beliefs, what is the
definition of marriage?
A. Marriage is a union between one man and one woman.
Q. And what do you base that definition on?
A. The Bible.
Q. And what do you believe the Bible to be?
A. God's holy word.
Q. So according to your Christian belief, can the union of
two men be a marriage?
A. No.
Q. Can the union of two women be a marriage?
A. No.
Q. How about three men?
A. No.
Q. How about a person and an animal?
MR. SHARP: Objection, Your Honor.
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THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Sustained. We don't have that here.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. According to your religious beliefs, Miss Davis, is there
any arrangement of people other than one man and one woman
which can be called a marriage?
A. No.
Q. Miss Davis, according to your Christian beliefs, do you
believe it is a sin for a man and a woman who are not married
to have sex?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe it is a sin for two men to have sex?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe it is a sin for two women to have sex?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe all sex outside of man and woman marriage
is a sin?
A. Yes.
Q. During the almost 30 years total that you've spent in the
clerk's office, either as a deputy clerk or as the elected
clerk, have you ever asked a marriage license applicant what
kind of sins they've committed prior to applying?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever asked marriage license applicants what
kinds of sins they plan to commit after getting married?
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A. No.
Q. Is it your religious belief that you are required to ask
applicants for marriage licenses what kinds of sins they
committed?
A. No.
Q. Is it your religious belief that you're required to ask
applicants for marriage what kind of sins they might commit
after marriage?
A. No.
Q. Is it your religious belief that sin disqualifies a
person from being married?
A. No.
Q. When did your office stop issuing marriage licenses this
year?
A. We issued one on the 26th. So we were open the 27th of
June, so June 27th would have been when we stopped.
Q. And are you aware that June 26 is the date that the
United States Supreme Court decision in Obergefell was handed
down?
A. I am.
Q. Your office was open on June 27?
A. We were.
Q. Did you issue any licenses then?
A. No.
Q. And was that pursuant to a decision you had made as of
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June 27 not to issue licenses?
A. When I first took office, when he went to -- the clerks
had a legislative meeting in January, and they formed a
committee in regard to this Supreme Court decision that was --
in light that it was going to be heard in April.
After that meeting, I came back and I directed a letter
to every senator and every legislator that I could get an
email address to and asked them, pleaded with them to, while
there was still time, to get a bill on the floor to help
protect clerks who had a moral issue in this regard.
I emailed every person. I'm not sure. It was
January 23rd was the date that I emailed them, and I emailed
every person and our legislators at LRC that I could get an
email address to. This is not something I decided because of
this decision that came down. It was something that was a
forethought and that I had prayed and fasted over weekly.
So it wasn't just a spur-of-the-moment decision. It was
thought out and, you know, I sought God on it.
MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, may I approach the witness
to provide an exhibit?
THE COURT: Sure. What are you showing her?
MR. GANNAM: This is a copy of the letter she's just
testified to.
THE COURT: That's fine. Do you have a copy,
Mr. Sharp?
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MR. SHARP: Yes, sir.
MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, would you like a copy?
THE COURT: Yes, thank you. Mark this as Defendant's
Exhibit 1?
MR. GANNAM: I marked the version I gave to the
witness.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Miss Davis, I've just handed you a document I've marked
as Defendant's Exhibit 1. It has a salutation, Dear Senator
Robertson. Is this a copy of the letter you just testified to
that you sent to multiple legislators in January?
A. It is.
Q. The first sentence says, I am contacting you in hope of
support of possible legislation that would give county clerks
the option to exempt themselves from issuing marriage license.
Are those your words, Miss Davis?
A. It is.
Q. And in the last sentence of that paragraph, I wanted to
have the option, as a person who has deep moral conviction, to
choose not to discriminate any party by allowing a clerk to
apply for an exemption for the issuance of marriage licenses.
Are those also your words?
A. They are.
Q. This was sent to legislators in January of 2015?
A. Yeah, January 23rd.
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Q. And has your position regarding the issuance of marriage
licenses changed between January 23rd of this year and today?
A. No.
Q. Miss Davis, I'd like to talk about the marriage license
form itself.
MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, may I approach the witness?
THE COURT: You may. Are you moving to admit
Exhibit 1?
MR. GANNAM: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SHARP: No objection.
THE COURT: Let it be received without objection.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Miss Davis, I've handed you an exhibit, which will be
Defendant's Exhibit 2. Do you recognize this document?
A. I do.
Q. Can you describe what it is?
A. It is the old version of the marriage license that was
prescribed by the KDLA for us to use for the issuance of
marriage applications.
Q. When you say old version, do you mean the version prior
to the Supreme Court decision?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So this would be the form of marriage license used by
your office up until June 26 of this year?
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A. Yes.
Q. I wanted to point out for you the very first sentence
after the heading that says Marriage License, Valid Only in
the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It says, To any person or
religious society qualified to perform marriages per
KRS 402.050, you are hereby authorized to join together in the
state of matrimony, according to the laws of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky. Do you see that language?
A. I do.
Q. And when this license says "you are authorized," who do
you understand to be authorizing the people on this license to
be getting married?
A. That would be me, the clerk.
Q. And is it your understanding that that is dictated by the
law of the Commonwealth of Kentucky?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you prepare this form yourself?
A. No.
Q. Who prepared or created this form?
A. The Kentucky Department of Library and Archives.
Q. I want to call your attention down to the middle of the
form. And just for the record, there are areas blacked out of
this form that would contain the personal information of
whoever these applicants are. The original forms would not
contain those black boxes, correct?
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A. Correct.
Q. So in the middle of the form, it says, We hereby certify
the above information is true to the best of our knowledge.
And it has spaces for, on this form, the bride and groom to
sign. Directly under that, it says, Issued this June 16,
2015, and the office of Kim Davis, Rowan County, County Clerk.
Do you see that language?
A. I do.
Q. Who puts that information on the form, your name and your
title as Rowan County Clerk?
A. It populates from our software.
Q. Do you have any control over that?
A. No.
Q. So when your software in your office is used to create a
marriage license, does it automatically put your name and
title into every marriage license?
A. It does.
Q. According to your understanding, who does this license
say is issuing the marriage license?
A. It was issued by my office.
Q. And underneath, in the next line, it says By, and there's
a name here, Brian Mason, Deputy Clerk. Is that a deputy
clerk in your office?
A. It is.
Q. Do deputy clerks have the authority to sign marriage
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licenses?
A. They have authority to sign it, yes.
Q. Whose authority are they exercising when they sign it?
A. Mine.
Q. Are you aware of any marriage license currently available
in the Commonwealth of Kentucky in Rowan County that would not
require you to authorize it?
A. No.
Q. And do you have the discretion to create a different kind
of license that would not require your authorization for it to
be issued?
A. No.
MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, I move to admit Defendant's
Exhibit 2 into evidence.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SHARP: No objection.
THE COURT: Let it be received without objection.
MR. GANNAM: May I approach again, Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Miss Davis, I've shown you a document that's been marked
as Defendant's Exhibit 3. Are you familiar with this
document?
A. I am.
Q. What is this document?
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A. It is the marriage license that KDLA has prescribed that
we use after the Supreme Court decision on June 26th.
Q. And I want to draw your attention to the language at the
beginning, To any person or religious society qualified to
perform marriages per KRS 402.050, you are hereby authorized
to join together in the state of matrimony, according to the
laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky -- I'll stop right there.
Is this language the same as was on the prior form marriage
license?
A. Yes.
Q. And under this new version of the marriage license who,
do you understand, is authorizing the people named in the
license to be getting married?
A. That would be me, the clerk.
Q. In moving down to the middle section of the form, after
where the party information would be filled in, it says, We
hereby certify the above information is true to the best of
our knowledge, and then there are lines for signatures of
first party and second party, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, on the prior form, that said bride and groom,
correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Now, below that it says issued this -- there's a blank
for the date, and the office of. There's a space for a name
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and then a county. When this form is used in your office,
what would go in that space for name and county?
A. That would be my name, Rowan County.
Q. And is it your understanding that this signifies that the
office would be -- the license would be issued under your
authority?
A. Yes.
Q. Moving down to the part that reads Marriage Certificate,
the third line down, it says -- I'm sorry, let me just read
that whole section under Marriage Certificate. It says, I do
certify that blank and blank were united in marriage on the --
there's a space for a date and location -- under the authority
of the above license and in the presence of, please print
witnesses' names. Do you see that language?
A. I do.
Q. What is your understanding to be the authority of the
above license that it's referring to?
A. That would be me.
Q. And since the change in the form following the Obergefell
decision, are you aware of any option in Rowan County to issue
a marriage license form that's not issued under your
authority?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware of any option for a marriage license form
that would not show your name on it?
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A. No.
Q. Apart from the sort of aesthetic differences in this form
and the prior form marked as Exhibit 2 and the change in
designation of parties from bride and groom to first party and
second party, is there any substantive difference between the
old form and the new form?
A. No.
MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, I move to admit Defendant's
Exhibit 3 into evidence.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SHARP: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let it be received without objection.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Miss Davis, we've covered your religious belief about
what marriage is, and we've covered the licensing scheme where
the licenses are issued in Rowan County under your authority.
I want to ask you specifically, why does authorizing the
marriage of same-sex couples violate your religious beliefs?
A. Because if I say that I authorize that, I'm saying I
agree with it, and I can't.
Q. And to be clear, is your religious objection to
authorizing a marriage license for a same-sex couple based on
any sin that you believe this couple may have committed?
A. No.
Q. Is it based on any sin you believe they might commit?
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A. No.
Q. Is your religious objection to authorizing a marriage
license for a same-sex couple based on any religious objection
other than what you believe the definition of marriage is?
A. No.
Q. Miss Davis, understanding that your religious objection
prevents you from issuing licenses to same-sex couples, why
did you decide not to issue licenses to any couples?
A. I didn't want to discriminate against anybody.
Q. Is that consistent with the position you took in January,
when you sent the letter to legislators asking them to provide
you an opt-out from issuing any licenses at all?
A. Yes.
Q. And has that position ever changed since that letter in
January?
A. No.
Q. Miss Davis, when the Supreme Court decided the Obergefell
case in June, after that, did you receive any guidance from
the Governor of Kentucky on issuing marriage licenses?
A. He issued a directive that came over the email, and I
later got a hard copy that said we may not agree with it,
but -- morally, you know, you may not agree with it, but we
had to issue them regardless.
MR. GANNAM: May I approach again, Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may. This will be Exhibit 4?
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MR. GANNAM: Yes, Your Honor.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Miss Davis, I've just handed you what has been marked as
Defendant's Exhibit 4. This appears to be a letter on the
letterhead of the Office of the Governor dated June 26, 2015.
This also appears in the complaint in this case as Plaintiff's
Exhibit Number 3. Is this the letter you were just referring
to?
A. It is.
Q. And what did you understand this letter to be directing
you to do as a clerk of court or as the county clerk?
A. Well, it simply states, says, Neither your oath nor the
Supreme Court dictates what you must believe. But as elected
officials, they do prescribe how we must act.
And we were instructed that Kentucky would recognize as
valid all same-sex marriages performed in other states, and we
were to start issuing license.
Q. Was there any doubt in your mind that the governor was
communicating to all the county clerk that they should issue
the marriage licenses regardless of what they believe?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you sent any communications back to the governor
after this letter was sent to you?
A. I have.
THE COURT: You have or you have not?
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THE WITNESS: I have.
THE COURT: You have, all right. Thank you.
MR. GANNAM: Before I get to that, I would move to
admit Defendant's Exhibit 4 into evidence.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SHARP: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let it be received.
MR. GANNAM: May I approach, Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, I apologize, I don't have a
final copy of this one.
THE COURT: That's fine.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Miss Davis, I just handed you a document marked as
Defendant's Exhibit 5. Do you recognize this document?
A. I do.
Q. What is this document?
A. It's a letter that not just myself but many clerks had
sent to the governor just trying to compel him to call a
special session or to do something in order to help the clerks
who had objections to issuing the same-sex marriage license on
grounds of conscience, that he would do something to try to
help us.
Q. I want to read from the letter. The first paragraph, the
last sentence says, Many clerks firmly believe that forcing
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county clerk offices to issue same-sex marriage licenses, when
it is against their deeply held religious beliefs and
traditions, is a direct violation of the U.S. Constitution's
First Amendment.
Are those the words you sent to the governor?
A. It is.
Q. And do you believe that to be the case?
A. I do.
Q. The next paragraph says, This dramatic and sudden change
has caused some clerks to go as far as to halt issuing
marriage licenses to anyone rather than compromise their
deeply held religious convictions.
Would that include you, Miss Davis?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Next sentence says, This position has ignited litigation,
and it is foreseeable that it may invite more lawsuits.
How many times have you been sued so far, Miss Davis?
A. Twice.
Q. Finally, next paragraph says, It appears the only timely
and reasonable solution to this conflict is a legislative one.
So for that reason, I respectfully request that you
immediately call an extraordinary session of General Assembly
to address the issues that have been caused in this transition
from traditional marriage being redefined to include same-sex
couples.
Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB   Doc #: 26   Filed: 07/23/15   Page: 46 of 83 - Page ID#: 262      Case: 15-5880     Document: 15-6     Filed: 08/19/2015    Page: 47 ( 24 of 313)
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
DAVIS - Direct 47
Are those your words to the governor, Miss Davis?
A. They are.
Q. Have you received any direct response from the governor?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware of press reports of conversations between
your counterpart in Casey County, Clerk Casey Davis, and the
governor?
A. I am.
Q. And are you aware of what's been reported as the
governor's answer to Mr. Davis's similar objection, that he
should simply issue the licenses or resign?
A. I am.
Q. Miss Davis, is resigning an option for you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why not?
A. Because if I resign, that leaves my deputies to deal with
this. It leaves another clerk to deal with it. They may not
have an issue with it, but the people that work for me have
issue with this also. And if I resign, that solves nothing.
It helps nobody. And there is a solution out there that
everybody can be happy, and it can be done so that nobody has
to be compromised in any way.
Q. Would you say that you've done a good job as the clerk of
Rowan County?
A. I think so, yes, sir.
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Q. Is that based in part on the, for example, the three
quarters of a million dollar surplus you've generated since
you've been the clerk?
A. Yes.
Q. And all those funds, if there's a surplus at the end of
the year, go back to the county?
MR. SHARP: Objection, Your Honor. Relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. My question was, those funds would go back to the county
if there's a surplus at the end of the year, correct?
A. That's correct.
MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, I would move to admit
Defendant's Exhibit 5 into evidence.
THE COURT: Any objection to 5?
MR. SHARP: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let it be received without objection.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. You mentioned some of your deputy clerks may share the
same objection. Out of your six deputy clerks, how many do
you know would have a similar religious objection to signing
off on a marriage license to a same-sex couple?
A. I know for certainty four.
Q. And out of the other two, do you know their positions?
A. One --
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MR. SHARP: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled. If you have a reason to know
why. I mean, first of all, have you spoken with the other six
clerks about the issuance of marriage licenses post-Supreme
Court decision?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You have spoken with them?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: The four that you've identified as having
objections, did they tell you they had objections?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: What about the other two?
THE WITNESS: One said they would be willing to issue
the license, wouldn't have any problem with it, one is kind of
ambiguous, just kind of straddling the fence.
THE COURT: So there would be one that would be
willing to issue the licenses?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And would that individual be able to
issue the licenses without any repercussions from you?
THE WITNESS: My name would be on that license.
THE COURT: Okay. I understand that. But as far as
that individual would be able to issue the licenses without
any repercussions from you?
THE WITNESS: That deputy would not have my authority
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to issue a license if I did not grant that authority.
THE COURT: All right. If the authority was required
to be granted, would that deputy be able to issue the license
without any repercussions from you?
THE WITNESS: Repercussions as far as maybe firing
that deputy?
THE COURT: Correct.
THE WITNESS: I don't know how to answer that,
because that causes me to speculate that if there was a form
that was generated that didn't have my name on it --
THE COURT: Is it the marriage license -- I know your
attorney asked to read this section. To any person or
religious society qualified to perform marriages pursuant to
KRS Section 402.050. Are you such a person authorized or
qualified to perform marriages?
THE WITNESS: No. I'm the authority --
THE COURT: You don't perform marriages, correct?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: All right.
THE WITNESS: I'm the authorizing agent of that
license.
THE COURT: But you're not a person qualified to
perform the marriages, correct?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: All right. You may proceed.
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BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Miss Davis, knowing what you do, that there is an
employee who is willing to issue the licenses, have you taken
any adverse employment action against that employee?
A. No.
Q. Do you have any intention of doing that?
A. No.
Q. Do you consider that employee to be a good employee?
A. Very loyal, very dedicated, very good employee.
Q. And I believe you testified earlier that -- could a
single employee handle all of the volume of Rowan County
marriage licenses, if called upon to do so?
A. Yes.
Q. I believe you testified that might take an hour a week?
MR. SHARP: Objection. Asked and answered.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. In the almost 30 years that you've been at the clerk's
office, have you ever objected on religious grounds to doing
any of the clerk's office functions apart from this marriage
license issue?
A. No.
Q. In your almost 30 years in the clerk's office, have you
ever witnessed another deputy clerk or the elected clerk make
a religious objection to performing some function of the
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clerk's office?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware of types of licenses that some clerk's
offices issue and some clerk's offices don't?
A. I am.
Q. Can you give an example?
A. Not all county clerks sell hunting and fishing licenses.
You can opt out of selling those, just by giving a written
explanation to the Department of Fish and Wildlife.
Q. And was that a directive or a law that was created by the
Department of Fish and Wildlife?
MR. SHARP: Objection. Relevance, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection.
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure how that law is. It's in
our duties that it says that a clerk can opt out from selling
hunting and fishing licenses.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Is there anything else that's issued out of your office
or filed in your office that doesn't depend on your authority?
A. No.
Q. Let me give you an example what I'm talking about. If
someone brings a document to you to be recorded, you're not
required to authorize or approve of whatever that document
says; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB   Doc #: 26   Filed: 07/23/15   Page: 52 of 83 - Page ID#: 268      Case: 15-5880     Document: 15-6     Filed: 08/19/2015    Page: 53 (230 of 313)
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
DAVIS - Direct 53
Q. Your duty would be limited to just recording it in the
public records?
A. As long as it meets the statutory requirements for that
particular type of document, we would record it.
Q. Approximately how many counties surround Rowan County,
immediately surround it?
A. About seven.
Q. Would those be Lewis, Fleming, Bath, Menifee, Morgan,
Elliott and Carter Counties?
A. Yes.
Q. To your knowledge, are all marriage licenses being issued
in those seven counties?
MR. SHARP: Objection. Speculation.
THE COURT: Overruled. If she knows.
THE WITNESS: They are.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. And what would be the longest distance one would have to
drive, approximately, from Rowan County to one of those seven
surrounding counties?
A. Maybe 30 minutes at the most.
Q. That would be for any of those seven?
A. Yes.
Q. Are there other --
THE COURT: Probably longer to Vanceburg.
THE WITNESS: Might be if you go over --
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THE COURT: Go ahead.
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Are there even more counties within a 60-minute drive of
Rowan County?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. And to your knowledge, are any of the counties within a
60-minute drive of Rowan County not issuing marriage licenses?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. When we were in court in Ashland last week, do you know
what county we were in?
A. We were in Boyd.
Q. And to your knowledge, is Boyd County issuing all
marriage licenses?
A. They are.
Q. And today, we're sitting in what county?
A. Kenton, I believe.
Q. And to your knowledge, is Kenton County issuing marriage
licenses?
A. Yes, they are.
Q. Miss Davis, when you took office in January of 2015, did
you swear out an oath?
A. I did.
Q. And did that oath include an oath to uphold the United
States Constitution and laws?
A. It did.
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Q. And did it include an oath to uphold the Kentucky
Constitution and laws?
A. Yes, it did.
Q. Have you kept that oath since taking office?
A. Yes.
Q. How do you explain the not issuing marriage licenses and
upholding, for example, the United States Constitution and
laws?
A. I think the First Amendment right gives me a right to
religious freedom.
Q. So have you ever made a decision that you're not going to
uphold the U.S. Constitution?
A. No.
Q. And how about under the Kentucky Constitution and laws.
How are you upholding those when you're not issuing marriage
licenses?
A. Well, so far, our Kentucky Constitution hasn't been
rewritten. I think it takes an act of legislation to do that,
and it still states and has defined, as we voted on in 2004,
to define marriage as a union between one man and one woman.
Q. Are you aware of any things that would be called
conscience protections in the Kentucky Constitution?
A. Yes. Our Bill of Rights.
Q. And so have you ever made a decision not to follow the
Kentucky Constitution?
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A. No.
Q. And in connection with your current policy on marriage
licenses, have you ever made a decision that you were not
going to follow the Kentucky Constitution and laws?
A. No.
MR. GANNAM: No further questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. Mando?
MR. MANDO: I do have a few questions, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. MANDO:
Q. Good morning, Miss Davis. I introduced myself to you
earlier this morning. My name is Jeff Mando. I represent
Rowan County. I just have a few questions.
A. Yes.
Q. It's my understanding you occupy the office of county
clerk in Rowan County, correct?
A. I do.
Q. As you understand it, that's a constitutional office,
created and recognized by the Kentucky Constitution?
A. Yes.
Q. And with regard to marriage licenses, you are directed by
state statute as a county clerk to issue marriage licenses,
correct?
A. I am.
Q. In fact, issuance of marriage licenses requires you to
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remit the fee for the marriage licenses, part of it back to
the state, correct?
A. It is.
Q. And then you have to report to the state so that the
state Department of Vital Statistics can gather and publish
information about marriages state-wide, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Also, with regard to marriage licenses, the forms that
you are required to utilize come from the state Department of
Libraries and Archives; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. That is a state agency that reports to the governor?
A. I would assume they do.
Q. And that state agency, the Department of Libraries and
Archives, to your knowledge, directs all clerks to issue
marriage licenses on this prescribed form? It's uniform?
A. That's correct.
Q. All right. I'm sorry, that was two questions. It's a
uniform form, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And it's directed by the Department of Library and
Archives that all county clerks use this state form?
A. That's correct.
Q. The employees in your office, you hire the employees in
your office, correct?
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A. I do.
Q. And you retain the authority to discharge and discipline
the employees in your office, correct?
A. I do.
Q. And you retain the authority to set the salaries for the
employees in your office, correct?
A. I do.
Q. That's not a fiscal court function?
A. The fiscal court has authority over my maximum allowable
salaries and benefits that I pay my deputies as a total, but
they do not have control over what each individual one makes.
Q. So they have approval over the total budget, and you
decide how to apportion it among your staff?
A. Yes.
Q. You mentioned that as county clerk, you viewed your job
as one where you're -- I think I wrote this down -- a
pass-through collection -- you viewed it as a pass-through
clerk's agency is the words I heard you say.
A. Yes.
Q. And you're a pass-through for the state, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Because you remit funds to the Department of
Transportation, state Department of Revenue, state Department
of Fish and Wildlife, state motor vehicle registration,
correct?
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A. Yes.
Q. All right. And after the Obergefell decision came down,
it was the state Department of Libraries and Archives that
sent you the revised form and other county clerks across the
state to use, correct?
A. It is.
Q. All right. And it was the governor who issued a letter
that was introduced by your lawyer, referred to you by your
lawyer. It was the governor who issued a letter directing you
to comply with that decision and issue these licenses?
A. It is.
MR. MANDO: Thank you, ma'am. No further questions.
THE COURT: Cross-examination.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. CANON:
Q. Good morning, Miss Davis.
A. Good morning.
Q. My name is Dan Canon. I represent the plaintiffs here.
The good news is that both Mr. Mando and Mr. Gannam have asked
you most of the questions I was planning to ask you anyway. I
promise not to be too long with you.
You testified you were elected on November the 4th, 2014;
is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you took office on January 1?
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A. 5th.
Q. The 5th of 2015. When did you first register to run for
that office?
A. I filed an intent in -- it was either the last part of
June, the first part of July of 2013.
Q. Okay. And Mr. Gannam asked you about the oath that you
took at the time that you took office. At the time that you
were elected to that office on November the 4th, were you
aware of a district court opinion by Judge Heyburn that struck
down the constitutionality of the portion of the Kentucky
Constitution that you testified about before?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And Mr. Gannam asked you whether or not you made a
decision not to follow the Constitution of Kentucky, and you
said no.
Did you make a conscious decision not to follow the
Constitution of the United States?
MR. GANNAM: Objection, Your Honor. Asked and
answered.
MR. CANON: I don't think it's been asked.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Say again, please.
BY MR. CANON:
Q. Did you make a conscious decision not to follow the
Constitution of the United States?
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A. No.
Q. Okay. And so did you believe that you were following the
Constitution of the United States on June 26, when you stopped
issuing marriage licenses?
A. We issued a license on June 26. It was June 27.
Q. June 27, then. Sorry.
A. I still feel I'm following the Constitution, knowing my
First Amendment rights are constitutional.
Q. Okay. So let's back up. You've got the ability to make
the rules for the Rowan County Clerk's Office, right?
A. For my office.
Q. You set policies, practices, all that good stuff for
Rowan County, right?
A. Yes.
Q. So even if you've got a deputy clerk that's willing to
issue licenses, issue marriage licenses, you can tell them no,
right?
A. As long as my name is issued -- is on that license, I'm
not going to ask them to do something I wouldn't do myself.
Q. You believe you've got the discretion to tell them not to
issue those licenses even if they're willing to do it; is that
right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And that's, in fact, what you've done here, isn't
it?
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A. (No response.)
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And in what way did you first institute that
policy? Did you sit down with your deputy clerks and have a
talk with them, or did you distribute a memo, or how did that
happen?
A. After the doors closed, we had a meeting.
Q. Tell me about that meeting.
A. Just simply stated that my religious beliefs can't
condone issuing and being a party to the issuance of a
same-sex marriage license. And I told them that we weren't
going to be issuing license, period, so we didn't discriminate
against any party.
Q. Okay. And was there any reason, other than your personal
religious beliefs, for refusing to issue those licenses?
A. No.
Q. And do you believe that county clerks have the discretion
to refuse to issue marriage licenses in general if they
believe that doing so runs contrary to their religious
beliefs?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Gannam asked you about, if you'll look at Defense
Exhibit 2, you'll recall that Mr. Gannam asked you about a
litmus test that you may or may not go through. Said you
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didn't go through whether you asked applicants for marriage
licenses whether they had engaged in any kind of sinful
behavior. Do you remember that line of questioning?
A. I do.
Q. You do ask applicants whether or not they've been
divorced, don't you?
A. I do.
Q. Okay. And do you have any religious objection to
somebody getting remarried once they've been divorced?
A. That's between them and God.
Q. Okay. But you don't have -- you don't personally have a
religious objection to issuing a license to somebody who's
been divorced?
A. No.
Q. And if a clerk has that religious objection, can they
then refuse to issue a license on that basis? Any clerk.
A. I don't know. I can't speak for them.
Q. Well, I'm asking about your conception of the discretion
that you have as a county clerk to deny the issuance of
marriage licenses. Do you understand?
A. My denial of a marriage license is the basis of what
marriage is defined.
Q. I understand. And the definition of marriage is based
upon your religious beliefs, right?
A. The word of God, yes.
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Q. So if a clerk has a religious belief that someone who is
divorced should not be able to get remarried, can that clerk
then refuse to issue a license on that basis?
A. I can't speak for them.
Q. Okay. What if a clerk has a religious objection to an
interracial marriage. Can they then refuse to issue a license
to an interracial couple?
A. I can't speak for them.
Q. So would you acknowledge --
A. If you would like me to answer that, I can answer it.
Q. Would you acknowledge -- do you have a religious
objection to an interracial marriage?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware if any clerks do?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. But if a clerk did have that religious objection, they'd
be able to not issue a marriage license?
A. I don't know. I can't speak for them.
Q. I just want to understand what your concept of your
discretion as a county clerk is. How far does that go?
MR. GANNAM: Objection, Your Honor. Calls for a
legal conclusion.
THE COURT: That's really not a question, how far
does it go. Why don't you ask a more specific question.
MR. CANON: Sure.
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BY MR. CANON:
Q. If I've got a personal belief -- if I'm a county clerk,
I've got a personal belief that interracial marriage is
unBiblical and I don't want to authorize it, can I refuse to
authorize it?
A. I don't know. That would be up to you.
Q. Okay. You understand if somebody doesn't have a marriage
license, they can't have their marriage recognized by the
state, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you --
THE COURT: Why don't you ask one question at a time.
MR. CANON: I'm sorry?
THE COURT: You were starting to ask a compound
question.
MR. CANON: I didn't intend to.
THE COURT: You understand if someone doesn't have a
marriage license, they can't have their marriage recognized by
the state, correct?
Did you say yes?
THE WITNESS: I did.
THE COURT: I'm sorry. Go ahead.
BY MR. CANON:
Q. Have you been in the clerk's office every work day since
June 27?
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A. Last Monday, I was out for court.
Q. When we were in court in Ashland?
A. I was there.
Q. Okay.
A. Not there --
Q. You were in the courthouse?
A. No, I wasn't at the courthouse. I was in Ashland. And
Wednesday, I had a clerk's meeting in Lexington, and then I'm
not there today.
Q. Okay. But generally speaking, you've been available; is
that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you heard Mr. Blevins testify that you haven't been
unavailable at any point in time, as far as he's concerned, to
issue those licenses. Do you disagree with anything he said?
A. No. I'm always there at my office.
Q. Have you been personally present when any couples came to
apply for a license?
A. I have.
Q. And what did you tell them?
A. I didn't speak to any of the parties involved, I think,
except maybe Miss Miller, the couple that you sat back behind
the bench. I don't know who they were.
Q. That's okay. Any couples. Do you recall --
A. There was one in this case.
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Q. And you recall personally turning them away?
A. I do.
Q. Okay. And what did you tell them?
A. I just told them that at the present time, we weren't
issuing marriage licenses. Didn't feel that I could put my
name to a marriage license that was issued to a same-sex
couple, and I didn't want to discriminate.
And I asked -- I told them that if what they were trying
to accomplish was to receive a marriage license, that they
could go to any of the surrounding counties and that they
could get a marriage license. They could actually come back
and get married in Rowan County if they wanted to, but that we
weren't issuing them, and I apologized for their
inconvenience.
Q. Now, how long is your term?
A. Four years.
Q. And assuming that you're not reelected for a second term,
do you intend not to issue marriage licenses during that
entire four-year duration?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had testified before that you think that that's
not a violation of the United States Constitution. You
understand that you swore an oath to uphold the United States
Constitution, right?
A. I did.
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Q. How do you determine what the Constitution of the United
States means?
A. Well, I'm not a lawyer.
Q. Right.
A. But I do know that the First Amendment right gives me the
right to my religious freedom.
Q. Very good. And your religious freedom, in your
conception, trumps the right -- you understand that the
couples in this case have a right to get a marriage license,
correct?
MR. GANNAM: Objection, Your Honor. Calls for a
legal conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. CANON:
Q. Is that your understanding of the law?
A. My understanding is that the U.S. Supreme Court redefined
marriage.
Q. And you don't want to abide by that definition, correct?
A. It's not the definition that I believe in.
Q. But you understand when the Supreme Court says that,
that's an issue of constitutional interpretation. That's the
law of the land. You do understand that?
A. I suppose.
Q. Okay. And you also understand that a marriage license
isn't quite the same thing as a hunting or a fishing license,
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don't you?
A. They're still a license.
Q. Well, is there any --
A. It's still giving authority to do something.
Q. Is there any difference in the rank of importance to you
between hunting and fishing and marriage?
A. They're a license.
Q. So they're all the same? Hunting, fishing, getting
married, all the same thing?
A. I think marriage is a sacred union.
Q. I agree. Aside from traveling to another county and
going to the judge executive's office, which we've already
talked about, are there any alternatives available for anybody
in Rowan County that wants to actually have their marriage
licensed in Rowan County right now?
A. Not unless the legislation can enact something.
Q. So that's a no?
A. Not unless the legislation can enact something.
Q. And they haven't enacted anything, right?
A. Uh-uh.
Q. And if Judge Bunning orders you to start issuing marriage
licenses as a result of the proceedings we've had here today,
are you going to do it?
A. I can't tell you.
Q. You can't tell me?
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A. Because you're asking me to speculate on something that
hasn't happened.
Q. You understand that it's a possibility that he could
order you to do that, right?
A. He could.
Q. Have you thought about what that possibility might look
like for you?
A. I have.
Q. Okay. And have you made a decision as to what you're
going to do if you are ordered to start issuing licenses?
A. I'll deal with that when the time comes.
Q. And you testified a little bit about the seven counties
that surround Rowan County. Now, you understand that once
somebody has their marriage license, they've got to also
travel back and have that marriage license filed?
A. They can mail it.
Q. Okay, very good. Now, you're not -- you testified about
this a little bit before. You're not denying licenses to
opposite-sex couples based on your religious beliefs, right?
A. No. I just didn't want to discriminate.
MR. CANON: Nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Any redirect? Because I have a few
questions myself.
MR. DONAHUE: Your Honor, may I be excused?
THE COURT: Yes. We were told you would have to be
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in Louisville this afternoon. You may be excused, sir.
MR. DONAHUE: Thank you.
(Mr. Donahue exited the courtroom.)
THE COURT: Mr. Gannam.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. I want to clarify, the oath of office that you took, you
said that you pledged to uphold the United States
Constitution; is that correct?
A. I did.
Q. Did you pledge to abide by the United States Supreme
Court's decisions?
A. No.
Q. So that wasn't a specific part of your oath?
A. No.
Q. Mr. Canon referenced a federal district court decision
invalidating Kentucky's marriage laws at the end of last year.
Are you familiar with that?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you also aware that a federal appellate court, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversed that decision?
A. I am.
Q. At the time you took office in January of 2015 and swore
your oath, was same-sex marriage permitted in the Commonwealth
of Kentucky?
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A. No.
MR. GANNAM: No further question, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Mando?
MR. MANDO: No, sir.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. CANON:
Q. Ma'am, do you get to interpret what the Constitution
means?
A. No.
Q. Who has the final say on what the United States
Constitution means?
MR. GANNAM: Objection, Your Honor. Calls for a
legal conclusion.
THE COURT: I can answer that. It's not me.
BY MR. CANON:
Q. I'll ask it a different way. Who do you understand has
the final say as to what the United States Constitution says?
A. (No response.)
Q. Do you know?
A. I don't know.
Q. And the Sixth Circuit opinion that Mr. Gannam referenced,
do you know what day that came down?
A. No.
Q. If I told you November the 6th, would you have any reason
to dispute that?
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A. I assume you wouldn't lie to me.
Q. I would not, ma'am.
THE COURT: I can take judicial notice of that.
MR. CANON: Very good.
BY MR. CANON:
Q. And the prior opinion that you and I discussed, the
opinion striking down the portion of the Kentucky Constitution
that prohibits same-sex marriage, you knew about that the
entire time you were on the campaign trail, didn't you?
A. It was there.
MR. CANON: Nothing further.
THE COURT: All right. Can I have Exhibit 3? Now, I
asked you earlier, ma'am, about the marriage license. Now I'm
looking at the one that was prepared by the state Department
of Library and Archives. You should have Defendant's
Exhibit 3 there.
THE WITNESS: I do.
THE COURT: I asked you earlier about this KRS
section referenced in the top, 402.050. And this includes, in
the definitional section -- it's not on the form, but it
includes ministers of the gospel and priests, justices and
judges of the court, county judge executives, justices of the
peace, and fiscal court commissioners authorized by the
governor or county judge and any religious society with no
minister.
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Those are the -- where it says to any person qualified to
perform marriages, that list I just gave you, that's the list.
THE WITNESS: Right.
THE COURT: County clerks aren't on that list. So if
Jane Doe and Richard Roe came in and said will you marry us,
like formally, you take this person, you take this person, et
cetera, you don't do that?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Okay. So where it says you are
authorized to join together in the state of matrimony
according to the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, you're
not authorized to join together in the state of matrimony
because you're not included in that definition?
THE WITNESS: But I'm authorizing the license of --
THE COURT: I understand that, but he read this.
"You are hereby authorized to join together." You're not
authorized to join them together?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: As an official of the marriage?
THE WITNESS: That's correct.
THE COURT: Now, when two individuals come in to seek
to get the license, the top part, above where it says "we
hereby certify," is that already filled out?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: So the deputy or the clerk would help
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them fill that out?
THE WITNESS: Yeah. We ask the information, type it
in.
THE COURT: So they come in across the counter and
they ask -- it's actually typed into some sort of template
form, then printed out?
THE WITNESS: Um-hmm.
THE COURT: At the bottom of Exhibit 2, where it says
issued June 16, 2015, the office of Kim Davis, Rowan County,
Morehead, and then Brian makes -- you referenced him. These
initials, these are Brian Mason's initials?
THE WITNESS: They are.
THE COURT: So the individual filling this out, that
typewritten portion would be based on whoever's typing the
information into the computer; is that fair?
THE WITNESS: Yeah. His name, he types his name in,
but my name is already populated in there.
THE COURT: Yours is just part of the form?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Now, at the bottom of the marriage
certificate itself, this is handwritten, said recorded this
July 2, 2015, and the office in Kim Davis, Rowan County Clerk,
says Roberta H. -- is it --
THE WITNESS: Earley.
THE COURT: Earley, deputy clerk. Is that actually
Case: 0:15-cv-00044-DLB   Doc #: 26   Filed: 07/23/15   Page: 75 of 83 - Page ID#: 291      Case: 15-5880     Document: 15-6     Filed: 08/19/2015    Page: 76 (253 of 313)
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
76
handwritten in by the deputy clerk?
THE WITNESS: It is.
THE COURT: In this case, why would Brian Mason be
different than Roberta Earley?
THE WITNESS: Because you're catching the license at
two different times. Brian Mason issued the license. Then
the center section where it says Marriage Certificate is
filled out by the person performing the ceremony. Then once
it's performed and completed, then the license is turned back
into the clerk's office, and then that's the recording of the
bottom part down here. That is the actual recording of the
document into our permanent records and indexing system.
THE COURT: And who fills that out, the bottom
portion?
THE WITNESS: The very bottom would be my clerk, my
deputy.
THE COURT: The clerk would fill that out, all right.
Let me check my notes here. That's all the questions I
have. Any further questions of the witness?
MR. SHARP: No, Your Honor.
MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, just briefly on the form.
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. GANNAM:
Q. Miss Davis, going back to Defendant's Exhibit 3, the
marriage license, the new marriage license, where it reads to
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any person or religious society qualified to perform
marriages, it says who it's to. What is your understanding of
who it's from?
A. It's from me.
Q. When it says "you are hereby authorized," who is the
"you" referring to?
A. "You" is talking about the people performing the
ceremony.
Q. And who is telling them that they are authorized?
A. Me, the clerk.
Q. So who is it that is authorizing them to do it?
A. It would be me, the clerk.
MR. GANNAM: No further questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And you believe that, even though the
statute doesn't include you? The statute I read to you
doesn't include the deputy clerk.
THE WITNESS: Right. But if you read after the
semicolon, it says you. The people you talked about in the
KRS that you read, it says you are authorized to join together
in the state of matrimony according to the laws of Kentucky.
I'm the one that's authorizing that marriage license. I'm the
one giving the authority because they can't get a marriage
license online, or they can't, you know -- it's actually the
clerk that's authorizing -- I'm saying that these people meet
the qualifications, and that they're not related, that
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they're -- that they meet the age requirements and everything.
That's the authority that I'm given through the statutes to
issue the marriage license and that's what --
THE COURT: The statute you referenced earlier before
we got started, Mr. Mando, those are the statutes she's
referring to?
MR. MANDO: The statute I was referring to, Your
Honor, was 402.080, talks about issuing -- the license shall
be issued by the clerk.
THE COURT: The license itself.
MR. MANDO: The license is issued by the clerk. The
ceremony is performed by one of those in the statute.
THE COURT: The individuals authorized to perform the
ceremonies are the 402.050?
MR. MANDO: Correct.
THE WITNESS: Um-hmm.
MR. CHRISTMAN: Your Honor, if I can interject as
well, Section 402.100 is actually the section that walks the
clerk through what the clerk needs to do in order to issue a
license, and it's the form that says each -- I'm reading
directly out of the statute.
Each county clerk shall use the form prescribed by the
Department For Libraries and Archives when issuing a marriage
license. This form shall provide for the entering of all the
information required in this section and may also provide for
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the entering of additional information prescribed by the
Department For Libraries and Archives.
The form shall consist of, and then it identifies what
has to be on the license. A marriage license which provides
for the entering of an authorization statement of the county
clerk issuing the license.
THE COURT: So you are authorizing the -- you are, in
essence, telling the state that the information provided on
this is accurate?
THE WITNESS: Um-hmm.
THE COURT: Is that what you're doing?
THE WITNESS: The information that's given, they
presented their information, and we applied it to the
prescribed document. And if they meet those statutory
requirements, then we're authorizing someone who is eligible,
like what you had stated earlier, to perform a ceremony, to
take this license that we've issued and actually marry
someone.
THE COURT: So once the couple, if you will, leaves
the courthouse with this, takes it, gets married, brings it
back or mails it back --
THE WITNESS: Or mails it back, yes.
THE COURT: So you're, in essence, signing off on the
accuracy of the information provided? Is that kind of what
this is?
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THE WITNESS: Well, we are verifying the information,
yes, as true and correct. And by our signature and the
issuance of it, we're saying that they're authorized to take
this and go to someone who is legally able to perform a
marriage, and they can present this form to them and that they
can have their ceremony performed and then bring it back in to
us for recording.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. CHRISTMAN: Your Honor, if I could continue with
the statute. Further down, with the marriage certificate
portion of the statute, it then says that the name it refers
to -- all the information that needs to be listed again, and
it refers to authority, and says the name of the county clerk
under whose authority the license was issued. That's why her
name is required on every license in those two places.
THE COURT: All right. You just object to your name
being on the license?
THE WITNESS: My name and my county, yeah.
THE COURT: Well, your county, you're elected by the
county. But if it said Rowan County and listed a deputy
clerk -- let's say the deputy clerk that would be permitted
to, or has agreed that he or she would not be religiously
opposed to issuing the license, if it just was the deputy
clerk's name with Rowan County and not your name, would you
object to that?
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THE WITNESS: It is still my authority as county
clerk that issues it through my deputy.
THE COURT: All right. Very well.
You may step down. Thank you.
Any further proof?
MR. GANNAM: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Mando, any proof from the
county's perspective?
MR. MANDO: No, sir.
THE COURT: All right. Any rebuttal?
MR. SHARP: No rebuttal evidence, Your Honor.
THE COURT: We have a response which is due on the
30th, and then the reply is due seven days after that.
MR. SHARP: That's correct.
THE COURT: Well, I think the earliest I would have a
decision -- I start a trial in Ashland on the 11th -- probably
the week of the 11th at some point. The response is due on
Thursday, the 7th, so I'll get a decision out as quickly as I
can on the motion.
We'll be in recess.
(Proceedings concluded at 11:43 a.m.)
- - -
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
ASHLAND DIVISION 
APRIL MILLER, ET AL., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
KIM DAVIS, ET AL., 
Defendants. 
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL ACTION 
0:15-CV-00044-DLB 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
DAVID L. BUNNING 
KIM DAVIS, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
STEVEN L. BESHEAR, in his official 
capacity as Governor of Kentucky, and 
WAYNE ONKST, in his official capacity as 
State Librarian and Commissioner, 
Kentucky Department for Libraries and 
Archives, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
VERIFIED THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT KIM DAVIS 
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, KIM DAVIS (“Davis”), for her third-party 
complaint pursuant to Rule 14, Fed. R. Civ. P., sues Third-Party Defendant STEVEN L. 
BESHEAR, in his official capacity as Governor of Kentucky (“Governor Beshear”), and Third-
Party Defendant WAYNE ONKST, in his official capacity as State Librarian and Commissioner, 
Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives (“Commissioner Onkst”), and alleges: 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Commonwealth of Kentucky, acting through Governor Beshear, has deprived 
Davis of her religious conscience rights guaranteed by the United States and Kentucky 
Constitutions and laws, by insisting that Davis issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
contrary to her conscience, based on her sincerely held religious beliefs. Because of Governor 
Beshear’s open declaration that Davis has no such rights, Governor Beshear has exposed Davis 
to the Plaintiffs’ underlying lawsuit, in which the Plaintiffs claim a constitutional right to a 
Kentucky marriage license issued specifically by Davis. Governor Beshear is not only liable to 
Davis for Plaintiffs’ claims, but is also obligated to effect Kentucky marriage licensing policies 
that uphold Davis’s rights of religious conscience. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
2. This action arises under Article VI and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Sections 1, 3, 5, and 8 of the Constitution of 
Kentucky, and the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 446.350 (the 
Kentucky “RFRA”). 
3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Davis’s federal law claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Davis’s 
state law claims pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
4. This Court has jurisdiction to render declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 
PARTIES 
5. Davis is the County Clerk for Rowan County, Kentucky. She was elected to the 
office of County Clerk in November 2014, and officially took office January 1, 2015, for a four-
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year term. Prior to taking office, Davis was a deputy clerk for her predecessor in office for nearly 
thirty years.  
6. Governor Beshear is the Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. As the 
highest executive officer of the Commonwealth, Governor Beshear has responsibility for 
effecting Kentucky marriage law, and has final policymaking authority over the enforcement of 
Kentucky marriage laws. 
7. Commissioner Onkst is the State Librarian and Commissioner of the Kentucky 
Department for Libraries and Archives. The Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives 
(“KDLA”) is an executive branch department of Kentucky government “headed by a 
commissioner whose title shall be state librarian who shall be appointed by and serve at the 
pleasure of the Governor.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 171.130. Commissioner Onkst has responsibility for 
the design and provision of the official Kentucky marriage license form to be used by all county 
clerks in the issuance of marriage licenses, and has final policymaking authority over the design 
of the official Kentucky marriage license form to be used by all county clerks in the issuance of 
marriage licenses. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
Administration of Kentucky Marriage Policy before Obergefell 
8. The Commonwealth of Kentucky has a body of democratically-enacted law 
memorializing the millennia-old, natural definition of marriage as the union of one man and one 
woman. In 1998, the Kentucky legislature codified at Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.005 the natural 
definition of marriage, previously entrenched in Kentucky common law, that “‘marriage’ refers 
only to the civil status, condition, or relation of one (1) man and one (1) woman united in law for 
life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent upon 
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those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex.” In 2004, the Kentucky legislature 
proposed a constitutional amendment, which was subsequently enacted on the approval of 
seventy-four percent (74%) of the voters, memorializing that “[o]nly a marriage between one 
man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky” KY. CONST. § 
233A.  
9. The Commonwealth also has a body of legislation governing the issuance of 
marriage licenses in Kentucky. Under these Kentucky marriage laws, individuals may obtain a 
Kentucky marriage license in any of Kentucky’s 120 counties, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.080, some of 
which have multiple branch offices. Thus, in total, there are approximately 137 marriage 
licensing locations in Kentucky. 
10. Pursuant to Kentucky’s marriage licensing scheme, “[e]ach county clerk shall use 
the form proscribed by the Department for Libraries and Archives when issuing a marriage 
license” which “shall be uniform throughout this state, and every license blank shall contain the 
identical words and figures provided in the form.” Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 402.100, 402.110. County 
clerks have no local discretion under Kentucky law to alter the composition or requirements of 
the KDLA-prescribed form. 
11. The KDLA form must include both a “marriage license” and a “marriage 
certificate.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.100. The marriage license section must include an 
“authorization statement of the county clerk issuing the license” and “[t]he date and place the 
license is issued, and the signature of the county clerk or deputy clerk issuing the license.” Ky. 
Rev. Stat. § 402.100(1). The marriage certificate section must include “the name of the county 
clerk under whose authority the license was issued, and the county in which the license was 
issued” and “[a] signed statement by the county clerk or a deputy county clerk of the county in 
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which the marriage license was issued that the marriage license was recorded.” Ky. Rev. Stat. 
§ 402.100(2), (3). The KDLA-prescribed form specifically uses the word “marriage” at six 
different places on the form (and one reference to “join[ing] together in the state of matrimony”). 
(A true and correct copy of a completed, KDLA-prescribed form of marriage license used in 
Rowan County prior to June 30, 2015, with personal information redacted, is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A.1) 
12. Thus, every marriage license must be issued and signed in the county clerk’s 
name and by the county clerk’s authority. In other words, no marriage license can be issued by a 
county clerk without her authorization and without her imprimatur. 
13. As an alternative to a marriage license issued by a county clerk, Kentucky 
marriage law provides for the issuance of a marriage license by a county judge/executive, the 
highest elected officer in a county, upon the absence of the clerk or vacancy in the clerk’s office. 
See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.240. This alternative procedure does not require the use of the KDLA 
marriage license form; rather, it authorizes the county judge/executive to issue a marriage license 
by “a memorandum thereof,” which is recorded by the clerk in the same manner as a KDLA 
form. See id.  
14. In February 2014, the Western District of Kentucky issued a decision holding 
Kentucky’s definition of marriage unconstitutional.2 In March 2014, Kentucky Attorney General 
Jack Conway, whose office had represented Kentucky in the case, tearfully proclaimed that after 
                                                 
1  The document attached as Exhibit A was admitted into evidence at the hearing on 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) as Defendant’s Exhibit 2 (“Old version of 
marriage license from KDLA”). (Ex. and Witness List (Doc. 25).) 
2  See Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (decided February 12, 
2014). 
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prayer and consultation with his wife he could not continue defending Kentucky’s marriage laws 
as an “inescapable” matter of conscience.3 Conway said, 
There are those who believe it’s my mandatory duty, regardless of my personal opinion, 
to continue to defend this case through the appellate process, and I have heard from many 
of them. However, I came to the inescapable conclusion that, if I did so, I would be 
defending discrimination. . . . 
That I will not do. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . I can only say that I am doing what I think is right. In the final analysis, I had 
to make a decision that I could be proud of – for me now, and my daughters’ judgment 
in the future.4  
15. Within minutes of Conway’s announcement, Governor Beshear announced the 
Commonwealth would hire private attorneys to pursue the appeal of the Western District’s 
ruling, and to represent Kentucky in a companion Western District case.5 Governor Beshear 
directed no adverse statements or actions towards Conway as a result of Conway’s refusal to 
perform official duties due to his conscience, though Conway’s refusal caused additional cost to 
the Commonwealth upwards of $200,000.00 for outside counsel. 6 
                                                 
3  Beshear to hire $125-an-hour lawyer for gay marriage appeal after Conway bows out, 
Wave3 News, available at http://www.wave3.com/story/24886884/beshear-to-hire-125-an-hour-
lawyer-for-gay-marriage-appeal-after-conway-bows-out (last accessed July 30, 2015) (quoting 
Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Dan Canon, that Conway’s conscientious objection to performing his duty to 
defend Kentucky’s marriage laws gave him “hope.”). 
4  Read and watch Jack Conway’s statement on same-sex marriage, WKYT.com, dated 
Mar. 4, 2014, available at http://www.wkyt.com/home/headlines/Read--watch-Attorney-
General-Conways-same-sex-statement-248381361.html (last accessed July 30, 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
5  See supra, n. 3. The Western District ruled against Kentucky in the second case, see Love 
v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536  (W.D. Ky. 2014). The Sixth Circuit reversed both district court 
decisions in DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), which was ultimately reversed by 
the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
6  Ky. Pays $195K+ to defend gay-marriage ban, The Courier-Journal, dated May 20, 2015, 
available at http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2015/05/20/cost-gay-marriage-
defense/27404461/ (last accessed July 30, 2015) (stating that Kentucky paid $195,400 to a 
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Davis’s Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs About Marriage 
16. Davis is a professing Christian who is heavily involved in her local church, 
attending weekly Bible study and worship services there, and who leads a weekly Bible study for 
women at a local jail. 
17. As a Christian, Davis possesses a sincerely held religious belief and conviction, 
based upon the Bible which she believes to be the Word of God, that “marriage” is exclusively a 
union between one man and one woman. According to her beliefs, there is no arrangement of 
people other than one man and one woman that is, or can be called, “marriage.” 
18. As county clerk, as a matter of Kentucky law, Davis authorizes, and signifies her 
authorization and approval by affixing her name to, each and every marriage license issued from 
her office. But Davis can neither authorize nor approve the “marriage” of a same-sex couple 
according to her conscience, because even calling the relationship of a same-sex couple 
“marriage” would violate her deeply and sincerely held religious beliefs. Nor can Davis allow 
her name to appear as the source of authority and approval for any marriage license issued to a 
same-sex couple because providing such approval would violate her sincere religious beliefs and 
convictions. 
19. Before taking office as County Clerk in January 2015, Davis swore an oath to 
support the constitutions and laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Kentucky “so 
help me God.” Davis understood (and understands) this oath to mean that, in upholding the 
federal and state constitutions and laws, she would not act in contradiction to the moral law of 
God, natural law, or her sincerely held religious beliefs and convictions. Davis also understood 
(and understands) the constitution and laws she swore to uphold to incorporate the constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                             
private firm through March 31, 2015 to defend Kentucky’s marriage law after Conway refused to 
do so). 
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and other legal protections of all individuals’ rights to live and work according to their 
consciences, as informed by their sincerely held religious beliefs and convictions, including 
without limitation such rights she holds in her own individual capacity. 
20. Davis’s sincerely held religious belief regarding the definition of “marriage” was 
perfectly aligned with the prevailing marriage policy in Kentucky at the time she took office, as 
provided in the Kentucky Constitution, Kentucky statutes, and controlling court decisions, and as 
effected by the Commonwealth through Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst.  
21. On January 16, 2015, just two weeks after Davis took office, the United States 
Supreme Court announced it would review the then-controlling Sixth Circuit decision upholding 
Kentucky’s natural definition of marriage. 
22. On January 23, Davis wrote Kentucky legislators exhorting them to “get a bill on 
the floor to help protect clerks” who had a religious objection to issuing marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples. (A true and correct copy of the form of letter sent to legislators is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B.7) 
23. Davis does not have a religious objection to issuing, signing, or otherwise 
approving a marriage license for any man and woman who otherwise satisfy all of the legal 
requirements for marriage under Kentucky law, regardless of the identities, orientations, or 
practices of the applicants, including sexual identities, orientations, and practices. Furthermore, 
Davis’s religious beliefs do not compel her to inquire of such applicants as to any aspects of their 
identities, orientations, or practices beyond the information required to complete the prescribed 
marriage license form.  
                                                 
7  The document attached as Exhibit B was admitted into evidence at the hearing on 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) as Defendant’s Exhibit 1 (“Letter to 
Senator Robertson from Kim Davis”). (Ex. and Witness List (Doc. 25).) 
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Administration of Kentucky Marriage Policy after Obergefell 
24. On June 26, 2015, a five-to-four majority of the United States Supreme Court 
held that democratically-approved laws from Kentucky and three other states, defining marriage 
as the union of one man and one woman, were “invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex 
couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.” 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015). According to the majority, the United States 
Constitution “does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms 
as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.” Id. at 2607.  
25. The same day, Governor Beshear sent a letter to all “Kentucky County Clerks,” 
including Davis, informing them that “[e]ffective today, Kentucky will recognize as valid all 
same sex marriages performed in other states and in Kentucky.” The letter stated that “Kentucky 
. . . must license and recognize the marriages of same-sex couples,” and further instructed that 
“[n]ow that same-sex couples are entitled to the issuance of a marriage license, the Department 
of Libraries and Archives will be sending a gender-neutral form to you today, along with 
instructions for its use.” (A true and correct copy of Governor Beshear’s letter to county clerks is 
attached hereto as Exhibit C.8) 
26. On Governor Beshear’s instructions, the KDLA provided county clerks with a 
new marriage license form, reflecting changes from the prior approved form to accommodate 
same-sex couples.9 Critically, however, the new form retained all references to “marriage,” and 
all references to the name, signature, and authorization requirements of the county clerk. (A true 
                                                 
8  The document attached as Exhibit C was admitted into evidence at the hearing on 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) as Defendant’s Exhibit 4 (“6/26/15 Letter 
from Governor”). (Ex. and Witness List (Doc. 25).). 
9  The post-Obergefell marriage form eliminated references to “bride” and “groom” and 
replaced them with “first party” and “second party. 
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and correct copy of the new KDLA marriage license form is attached hereto as Exhibit D.10) 
Thus, Davis cannot issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple on the new form without 
violating her conscience, as informed by her sincerely held religious beliefs. 
27. Following Governor Beshear’s decree, county clerks across the Commonwealth 
began issuing same-sex marriage licenses. Governor Beshear reiterated, “government officials in 
Kentucky . . . must recognize same-sex marriages as valid and allow them to take place,”11 and 
confirmed that “[s]ame-sex couples are now being married in Kentucky and such marriages from 
other states are now being recognized under Kentucky law.”12 In these same pronouncements, 
Governor Beshear stated that the “overwhelming majority of county clerks” are “iss[uing] 
marriage licenses regardless of gender” and only “two or three” county clerks (of 120) were 
“refusing” to issue such licenses due to their “personal beliefs” and “personal feelings.” 
28. In subsequent pronouncements, Governor Beshear has maintained that county 
clerks must issue marriage licenses, including to same-sex couples, despite any clerk’s “own 
personal beliefs.”13 According to Governor Beshear, the only options available to county clerks 
who oppose issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, even due to conscience or sincerely 
held religious beliefs, are to either issue the licenses in violation of conscience, or resign.14 
                                                 
10  The document attached as Exhibit D was admitted into evidence at the hearing on 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) as Defendant’s Exhibit 3 (“New version of 
marriage license from KDLA after S.Ct. 6/26/15 decision”). (Ex. and Witness List (Doc. 25).). 
11  Press Release, Gov. Beshear Statement on Today’s Meeting with Casey County Clerk, 
dated July 9, 2015, available at http://migration.kentucky.gov/Newsroom /governor/20150707 
statement.htm (last accessed July 29, 2015). 
12  Press Release, Gov. Beshear: No special session needed, dated July 7, 2015, available at 
http://migration.kentucky.gov/Newsroom/governor/20150707statement.htm (last accessed July 
29, 2015); 
13  Gov. Beshear Tells County Clerks to Fulfill Their Duties or Resign, WMKY.com, dated 
July 21, 2015, available at http://wmky.org/post/gov-beshear-tells-county-clerks-fullfill-their-
duties-or-resign (last accessed July 29. 2015). 
14  See supra, n. 13. 
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29. On June 27, 2015, Davis discontinued issuing marriage licenses in Rowan 
County. This was not a “spur-of-the-moment decision” reached by Davis. Rather, after exhorting 
legislators to provide conscience protection for county clerks upon taking office, Davis prayed 
and fasted during the months leading up to Obergefell over how she would respond to such a 
Supreme Court decision. Though Davis’s religious objection is limited to issuing licenses to 
same-sex couples, she suspended the issuance of all licenses to ensure that all individuals and 
couples in Rowan County were treated the same. 
30. On July 8, 2015, Davis sent a letter appealing to Governor Beshear to uphold her 
religious conscience rights, and to call a special session of the Kentucky General Assembly to 
legislatively address the conflict between her religious beliefs and Kentucky marriage policy as 
effected by Governor Beshear. (A true and correct copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 
E.15) Davis has received no response to her letter.  
31. During Davis’s entire tenure in the Rowan County Clerk’s Office, spanning 
nearly thirty years, neither Davis, any deputy clerk, nor Davis’s predecessor in office ever 
asserted a religious objection to performing any other function of the clerk’s office. 
32. The County Judge/Executive of Rowan County, Walter Blevins (“Judge 
Blevins”), would raise no religious objection to issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
under the authority of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.240. However, Judge Blevins has refused to issue a 
marriage license to any of the Plaintiffs in the underlying action against Davis based on his belief 
that Davis’s discontinuation of the issuance of all marriage licenses in Rowan County does not 
                                                 
15  The document attached as Exhibit E was admitted into evidence at the hearing on 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) as Defendant’s Exhibit 5 (“7/8/15 Letter 
from Kim Davis to Governor”). (Ex. and Witness List (Doc. 25).). 
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count as the “absence” of Davis for purposes of the issuance of marriage licenses under Ky. Rev. 
Stat. § 402.40. 
Effect of Governor Beshear’s Administration of Kentucky Marriage Policy 
and the Need for Immediate Relief 
33. Governor Beshear took it upon himself after Obergefell to set and announce new 
Kentucky marriage license policies, and command county clerks to abide by such policies.  
34. Governor Beshear’s policies and directives are specifically targeting clerks like 
Davis who possess certain religious beliefs about marriage. This targeting is demonstrated by the 
exemption Governor Beshear granted to Attorney General Conway when he was unwilling to 
defend Kentucky’s marriage laws—after “pray[ing] over this decision”—pursuant to Conway’s 
own personal beliefs and feelings about “doing what I think is right” and “mak[ing] a decision 
that I could be proud of.” (See supra, n.4.) 
35. Governor Beshear is unlawfully picking and choosing the conscience-based 
exemptions to marriage that he deems acceptable. For instance, when Attorney General Conway 
refused to defend Kentucky’s marriage laws, Beshear did not admonish Conway that “Neither 
your oath nor the Supreme Court dictates what you must believe. But as elected officials, they do 
prescribe how we must act,” but Governor Beshear did so direct county clerks like Davis. (Ex. 
C.) Beshear did not command Conway that “when you accepted this job and took that oath, it 
puts you on a different level,” and “[y]ou have official duties now that the state law puts on you,” 
but he did deliver this command to county clerks like Davis. (See supra, n.13.) Beshear did not 
publicly proclaim that Conway was “refusing to perform [his] duties” and failing to “follow[] the 
law and carry[] out [his] duty,” and should instead “comply with the law regardless of [his] 
personal beliefs,” but he did make this proclamation (repeatedly) about county clerks like Davis 
(See supra, nn. 11, 12.) Beshear did not instruct Conway that “if you are at that point to where 
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your personal convictions tell you that you simply cannot fulfill your duties that you were 
elected to do, than obviously the honorable course to take is to resign and let someone else step-
in who feels that they can fulfill these duties,” but he did issue this instruction to county clerks 
like Davis. (See supra, n.13.) Beshear did not ominously declare that “[t]he courts will deal 
appropriately with” Conway, but he did so declare as to the “two or three” county clerks who are 
not issuing marriage licenses. (See supra, n.12.) 
36. In no uncertain terms, Governor Beshear’s policies and directives are intended to 
suppress religion—even worse, a particular religious belief. Thus, although Attorney General 
Conway was given a pass for his conscience about marriage without any threats of repercussion, 
clerks like Davis are being repeatedly told by their Governor to abandon their religiously-
informed beliefs or resign. In doing so, Governor Beshear is forcing clerks like Davis to choose 
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting her position, on the one hand, and 
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to keep her position, on the other hand. 
37. Citing Governor Beshear’s policies and directives to all county clerks to issue 
licenses to same-sex couples irrespective of their sincerely held religious beliefs, the Plaintiffs in 
the underlying action allege that they are entitled to Kentucky marriage licenses issued 
specifically by Davis, and claim that Davis’s refusal to issue marriage licenses violates their 
constitutional rights. 
38. Governor Beshear’s targeted and discriminatory marriage policy pronouncements 
constitute government-imposed pressure on Davis to act contrary to her religious beliefs, and 
expose Davis to potential liability if she refuses to compromise her religious beliefs and violate 
her conscience. 
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39. Davis needs immediate relief from Governor Beshear’s unlawful policies before 
this Court can properly adjudicate the Plaintiffs’ claims against Davis in the underlying action. 
40. At all relevant times, Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst acted under 
color of state law. 
41. All conditions precedent to the commencement and maintenance of this action 
have been satisfied, have occurred, or have been waived. 
COUNT I 
Third-Party Liability 
42. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of 
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
43. Plaintiffs’ claims against Davis in the underlying action are based on Governor 
Beshear’s unlawful policies and directives to Davis with respect to issuing Kentucky marriage 
licenses, including without limitation the failure of Governor Beshear to uphold and protect 
Davis’s rights of religious conscience.  
44. Governor Beshear is liable to Davis for all of any relief obtained by Plaintiffs 
against Davis in the underlying action. 
45. If the Court determines Plaintiffs are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license 
issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to 
provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to Plaintiffs which does not violate the 
religious conscience rights of Davis. 
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief. 
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COUNT II 
Violation of Kentucky RFRA 
Third-Party Liability 
46. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of 
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
47. Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise. 
48. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, create government-imposed coercive pressure on Davis to change or 
violate her religious beliefs. 
49. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, chill Davis’s religious exercise. 
50. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, expose Davis to liability to Plaintiffs and others. 
51. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, impose a substantial burden on Davis’s religious exercise. 
52. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, further no compelling government interest. 
53. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, are not narrowly tailored to any compelling government interest. 
54. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, are not the least restrictive means of furthering any interest of Kentucky. 
55. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by the Kentucky RFRA. 
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56. Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs
are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to 
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by the Kentucky RFRA. 
57. Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as
effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be 
harmed. 
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief. 
COUNT III 
Violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Free Exercise Clause 
Substantial Burden  
Third-Party Liability 
58. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
59. Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses
to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise. 
60. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, are not neutral. 
61. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, are not generally applicable. 
62. Governor Beshear has targeted and singled out Davis for discriminatory treatment
under Kentucky’s marriage policies, in order to suppress the religious exercise of Davis and 
others. 
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63. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, create government-imposed coercive pressure on Davis to change or 
violate her religious beliefs. 
64. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, chill Davis’s religious exercise. 
65. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, expose Davis to liability to Plaintiffs and others. 
66. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, impose a substantial burden on Davis’s religious exercise. 
67. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, further no compelling government interest. 
68. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, are not narrowly tailored to any compelling government interest. 
69. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, are not the least restrictive means of furthering any interest of Kentucky. 
70. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
71. Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs
are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to 
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by the Free Exercise Clause of 
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the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
72. Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as 
effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be 
harmed. 
 WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief. 
COUNT IV 
Violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Free Exercise Clause 
Intentional Discrimination  
Third-Party Liability 
 
73. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of 
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
74. Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise. 
75. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, make it impossible for Davis to comply with both her religious beliefs and 
Kentucky’s marriage policies. 
76. Governor Beshear has targeted and singled out Davis for discriminatory treatment 
under Kentucky’s marriage policies, in order to suppress the religious exercise of Davis and 
others. 
77. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by the Free Exercise Clause of the 
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First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
78. Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs
are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to 
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
79. Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as
effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be 
harmed. 
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief. 
COUNT V 
Religious Discrimination— 
Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses; Due Process and Equal Protection  
Third-Party Liability 
80. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
81. Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses
to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise. 
82. By design, Governor Beshear allows some religious and conscientious objections
to compliance with Kentucky marriage laws but not others, resulting in discrimination among 
religious objectors. 
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83. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, vest Governor Beshear with unbridled discretion in deciding whether to 
allow exemptions from compliance with Kentucky marriage law to some persons. 
84. Religious liberty is a fundamental right. 
85. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, protect some religious objectors, but not Davis. 
86. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
87. Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs 
are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to 
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
88. Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as 
effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be 
harmed. 
 WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief. 
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COUNT VI 
Violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Freedom of Speech 
Compelled Speech  
Third-Party Liability 
89. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
90. Davis believes and professes that issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples
violates her religious beliefs. 
91. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, would compel Davis to cooperate in activities, through the issuance of 
marriage licenses under her name and approval, that are violations of Davis’s religious beliefs. 
92. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, would compel Davis to state her identification, authorization, and approval 
as “marriage” of same-sex relationships which cannot be “marriage” according to her religious 
beliefs. 
93. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, are not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. 
94. Kentucky’s actions, as effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst,
thus violate Davis’s right to be free from compelled speech as secured to her by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
95. Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs
are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to 
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
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96. Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as 
effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be 
harmed. 
 WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief. 
COUNT VII 
Violation of Article VI of the United States Constitution 
Religious Test  
Third-Party Liability 
97. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of 
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
98. Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise. 
99. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, require persons with religious beliefs like those of Davis to renounce such 
beliefs as a condition to holding the office of county clerk, and thereby impose a religious test as 
a qualification to hold the office of county clerk. 
100. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by Article VI of the United States 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
101. Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs 
are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to 
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Article VI of the United 
States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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102. Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as 
effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be 
harmed. 
 WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief. 
COUNT VIII 
Violation of Sections 1 and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution 
Religious Freedom and Rights of Conscience  
Third-Party Liability 
103. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of 
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
104. Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise. 
105. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, are not neutral. 
106. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, are not generally applicable. 
107. Governor Beshear has targeted and singled out Davis for discriminatory treatment 
under Kentucky’s marriage policies, in order to suppress the religious exercise of Davis and 
others. 
108. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, create government-imposed coercive pressure on Davis to change or 
violate her religious beliefs. 
109. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, chill Davis’s religious exercise. 
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110. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, expose Davis to liability to Plaintiffs and others. 
111. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, impose a substantial burden on Davis’s religious exercise. 
112. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, further no compelling government interest. 
113. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, are not narrowly tailored to any compelling government interest. 
114. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, are not the least restrictive means of furthering any interest of Kentucky. 
115. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights of religious freedom and conscience secured to her 
by Sections 1 and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution. 
116. Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs
are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to 
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Sections 1 and 5 of the 
Kentucky Constitution. 
117. Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as
effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be 
harmed. 
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief. 
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COUNT IX 
Violation of Sections 1 and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution 
Religious Discrimination  
Third-Party Liability 
118. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
119. Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses
to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise. 
120. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, make it impossible for Davis to comply with both her religious beliefs and 
Kentucky’s marriage policies. 
121. Governor Beshear has targeted and singled out Davis for discriminatory treatment
under Kentucky’s marriage policies, in order to suppress the religious exercise of Davis and 
others. 
122. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights against religious discrimination secured to her by 
Sections 1 and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution. 
123. Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs
are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to 
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Sections 1 and 5 of the 
Kentucky Constitution. 
124. Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as
effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be 
harmed. 
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 WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief. 
COUNT X 
Religious Discrimination— 
Violation of Sections 1, 3, and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution 
Religious Preference; Equality  
Third-Party Liability 
125. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of 
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
126. Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise. 
127. By design, Governor Beshear allows some religious and conscientious objections 
to compliance with Kentucky marriage laws but not others, resulting in discrimination among 
religious objectors. 
128. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, vest Governor Beshear with unbridled discretion in deciding whether to 
allow exemptions from compliance with Kentucky marriage law to some persons. 
129. Religious liberty is a fundamental right. 
130. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, protect some religious objectors, but not Davis. 
131. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights to equality and against religious discrimination and 
religious preferences secured to her by Sections 1, 3, and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution. 
132. Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs 
are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to 
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Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Sections 1, 3, and 5 of the 
Kentucky Constitution. 
133. Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as 
effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be 
harmed. 
 WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief 
COUNT XI 
Violation of the Sections 1 and 8 of the Kentucky Constitution 
Freedom of Speech 
Compelled Speech  
Third-Party Liability 
134. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of 
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
135. Davis believes and professes that issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
violates her religious beliefs. 
136. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, would compel Davis to cooperate in activities, through the issuance of 
marriage licenses under her name and approval, that are violations of Davis’s religious beliefs. 
137. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, would compel Davis to state her identification, authorization, and approval 
as “marriage” of same-sex relationships which cannot be “marriage” according to her religious 
beliefs. 
138. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, are not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. 
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139. Kentucky’s actions, as effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst,
thus violate Davis’s right to be free from compelled speech as secured to her by Sections 1 and 8 
of the Kentucky Constitution. 
140. Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs
are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to 
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Sections 1 and 8 of the 
Kentucky Constitution. 
141. Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as
effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be 
harmed. 
WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief. 
COUNT XII 
Violation of Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution 
Religious Test  
Third-Party Liability 
142. Davis realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations of
paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 
143. Davis’s sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit her from issuing marriage licenses
to same-sex couples. Davis’s compliance with her religious beliefs is a religious exercise. 
144. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and
Commissioner Onkst, require persons with religious beliefs like those of Davis to renounce such 
beliefs as a condition to holding the office of county clerk, and thereby impose a religious test as 
a qualification to hold the office of county clerk. 
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145. Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, violate Davis’s rights secured to her by Section 5 of the Kentucky 
Constitution. 
146. Given the foregoing violations of Davis’s rights, if the Court determines Plaintiffs 
are entitled to a Kentucky marriage license issued in Rowan County, then Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst are liable to Davis to provide a means for issuance of marriage licenses to 
Plaintiffs which does not violate the rights of Davis secured to her by Section 5 of the Kentucky 
Constitution. 
147. Absent injunction and declaratory relief against Kentucky’s marriage policies, as 
effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, Davis has been and will continue to be 
harmed. 
 WHEREFORE, Davis prays for relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner 
Onkst as hereinafter set forth in her prayer for relief. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 WHEREFORE, Davis respectfully requests that the Court: 
a. Declare that Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, violate the Kentucky RFRA; 
b. Declare that Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, violate the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and Article VI of the United States Constitution; 
c. Declare that Kentucky’s marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst, violate Sections 1, 3, 5, and 8 of the Kentucky Constitution; 
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d. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of  Kentucky’s
marriage policies, as effected by Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, against
Davis;
e. Impose against or transfer to Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst any relief
obtained by Plaintiffs against Davis in the underlying action;
f. Award Davis the costs of this action and reasonable attorney’s fees; and
g. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
JURY DEMAND 
Davis requests a trial by jury on all issues so triable. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
/s/ Roger K. Gannam  
Roger K. Gannam (Fla. 240450)† 
  rgannam@LC.org 
  court@LC.org 
Jonathan D. Christman (Pa. 306634)† 
  jchristman@LC.org 
LIBERTY COUNSEL 
P.O. BOX 540774 
Orlando, FL 32854-0774 
(800) 671-1776 Telephone
(407) 875-0770 Facsimile
†Admitted pro hac vice
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, Kim Davis 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed via the Court’s 
CM/ECF system, which will effectuate service through the Court’s transmission facilities by 
notice of electronic filing to all counsel or parties of record: 
Daniel J. Canon Jeffrey C. Mando 
L. Joe Dunman Claire Parsons 
Laura E. Landenwich ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & 
CLAY DANIEL WALTON ADAMS, PLC DUSING, PLLC 
462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101 40 West Pike Street 
Louisville, KY 40202 Covington, KY 41011 
dan@justiceky.com jmando@aswdlaw.com 
joe@justiceky.com cparsons@aswdlaw.com 
laura@justiceky.com
Attorneys for Rowan County 
William Ellis Sharp 
ACLU OF KENTUCKY 
315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300 
Louisville, KY 40202 
sharp@aclu-ky.org 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DATED: August 4, 2015 /s/ Roger K. Gannam 
Roger K. Gannam 
Attorney for Defendant Kim Davis 
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AO 441 (Rev. 07/10)  Summons on Third-Party Complaint
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
__________ District of __________ 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff
v. Civil Action  No.
Defendant, Third-party plaintiff
v.
Third-party defendant
SUMMONS ON A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
To: (Third-party defendant’s name and address)
A lawsuit has been filed against defendant , who as third-party plaintiff is making
this claim against you to pay part or all of what the defendant may owe to the plaintiff .
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff and on the defendant an answer to the attached complaint or a
motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The answer or motion must be served on the defendant or
defendant’s attorney, whose name and address are:
It must also be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney, whose name and address are: 
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the third-party
complaint.  You also must file the answer or motion with the court and serve it on any other parties. 
A copy of the plaintiff’s complaint is also attached.  You may – but are not required to – respond to it. 
Date:
CLERK OF COURT
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
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        Eastern District of Kentucky
April Miller, et al.
Kim Davis, et al.
Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky, et al.
0:15-CV-00044-DLB
Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky 
700 Capitol Avenue, Suite 100 
Frankfurt, Kentucky  40601
Kim Davis
April Miller, et al.
Jonathan D. Christman & Roger K. Gannam, Liberty Counsel, P.O. Box 540774, Orlando, Florida 32854 
and 
A.C. Donahue, Donahue Law Group, P.S.C., P.O. Box 659, Somerset, Kentucky 42502
Dan Canon, Joe Dunman, & Laura Landenwich, Clay Daniel Walton Adams, PLC, 462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101, 
Louisville, Kentucky 40202, and 
William Sharp, ACLU of Kentucky, 315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300, Louisville, Kentucky 40202
08/04/2015
AO 441 (Rev. 07/10)  Summons on Third-Party Complaint (Page 2)
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)
was received by me on (date) .
’ I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)
on (date) ; or
’ I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date)  , and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or
’ I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is
 designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)
on (date) ; or
’ I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or
’ Other (specify):
.
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ .
I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
Date:
Server’s signature
Printed name and title
Server’s address
Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
__________ District of __________ 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff
v. Civil Action  No.
Defendant, Third-party plaintiff
v.
Third-party defendant
SUMMONS ON A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
To: (Third-party defendant’s name and address)
A lawsuit has been filed against defendant , who as third-party plaintiff is making
this claim against you to pay part or all of what the defendant may owe to the plaintiff .
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff and on the defendant an answer to the attached complaint or a
motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The answer or motion must be served on the defendant or
defendant’s attorney, whose name and address are:
It must also be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney, whose name and address are: 
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the third-party
complaint.  You also must file the answer or motion with the court and serve it on any other parties. 
A copy of the plaintiff’s complaint is also attached.  You may – but are not required to – respond to it. 
Date:
CLERK OF COURT
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
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        Eastern District of Kentucky
April Miller, et al.
Kim Davis, et al.
Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky, et al.
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Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky 
700 Capitol Avenue, Suite 100 
Frankfurt, Kentucky  40601
Kim Davis
April Miller, et al.
Jonathan D. Christman & Roger K. Gannam, Liberty Counsel, P.O. Box 540774, Orlando, Florida 32854 
and 
A.C. Donahue, Donahue Law Group, P.S.C., P.O. Box 659, Somerset, Kentucky 42502
Dan Canon, Joe Dunman, & Laura Landenwich, Clay Daniel Walton Adams, PLC, 462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101, 
Louisville, Kentucky 40202, and 
William Sharp, ACLU of Kentucky, 315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300, Louisville, Kentucky 40202
08/04/2015
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Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)
was received by me on (date) .
’ I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)
on (date) ; or
’ I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date)  , and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or
’ I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is
 designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)
on (date) ; or
’ I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or
’ Other (specify):
.
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ .
I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
Date:
Server’s signature
Printed name and title
Server’s address
Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:
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Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT ASHLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-44-DLB
APRIL MILLER, et al.  PLAINTIFFS
vs.         ORDER
KIM DAVIS, both individually
and in her official capacity, et al.          DEFENDANTS
***********************
On August 17, 2015, this Court entered an Order (Doc. # 52) denying Defendant
Kim Davis’ motion to stay the Court’s August 12, 2015 Order (Doc. # 43) granting Plaintiffs
a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendant Davis from enforcing her “no marriage
licenses” policy against Plaintiffs.  However, in deference to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Court temporarily stayed its August 12, 2015 Order to give the appellate court
an opportunity to review, on an expedited basis, the August 17, 2015 Order denying the
motion to stay.
Upon review of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(2), governing stays of
injunctions pending appeal, the Court finds it necessary to set an expiration date for the
temporary stay.  Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Court’s temporary stay of its August 17, 2015 Order shall
expire on August 31, 2015, absent an Order to the contrary by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
1
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This 19th day of August, 2015.
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